

Francis Wilcox

Chief of Staff

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955

Preface

by Donald A. Ritchie

The size and role of congressional committee staffs changed very little between the appointment of the first committee clerks in the 1850s and the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Staffs were small. Their responsibilities were limited to handling correspondence, overseeing the printing of committee documents, and setting up the mechanics of public and executive hearings. Generally, they had to rely upon the executive agencies to generate information, reports, and even drafts of speeches on proposed legislation. When Francis O. Wilcox became the first chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947, its staff consisted of one full-time clerk, a half-time clerk, and a half-time secretary. Wilcox then set out to build a professional staff to enable the committee to develop its own sources of information to form independent judgments.

Born in Columbus Junction, Iowa, on April 9, 1908, Francis Wilcox came to the committee after teaching at the University of Louisville, working with the Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of Civilian Defense, and serving as the international relations specialist for the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. In that latter capacity he accompanied Senators [Arthur Vandenberg](#) and [Tom Connally](#) to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in 1945. When the Legislative Reorganization Act authorized committees to appoint professional, nonpartisan staffs, Senators Vandenberg and Connally agreed that Wilcox was the right man to head the Foreign Relations Committee staff. He epitomized the nonpartisan nature of the new staff. As Senator [Bourke Hickenlooper](#) (R-IA) later noted of Wilcox: "I have served with him on the Committee of Foreign Relations since 1948, and I still do not know to what political party he belongs because I have never been politically minded to such an extent as to inquire what his partisan politics may be. I can say honestly that he has never disclosed them to me, voluntarily or involuntarily, and I have never inquired of him. It is sufficient to say that in his service to the committee he has acted not only without partisanship, but also in such a manner as to serve Democrats and Republicans with complete impartiality and intelligent assistance." Appropriately, Francis Wilcox served on the Foreign Relations Committee staff during the zenith of bipartisanship in American foreign policy. Much of his oral history is devoted to discussing the forces and personalities that facilitated such bipartisanship, and that eventually unraveled it. He served under the chairmanships of Arthur Vandenberg, Tom Connally, [Alexander Wiley](#), and [Walter George](#), while the committee was deliberating over such momentous issues as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the formation of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization. After leaving the committee staff in 1955, Wilcox continued a distinguished career in foreign policy. From 1955 to 1960 he was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, a position which gave him a view of policy making from the executive branch's perspective. From 1961 to 1973 he served as dean of the prestigious School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. In 1973 he became executive director of the Committee on Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy and from 1975 to 1984 he was director general of the Atlantic Council of the United States. His books include *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* (with Carl M. Marcy), 1955; *Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy*, 1971; and *The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, 1976. Francis Wilcox died on February 20, 1985.

About The Interviewer: Donald A. Ritchie is associate historian of the Senate Historical Office. A graduate of C.C.N.Y., he received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland. He has taught at the University College of the University of Maryland, George Mason University, and the Northern Virginia Community College, and conducted a survey of automated bibliographical systems for the American Historical Association. He has published several articles on American political and economic history, a book, *James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), and has edited the *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)* for publication by the committee. He has served as an officer of both the Oral History Association and Oral History in the Mid-Atlantic Region (OHMAR), and in 1984 received OHMAR's Forrest C. Pogue Award for significant contributions to the field of oral history.

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Interview #1:
At the Legislative Reference Service
(Wednesday, February 1, 1984)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

RITCHIE: We're interested in what people's experiences were before they came to the Senate, and how they got to the Senate. I was looking through the records and saw that you were born in Columbus Junction, Iowa, and spent your early years in Iowa. I wondered if you could tell me a little about your family and what they did in Columbus Junction?

WILCOX: Well, that was quite accidental in a way, because we lived in the little town of Montrose, Iowa which was 80 miles south of Columbus Junction. My mother, for some reason which I was not then aware of, obviously, went to Columbus Junction for the birth of her baby. This was where my grandparents lived. She went there and I was born in Columbus Junction, although my family actually lived in Montrose, Iowa.

RITCHIE: Was your father a farmer?

WILCOX: My father was a druggist. He owned and managed a drug store in this little town. I worked in the drug store in my off hours from school, and between high school and college I spent a year working there with him. My job was to run the soda fountain part of the drug store, with the ice cream and candy and all those good

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things that drug stores sometimes have. I worked after school and on weekends, trying to help out with the family affairs.

RITCHIE: Did you attend public schools there?

WILCOX: I attended public schools in Montrose, Iowa. As I recall there were 20 students in my graduating class in high school.

RITCHIE: Then you went to the University of Iowa.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: I read a tribute that Senator Thomas Martin gave you when you left the Senate. He said that you were a "brilliant student and an outstanding athlete" there.

WILCOX: Well, you know how senators are, they're inclined to exaggerate sometimes--especially when their constituents are involved--and I think he probably did on this occasion! I did reasonably well in my studies and I wasn't that good an athlete, but I was on the varsity team.

RITCHIE: This was early on in the Depression, in the early 1930s. Did that pose any problem about being in college?

WILCOX: It did, because my parents lost what they had in the Depression, and this meant that I had to work my way through school from the very beginning. As you know, it's not easy to work your way

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through college, but you can if you really try. In a way, I suppose it was a handicap; it was also a discipline because I learned the value of money, certainly, and I learned the value of time. I could get my studies taken care of in a relatively short period of time, because I had to. I did all kinds of things: selling programs at football games, and waiting on tables; you name it and I did it. My first couple of years of graduate work I ran a pawn shop with a student in the law school, and we did fairly well on that. But there were a good many kinds of things that I did--including the job of circulation manager of student publications--to get through school.

RITCHIE: I see that you stayed at the University of Iowa for graduate work.

WILCOX: Yes, for three more years.

RITCHIE: What was it that made you decide to go on--in political science, wasn't it?

WILCOX: Yes, it was in political science. I had intended to go into the law, but because of the financial pressures I was under I decided that I could get a doctor's degree more easily than I could get a law degree because I could teach part-time and work my way through in that way. In the law school this is rather difficult to do, for there aren't the same kinds of opportunities in the law school to earn your way through. So I did that, and I stayed at the

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University of Iowa because I had these opportunities which I wouldn't have had if I had gone elsewhere. I remember that I wrote to a couple of institutions, Princeton in particular. I was interested in going to Princeton to complete my doctor's work, but they wrote back and said I had a very fine record, but they had only two opportunities and those were taken by people who were already on board, therefore they had nothing to offer. So I decided to stay where I was. Then after that I went to Europe for two years. I got a fellowship from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and I was entitled to go anywhere that I wanted to go to take advanced work. So I went to Europe because I had had seven years of training in a provincial situation and I felt that I needed to broaden my horizons a bit. I went to what was then the best school of international relations in the world, the University of Geneva, L'Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales, the graduate institute of international studies. It was at the time when the League of Nations was in its hayday, and I learned a tremendous amount--or so I thought, anyway--in a period of two years. But that's the reason I went abroad. While abroad I decided that since I was there for two years, I might just as well qualify for a degree that would be from another institution. So I took my doctor's degree from the University of Geneva. Not that I was hunting for

degrees particularly, but it seemed to me that it would balance off my credentials a little bit to have an advanced degree from another institution.

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RITCHIE: When you were at Iowa were you in international studies as part of your political science program?

WILCOX: Yes, my field of study was political science, but because the head of the department came to me one day and said that if I wrote my dissertation in local government, he had the money to publish it. Of course, every doctoral candidate is anxious to have his doctor's thesis published, so I said all right, I would do it. I went from county government--I wrote my doctor's dissertation on the financial administration of county government in Iowa, taking Johnson County, Iowa, as a typical case, and it was subsequently published--then I went from local government to international government, you see, in one big jump.

RITCHIE: But you were tending towards international relations while you were at Iowa?

WILCOX: Yes. Because when I got the fellowship to study somewhere else, I decided that this was what I wanted to do. I had taken several courses in international relations, and I became very much interested in that field. So I chose to go abroad then for my postdoctoral work.

RITCHIE: Did you do another dissertation in Geneva?

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WILCOX: Yes. The Ratification of International Conventions. It was published by George Allen and Unwin of London, and was my first book.

RITCHIE: I was curious about the impact of living in Europe in 1933 to 1935, and again in 1937, in such a period of tumult. Do you think that being there then shaped some of your world view?

WILCOX: Oh, there's no question about that. The milieu was an international one, and the graduate institute of international studies, as I said, had the best professors in the world at that time. I became very much interested in the League of Nations and its efforts to work toward world peace. I was there from 1933 until 1935. And, of course, it was a rough time economically. My wife and I got there--we were married just before I left for Europe--we got there in August and some months after that we had word that President Roosevelt had devalued the dollar. That meant that our fellowship was cut almost into half. As a result we had a pretty rough time financing our two years in Europe.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask if you traveled much through Europe while you were there, but that must have held you back.

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WILCOX: We traveled some. We took advantage of vacations and went to Italy, for example, and spent some time in Paris. We did travel a bit, although our limited financial resources meant that we had to keep out traveling to a minimum.

RITCHIE: If you were in Italy did you have a chance to get some sense of Mussolini's impact there?

WILCOX: Yes. The grandeur of Mussolini and the fascist regime was apparent. I remember the people were praising him because he "made the trains run on time." Frankly, at that time, my wife was interested in art, and we spent a good deal of time in Florence and other cities in Italy where art collections are reknowned and very famous. But we did, of course, get to attend the discussions in Geneva centered around Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, just before I left Geneva. Of course, that stirred up a lot of concern and question and comment. I remember coming back to the United States and I wrote a series of articles for the paper in Iowa City, where I had gone to school, on the Ethiopian situation.

RITCHIE: What paper was that?

WILCOX: The *Daily Iowan*.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of the League of Nations, when you had a chance to watch it in action?

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WILCOX: I suppose like all young people imbued with a certain amount of optimism and hope about the future and about the maintenance of world peace and avoiding another war, I studied the League of Nations with a great deal of interest and hope. I read a great many books about it at that time. The library of the Institute was a very good one and it had many, many volumes on the League of Nations and its weaknesses, its strengths, its hopes, and its aspirations. I read many of those with a great deal of interest. Also, some of the classes were centered primarily on the work of the League of Nations. So I obviously became very much interested in that aspect of world affairs.

RITCHIE: So your feeling at that time was that the League of Nations was performing, it was working?

WILCOX: Well, we watched with hope. And, of course, when the situation in Manchuria developed in 1931 as it did, and then the one in Ethiopia in 1935, we began to have some reservations obviously, as people now have reservations about the United Nations and its capacity to keep world peace. It did not have the means at its disposal, the required will on the part of the states that were members, and the willingness to put down aggression where it occurred.

RITCHIE: Do you think that your experiences watching the League of Nations shaped the way you thought about the United Nations when it was founded?

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WILCOX: Yes. I remember drawing up a list of lessons from the League of Nations as we were studying the UN Charter: what were the weaknesses of the League of Nations and to what extent did they charter of the United Nations take into account those weaknesses. So there was no question but what my interest in international organization was stimulated greatly by my experience in Geneva.

RITCHIE: You went back to Europe in 1937 for your Ph.D. at the Hague?

WILCOX: Not for my Ph.D. I went back there for a summer at the Hague Academy of International Law, which is known all over the world for its work in the field of international law. I had a fellowship to go there for the summer. So I spent some time in Berlin and some time at the Hague.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Berlin in 1937?

WILCOX: Well, you couldn't help but feel that Hitler's efforts were moving the world toward a very serious situation. I remember going down one of the main streets, maybe the Unterdenlinden, I'm not sure now, and seeing great big signs: "Give Me Four Years Time." This was what Hitler was saying in 1937. And, of course, you know what happened in less than four years' time: he had the world at war. So, yes, you couldn't help but feel a great concern about the

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future of Naziism and what this was going to do to Germany and the world, because Hitler's aggressive tactics had already been clearly demonstrated.

RITCHIE: The United States at this time was going through a great debate between internationalism and isolationism. I assume, from your experiences, you tended towards an internationalist view. Is that true, or did you have reservations about America's role in the world?

WILCOX: Well, when you saw the nature of the Hitler regime and the philosophy that characterized its leaders, you couldn't help but feel that this thing had to be stopped some way, otherwise its aggressive designs would either destroy the world or have tremendous adverse impact upon the world. So when Hitler invaded Poland, everybody obviously had to be deeply concerned, and I think the only question then was when and how the United States might become involved, whether we wanted to be involved or not. It was inevitable almost that we should be. We learned two big lessons from World War I and World War II--one big lesson--and that is that if you want to prevent war, the only way to do it is to have those nations interested in keeping the peace band together as we did in the North Atlantic Treaty and say to the world in advance that we would stand together to defend ourselves against possible aggression. That had not been done before World War II, or before World War I. I'm sure that the

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Kaisar would not have launched World War I, and Hitler would not have launched World War II had they been convinced, had they been aware of the probability that the United States would be involved. I think they would have not dared to embark upon hostilities.

RITCHIE: You came from an area, Iowa, that was strongly isolationist. Did you find yourself drawn into any of the debates or did you feel any kind of tension over differences of opinion?

WILCOX: No. On the university campus people tend to be a little more outgoing, a little more liberal, maybe, if I can use that term. A little more internationalist in their approach. Besides, I left Iowa in 1933, and then I did not

go back. I went from Geneva to the University of Louisville to begin my teaching career.

RITCHIE: I just wondered in terms of your personal contacts, family and friends who were still in Iowa?

WILCOX: Well, they're inclined to be a little more conservative in their approach toward world affairs I think, generally, and this is true of the Middle West. I often remind my friends here in Washington there's an awful lot of territory out there, there's an awful lot of economic activity, and this is a tremendously important part of our country, and they shouldn't think that the Atlantic seaboard is the only important place to be. They tend to be a little more isolationist, perhaps.

RITCHIE: When you came back you went to the University of Louisville. How did you happen to locate there?

WILCOX: Well, I located there because I wrote about seventy-five or eighty letters from Geneva to heads of departments of political science in this country, looking for a job. I was not able to find one. I had many nice letters back saying I had a wonderful record, but they had no job opportunities, they were sorry and so on. But one of my former colleagues at the University of Iowa was asked to be the head of the political science department at the University of Louisville. He wrote me and asked if I would come and join him. He said he would handle the national government and the local problems, political parties and matters of that kind, and I would handle the international affairs, American foreign policy, and international relations. Of course, I agreed. The salary was a magnificent two thousand dollars a year, but I was delighted to have it. And we saved money in the process! That's the way I got the job.

RITCHIE: I'm also curious about your teaching about the world in the late 1930s. Did you find yourself getting involved in discussing the international scene as it was unfolding, and the question of the United States' future role?

WILCOX: Oh, yes, of course. In the teaching of international relations and international organizations, the role of the United States obviously came up. There was a good deal of talk about the

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fact that the Senate had refused to approve the Treaty of Versailles. As a result, we had not become a member of the League of Nations. Would the world be different if we had joined the League of Nations and cast our lot with the other countries in an attempt to maintain peace? There was a good deal of talk along those lines in the classroom, and to a certain extent outside. I found a good deal of interest in international relations in the Louisville Women's Club, the Rotary, and the other clubs in the city, and I spoke frequently to them.

RITCHIE: Did you find much America First sentiment among the undergraduates?

WILCOX: Not much at that time, no. I don't think so.

RITCHIE: You pursued an academic career from 1935 to 1942. I noticed that you were a visiting professor at the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan. Did you envision that your career would basically be an academic one?

WILCOX: Yes, my assumption was that it would be. I had thought when I was at the University of Iowa that if I had a full professorship at some good university with a salary of three thousand dollars a year I'd be very happy; that I could buy a house, have a family, and get along very well with a salary of that kind. So I had assumed that my background was such that I would be in the teaching

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field the rest of my life. I did spend a year at the University of Chicago as a visiting fellow. I also taught a graduate seminar at the University of Michigan one summer.

RITCHIE: I see then that in 1942 you came to Washington, and I assume that that had to do with the war. What was it, and who was it, that brought you to Washington?

WILCOX: Well, a friend of mine who is now at the University of Indiana, was with Nelson Rockefeller in the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs Office here in Washington and he wrote me and said that he had a job in his division that he wished I would take. I decided that I did want to get more directly into the war effort, so I came here and my first job was with Nelson Rockefeller. Walter Laves was the individual, now retired from the University of Indiana, who had invited me to come. I felt that the world situation being what it was, I wanted to be involved in a more specific way in the war effort. So I took leave of absence and came to Washington. I intended to stay a year, and I guess I'll have to say the year isn't up yet.

RITCHIE: What did you do at the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs?

WILCOX: Our job was to do what we could to help the American people understand the nature of the war, and the relationship of the

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Latin American countries to that war effort. We prepared and distributed pamphlets on the war effort and on the role of the Latin countries, the problem of raw materials, and facilities, access to bases, and things of that sort, that helped our people understand better the nature of the conflict that we were in, the global nature of it, and the very positive, constructive role the Latin American countries were playing in that effort.

RITCHIE: Was this a State Department agency?

WILCOX: No, it was a separate agency at the time. It was a war agency. It was related to the State Department in that our tasks were somewhat comparable, but it was not a part of the State Department.

RITCHIE: Did you see much of Nelson Rockefeller at that time?

WILCOX: Not a great deal, because I was down the ladder a little. I saw some of him, and I saw more of him at the United Nations Conference in 1945 in San

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Francisco. But I didn't see a great deal of him at that time because he was the boss and I was pretty far down the stepladder.

RITCHIE: He was a pretty young man at that time.

WILCOX: Yes, quite young.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of him?

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WILCOX: A very good impression. I had the feeling all along that he had many of the qualities that we needed in the White House, and I supported him at the time he ran for office. I had great admiration for him. When he was vice president he was a member of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, which I was the director of. He was an excellent member. I thought his questions were very good, timely, well expressed, and I had great admiration for him.

RITCHIE: How did you find moving to Washington in 1942? I gather that the city was pretty hectic and crowded and growing rapidly because of the war.

WILCOX: My friend wired me to the effect that a friend of his was moving from his apartment in Washington and if I wanted it he could get it for me, but I had to respond right away. So sight unseen we took an apartment in Washington. It was hectic, of course. The rationing problem, the traffic problem, the housing problem, but we enjoyed it very much.

RITCHIE: There was the exhilaration, I guess, as well.

WILCOX: Yes, yes.

RITCHIE: Most people who came at that time always talk about the housing problem.

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WILCOX: Yes, the housing problem was a serious one, and we were glad to get whatever was available.

RITCHIE: After you worked for the Office of Coordination of Inter-American Affairs, you moved to the Office of Civilian Defense, in 1943. How did you make that switch?

WILCOX: The Office of Civilian Defense was engaged in the same kind of thing that we were engaged in, a kind of public relations activity in trying to develop a better understanding of the war effort in the country. This was a broader-gauged sort of thing and it seemed natural that our operation should become a part of the Office of Civilian Defense. We broadened our approach towards the war and towards the public understanding of the war.

RITCHIE: When did you get to the Office of Civilian Defense? I was wondering if James Landis was still the director when you were there?

WILCOX: Yes, Jim Landis was still the head of it.

RITCHIE: I'm interested because I wrote a biography of James Landis.

WILCOX: Oh, really? Yes, he was still there.

RITCHIE: Did you have any dealings with him?

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WILCOX: Some, not a great deal. He was a pretty good administrator. I didn't have any very extensive contacts with him, again because I was not a senior member of the administrative team. But he seemed to be doing a good job in the Civilian Defense organization and certainly he was a very capable man, there's no question about it.

RITCHIE: He was something of a difficult man to work with.

WILCOX: A difficult man, yes, he had his peculiarities. But he was an able lawyer and an able person.

RITCHIE: The Office of Civilian Defense was one of the most controversial assignments that he had, because it had to cover so much and it got bad publicity when Mrs. Roosevelt was organizing lunchtime dancing on the roof of the headquarters.

WILCOX: That's right.

RITCHIE: Which division did you work under? I know that U.S. Grant III and Jonathan Daniels ran two of the divisions at OCD.

WILCOX: Walter Laves was the head of the division that I worked in and I was associate director. Our job, as I said, was to help to develop a better understanding of the war effort among our people. We accomplished that working through the local defense

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councils, and working with the media, and issuing pamphlets of one kind or another. It was a public relations job.

RITCHIE: Did you know Frances Knight at all at that time? She became head of the Passport Office later, but she was handling public relations for the OCD.

WILCOX: I didn't know her very well at that time. I knew her better later on when she was in the State Department.

RITCHIE: It was an interesting agency in that it brought together a lot of very different types of people.

WILCOX: Well, that's understandable, because a lot of people were interested in helping with the war effort, and you had to find places for them, where they could fit in and do something constructive and helpful.

RITCHIE: In 1943 Landis left to go to the Middle East. His feeling was that the threat of attack on the United States had diminished and the functions of the Office of Civilian Defense really were beginning to phase out. I see that you also left after a relatively short time there.

WILCOX: Yes, because as a matter of fact our activity was terminated. The budget was cut and our activity was considerably

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reduced. I joined the Bureau of the Budget at that time. It was then called the Bureau of the Budget, it's now the Office of Management and Budget.

RITCHIE: How did you wind up in the Bureau of the Budget?

WILCOX: Well, they were looking for somebody in the field of international relations to tackle the problem of future foreign aid programs and that kind of thing, and international organization coming out of the war. This was something that interested me. There was a small group under Sherman Shepherd that was concerned with this problem, in the division of management under Don Stone. We had a very capable group of fairly young people who had been interested in international affairs, most of them coming from the academic world. We worked together beautifully as a team, and I enjoyed my work there very much. What we did was to try to help various agencies of the government organize themselves to do a more effective job in the international field.

RITCHIE: You were specifically planning for American expenditures for foreign aid?

WILCOX: Our job wasn't so much in the expenditure field, the appropriation field, as it was in the management field, how to organize, how to run, and how to manage the different activities that were being carried on. Some of the departments and agencies had been

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set up rather quickly, you see, as part of the war effort. They needed to settle down and to think through more carefully how they could do their jobs better. This was our task, to give them advice and counsel.

RITCHIE: I looked at the Bureau of the Budget records for the years when Landis was head of the Civil Aeronautics Board after the war, and the Bureau of the Budget did a major study of how that board operated and made very strong recommendations about how it could improve its operations. I hadn't realized how much the Bureau of the Budget did in terms of analyzing structure and work flow and all the rest. Unfortunately, very few of the proposals for that agency were actually adopted.

WILCOX: Well, you had to assume that your recommendations might or might not be accepted by the agency involved, but we had a fairly good batting average. We assumed that if one-third of our proposals were accepted and put into practice that would not be too bad.

RITCHIE: Did you find that most of your work was oriented toward State Department activities?

WILCOX: A good deal of it had to do with State Department activities, the organization of the State Department and the foreign service and other areas of concern to the State Department, foreign economic programs, that sort of thing.

RITCHIE: Well, then in 1945 you moved to the Legislative Reference Service at the Library of Congress, which was the forerunner of the current Congressional Research Service.

WILCOX: Before that I went in the Navy.

RITCHIE: Oh, you did go in the service?

WILCOX: The Navy wanted me to help with their training program. Since I had been in the teaching field, they thought that my talents could be used there,

whatever they were. So I went in BUPERS, the Bureau of Personnel, to help with the training program. I was there for a little over a year.

RITCHIE: So you were in uniform?

WILCOX: Yes. Here in Washington.

RITCHIE: What was your rank?

WILCOX: I reached the exalted rank of Lieutenant, j.g. My eyes weren't good enough to go to sea, so they put me in the training program, and I was there for thirteen months. My first job was to

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take a good look at the thirty-five cooks and bakers schools in the Navy and recommend a curriculum or program of study for them! Just as I was about to be promoted, Ernest Griffith from the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress came and asked my commanding officer if he could take me out of the Navy and put me with the Legislative Reference Service. My first job there would be to go to San Francisco to attend the United Nations Conference as advisor to the congressional members of the delegation. I thought that was a much better opportunity than I had in the Navy and I agreed to go with the Legislative Reference Service. I went to the conference with Senator [Tom] Connally and Senator [Arthur] Vandenberg, the two members of the delegation from the Senate, and helped them with their work at San Francisco. It was an interesting experience, and very exhilarating. Everybody was hopeful that we could develop the kind of international organization that would help keep the peace. I think everybody recognized that this would require the cooperation of the great powers, that it would depend to a large extent on what the Soviet Union might be willing to do, but nevertheless there was a hope that out of World War II could come the beginnings of a new era where the kind of cooperation that had won the war might result in winning the peace. So people were hopeful.

RITCHIE: Had you known Ernest Griffith earlier, that he specifically sought you out for this assignment?

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WILCOX: Yes, I had known him. I had known him because of my relations in the academic world, and also because he belonged to the same church that I belonged to, the Metropolitan Memorial Methodist Church here in Washington.

RITCHIE: And so he assigned you to go as Tom Connally's assistant?

WILCOX: Yes. I was assistant to both of the senators. More to Senator Connally in a way because he was then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but also Senator Vandenberg. Since they had no money to pay me from the Foreign Relations Committee, I was loaned to the committee from the Library of Congress for this purpose. After the conference I was fairly well equipped to help get the Charter through the Senate, to help with the Senate debate, and the preparation of the committee report, organize the hearings, and all the other things the Senate had to do with the United Nations Charter. It was a very interesting and exciting time, of course.

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RITCHIE: The reason I ask is that I was looking at Connally's memoirs [*My Name is Tom Connally* (New York, 1954)] and there's a line in there where he says that people thought Senator Vandenberg had brought Francis Wilcox on the staff, but he was actually my staff man two years earlier at the United Nations Conference.

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WILCOX: Well, there is a little story about that, which may be of some interest. As I have said, Ernest Griffith loaned me to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I served as consultant to the committee for two years. I was not the staff director, although in fact I did direct the professional work of what staff there was. At the end of the two-year period, the election, of course, returned the Senate majority to the Republicans and Senator Vandenberg took Senator Connally's place as chairman. Senator Connally said to me one day: "Would you like to be the committee staff director? We're going to set up a new staff. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as you know, we're entitled to set up a professional staff." I replied that I hadn't thought about it, but it would be interesting and I would be glad to consider that. He said, "I think I can talk Old Van"--that's the way he referred to Senator Vandenberg--"I think I can talk Old Van into it. I'll see what I can do." Well, the next day, before Senator Connally had a chance to talk to Senator Vandenberg about me, the senator from Michigan called me in and asked me if I would like to become the director of his new staff. I immediately accepted the invitation. This meant, in effect, that Senator Connally was under the impression that he had gotten me the job, and I was therefore his man; and Senator Vandenberg had asked me, regardless of what Senator Connally had said or done after the event. So, in effect, I was more or less welcomed by both the Senate committee leaders, which put me in a very good

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position, because I was a good friend of Senator Connally and also of Senator Vandenberg. There's nothing more helpful to a Senate staff member than to be *persona grata* to both majority and minority leaders.

RITCHIE: Going back to the United Nations Conference in the spring of 1945, John Foster Dulles also went along as an advisor to the Senate delegation.

WILCOX: Yes. He was a senior advisor to the delegation.

RITCHIE: Were you and he the only two Senate advisors?

WILCOX: Oh, they had a number of technical advisors, of course, in all fields. I don't know how big our delegation was, but Senator Dulles--Mr. Dulles later became senator--Foster Dulles was a senior advisor and consultant, and I was only a junior member of the delegation. But there were, of course, quite a few advisors all together. I'd say there were twenty-five or thirty people who attended the meetings of the United States delegation each day. But there were a good many other junior advisors who did not attend those meetings. I was privileged to attend them all, and therefore kept in close touch with what was going on. I attended the meetings of Committee Three, and the meetings of Committee One,

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which Senator Connally was assigned to, and helped him with whatever needed to be done in preparation for these meetings and in preparation for the

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meetings of the United States delegation--working with State Department people, of course.

RITCHIE: That whole bringing in of senators onto the delegation really was a break-through for American executive-legislative relations, as opposed to what had happened after World War I. But I wondered, how did a senator function as a representative of the executive? Did they have any kind of independent line, or were they basically presented with the State Department's program?

WILCOX: Well, Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg had served with Secretary [Cordell] Hull and later Secretary [Edward] Stettinius in advising the department officials, the secretary, and the president, on the future organization of the international community. This was, I think, an attempt on the part of the administration to avoid the difficulties that we had encountered in 1919 after the war, in connection with the Treaty of Versailles, when President Wilson didn't consult adequately with members of the Senate and the Treaty of Versailles was rejected. So this was an attempt to avoid that difficulty and to share the responsibility, share the power at that time, with the members of the Senate who would be responsible for getting the charter through the Senate. It obviously worked very well because both the House and the Senate were represented at San Francisco and the members took a very active part in the work of the United States delegation. The conference was a great success. We

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came back to Washington and the two senators were recognized as the authorities in the Senate on the Charter; they had been through all the negotiations, they knew the attitude of the Russians and the other delegations there. So there was no real problem getting it through the Senate--through the Foreign Relations Committee first and then the Senate afterwards.

RITCHIE: Of course, it sort of blurred the whole distinction between the branches and the system of checks and balances to have legislative representatives in basically an executive function.

WILCOX: Yes, I suppose it did. I think that later on this was done to a certain extent. Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally spent two hundred and thirteen days--as I recall--with Secretary of State [James] Byrnes, negotiating the peace treaties with the satellite countries. I think they found, however, that this took them away from their Senate duties too long at a time, and after that there was a tendency not to get involved in these lengthy negotiations, whereby two senators would go on the delegation to the United Nations General Assembly every other year, and two House members would go in the off-election year. That I think was a very good arrangement, which made a good many senators and congressmen much more aware of what the United Nations was and how it

operated. It helped them both on the Senate floor and in the committees in dealing with United Nations problems and international affairs generally. So
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it's a good thing it seems to me to have this kind of legislative executive cooperation. You might say it's not in keeping with our philosophy of separation of powers, but it's a very good thing for both branches of government, I think, to have this kind of relationship. Even though on the whole the relationship is supposed to be an adversary one, you can still be an adversary and be involved in cooperation at certain stages.

RITCHIE: I was looking through *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* [(Boston, 1952)] that there were morning briefings at the Pent-House, which is what he called Stetinius' hotel rooms. Were those the marching orders for the day? Strategy sessions for how to proceed?

WILCOX: No, the Pent-House meetings that he referred to were closed meetings, not open to the whole delegation. They were, I think, for the most part only the members of the delegation proper, or maybe even a part of them, the two senators and House members involved. There were a few of those, and they were very restricted, to settle certain policy issues that they did not want to bring up before the total delegation.

RITCHIE: Connally worked on the committee dealing with the Security Council, and much of its debate centered around the veto power.

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WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: But eventually the Soviets excepted the American formula for the veto.

WILCOX: Yes, they did but with some reservations.

RITCHIE: Were you involved in the deliberations on that?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. These problems were discussed very often in the meetings of the delegation. The veto and the Security Council problem was one that came up for considerable discussion. I wrote a piece for the *American Political Science Review* about this a little bit later, but the question was whether we would have a charter with the veto or no charter at all. I think the members of the Senate felt that on the critical issues involving the use of armed forces and on very important substantive issues, the United States would require a veto. Otherwise I think it is very doubtful that the Senate would have approved the charter. So it was agreed that there would be a veto, although the final result was an arrangement whereby procedural questions could be settled on a qualified majority basis, and the substantive issues would require the concurring votes of the five permanent members.

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RITCHIE: Senator Connally described in his memoir a dramatic scene in which some of the smaller country delegates were objecting to the veto. He stood up apparently and ripped up a copy of the charter. Were you there when he did that?

WILCOX: Yes, I was there. He was very dramatic, you know, he had a very dramatic approach to political questions anyway. Somebody said he was the only senator who really looked like a senator. But he, in a very dramatic way, said to the members of the UN Committee, "If you want a charter, you can have a charter with the veto or no charter at all." And he tore up the charter in a very dramatic gesture. I think the smaller countries realized that in the Assembly, where the veto did not prevail, they had an advantaged position, too, because they each had one vote. That gave them an advantaged position in the Assembly, whereas the great powers had an advantaged position in the Security Council. So they considered it a reasonably fair trade.

RITCHIE: The irony was that the United States waited thirty years before casting its first veto, and the Soviet Union immediately took advantage of it.

WILCOX: Yes, this was because the United States had pretty general control over what went on in the United Nations in the first fifteen years, at least. We could always count on the support of Latin American countries, our Western European allies, and certain

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other countries. With the exception of the Soviet bloc we had almost unanimous support in the organization. But that changed with the admission of all the new countries from Asia and Africa. They began to throw their weight around and our position changed drastically.

RITCHIE: So, when you came back from that conference you stayed on as consultant to the committee. Did you work actually at the Legislative Reference Service at all, or were you almost entirely with the committee?

WILCOX: Well, I had an office in the Library of Congress, but I did a good deal of my work with the committee because I was attending hearings, preparing reports, and dealing with members of the Senate who were concerned about the charter. I was considered the legislative expert on that subject, since my teaching days had been involved in League of Nations affairs, and since I had been at the San Francisco conference. So I was able to do quite a little in helping to develop a better understanding among the senators of what had gone on at San Francisco and what the United Nations Charter was all about.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me a little bit about what the Legislative Reference Service was like at that stage? It was obviously a very small operation.

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WILCOX: It was a relatively small operation. I was the first of the new senior advisors that were created at the end of the war: one on military affairs, one on education, one on agriculture, one on health, one on foreign policy, etc. In the early days of the service, when I was there, one of our big problems was to develop among the members of the House and the Senate a feeling of confidence

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in our work. This was a new organization, a new institution. There was some thought that maybe the "brain trusters," as we were called, would attempt to dominate the Senate and the House in some fashion. We had to justify our existence by demonstrating our objectivity, our sincerity, and our intellectual integrity, and to develop effective working relations with the committees of the Congress. This was one of our problems in the early days. It didn't take long-- Congress realized they needed expert help--for them to develop confidence in our ability and in our work. As time went on, of course, the demands increased, the inquiries from the House and Senate grew by leaps and bounds, and the staff, of course, was increased quite substantially.

RITCHIE: You were spending a lot of time with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Did you have a counterpart who was working with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, or did you handle that as well?

WILCOX: Well, at that point the House wasn't heavily involved in United Nations activities, treaties being handled by the Senate.

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The House committee did develop a professional staff, but they weren't involved particularly in the United Nations activities that we spoke of. They were heavily involved in the Marshall Plan and in the Greek-Turkish aid program, and important legislation of that kind, but they were not heavily involved in the work of the United Nations. Boyd Crawford was the staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and we did work closely with him on various problems.

RITCHIE: Wasn't it really just in the appropriations process that they had a role at all in foreign affairs?

WILCOX: Yes. They certainly didn't get involved in the charter of the United Nations at the early stage. They did later in authorizing funds for the work of the UN and the specialized international organizations.

RITCHIE: You said you were working as a consultant for the committee. What was the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee like in 1946, before the Reorganization Act?

WILCOX: Oh, it was a really big staff. We had a clerk, Bob Shirley, who taught at the University of Maryland half-time. He was the chief clerk. We had an assistant clerk, Emmett O'Grady, who could take dictation and type, run a stenotype machine, and take care of the office generally. And we had a secretary from Senator

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Connally's office, who devoted half her time to the committee. That was the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now, you can see, at that point there could be no adversary relationship between the two branches of government, because most of the professional work clearly had to be done in the Department of State or in the government somewhere. Speeches had to be written there; committee reports to the Senate were prepared by the executive branch; there was no mechanism really by which the Senate could act independently, or could bring to

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bear the kind of helpful advice and counsel that a professional staff could bring. This meant that the Senate committee turned customarily to the executive branch for help. It wasn't until we had created the professional staff that the Senate was in a position to develop an independent judgment of its own, based upon its own sources of information. Of course, in foreign policy the Congress has to get much of the information it needs from the executive branch anyway, but nevertheless you can see that with a staff of only three--two and a half people--the Senate committee could not function very effectively.

RITCHIE: I know the records for the Foreign Relations Committee for most of the 1930s can be fitted into one folder, and someone said the only reason they had that one folder was because it fell down between two file cabinets. We have almost nothing in terms of decent documentation of what the committee was doing at that time. Part of

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it may be that there really wasn't any generation of independent records. What was your impression when you got there and found that the staff was so small?

WILCOX: Well, I found that they needed some help, obviously, and when I was asked to set up the staff we were entitled to hire four professional people under the congressional Reorganization Act, which I proceeded to do. We approached our task in a careful way, not attempting to do too much too soon. But the fact is that shortly after the end of the war, there came a flood of treaties and legislation that needed the attention of the Senate, and the prompt action of the Senate and the House. It was obviously a good thing that we had the beginnings of a staff at that time, because otherwise the Foreign Relations Committee would have been completely flooded. We had the United Nations Charter, the peace treaties with the satellite countries, the peace treaty with Japan, the program of aid to Greece and Turkey, the interim aid program, the Marshall Plan, the NATO Treaty, and a whole host of important issues, including the specialized agencies of the UN--with the exception of the Bank and the Fund which had been approved earlier. But we had a whole host of important issues before the Senate and the House that constituted the base, the pillars for our postwar international relationships.

RITCHIE: When you were appointing these people, did any of the senators make suggestions as to whom you should hire?

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WILCOX: No. Senator Vandenberg said to me, "You go hire the best people you can find. I don't want to have anything to say about it. But remember"--with a twinkle in his eye--"I'm holding you responsible." This was obviously a good way to handle the matter, because I was in a position then not to have to take people recommended by other members of the committee, but to go and find the best people who were equipped intellectually and by training to do a good job for the committee, and this is what I proceeded to do.

RITCHIE: Where did you look? Did you look in the State Department, or in the universities?

WILCOX: Yes, both. In a situation like that you tend to turn to those that you know and seek information. We borrowed Carl Marcy from the Department of State for a year or two, and he liked it so much that he decided to stay on. He was very good. We borrowed Frank Valeo from the Legislative Reference Service, and he was with the committee for several years. We borrowed Thorsten Kalijarvi, who had been in the academic world, and he was with us for a period of time. Dick Heindel, who later went to the University of Pennsylvania was another early staff member, as was Alwyn Freeman who later went to the UN. We borrowed Morella Hanson from the Legislative Reference Service. We borrowed her, and she was so good she stayed. So, it depended upon whom we could find among qualified people who were available--individuals who had had some experience in the field

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related to the work of the Foreign Relations Committee. But I hasten to say, I did not inquire of any of them whether they were Republican or Democrat. I just hired the people who could do the job.

RITCHIE: And you never felt any pressure from the committee?

WILCOX: No, not the slightest.

RITCHIE: In 1946, George Galloway was working with Senator La Follette and Congressman Monroney on the Legislative Reorganization Act. Did you have any dealings with him at that time, or make any suggestions, or work at all on the act?

WILCOX: Yes. I knew George Galloway very well and talked with him on various occasions about the problems of organization and the relations of the Congress to the executive branch. He wrote a very good book on that subject.

RITCHIE: Did you make some suggestions based on what you were seeing going on in the Foreign Relations Committee?

WILCOX: Yes, sure. We talked as professionals one to another and I think we both profited greatly. His rich experience on Capitol Hill was such that he had a good many ideas. We exchanged views about executive-legislative relations, and about the organization of the committee and its relationship to other committees on Capitol Hill, to the Legislative Reference Service, and to the various

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departments of the government. George was a very competent scholar, and an able observer and analyst.

RITCHIE: Did the reorganization work out the way you had hoped it would?

WILCOX: Yes. I think so--with some exceptions. It was our feeling that we did not need to duplicate all of the offices and bureaus in the Department of State or in the United States government. We felt that the principal task of the professional members of the staff was to organize hearings, to arrange meetings, to develop the kinds of questions that should be asked of the executive branch people, and to furnish the committee with basic background data that they needed to make good, sound judgments. We did not think it was necessary to have a large staff. We got along reasonably well--despite the heavy legislative

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burden--with four top professional staff people. I recognize that as time has gone by, the over-all legislative burden has increased in the Senate and the House, and senators need more staff help to keep up with this ever increasing load.

Eventually, of course, they did decide to provide minority members of the committee with special staff assistants. This departed from what I thought was an important aspect of staff organization, namely the capacity of staff members, and their willingness to serve both Democrats and Republicans with equal ability and interest. But, of course, when the minority members

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asked for special assistance, this began to increase the size of the staff. Then special subcommittees were set up, and staff was provided for those activities. So now, the staff is much larger than it was. Indeed, there is quite a lot of complaint in Washington that the staff members on Capitol Hill are running things, that there are too many of them, that they stimulate debate and discussion, and they prepare resolution and legislation that wouldn't be introduced if it weren't for their ambitious interest in moving ahead. There is a lot of criticism, as you know, about the increasing size of the staff on Capitol Hill. I don't mean to be critical myself, for I can see some justification for increases; I'm just explaining the striking difference between 1947 and 1984.

RITCHIE: Do you think that you were successful in creating a bipartisan staff in part because there was a bipartisan feeling on the committee?

WILCOX: Yes, undoubtedly. Of course, one of the factors, I think, was the fact that I was persona grata to both Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg, and it became a kind of tradition. I served under Vandenberg, Connally, and [Alexander] Wiley, then [Walter] George of Georgia. I served under two Democrats and two Republicans as chief of staff. We tried to develop a tradition along those lines, and it did last for a number of years, but then for reasons which I have explained, the situation did change. If I may go back

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and tell you how I got to be "chief of staff"--when Senator Vandenberg asked me to take over the staff responsibility, he said, "Well, what will we call you?" I said, "Oh, staff director or executive director." He said, "It's got to be more important than that. I want to make an impression on the State Department. How about chief of staff. That sounds bigger and better and stronger." I replied, "Well, that sounds a little too military. I don't know, I thought that maybe just staff director would be enough." "No, " he said, "I want you to be an important figure. Let's call you chief of staff." So we settled on chief of staff.

RITCHIE: Do you think it made any difference in your relations with the State Department?

WILCOX: No, I don't think so.

RITCHIE: How *did* the State Department react to having a professional staff on the committee?

WILCOX: There was some question at first. I know when Senator Connally asked the State Department for permission to take me to the United Nations conference in San Francisco, three fairly important members of the State Department staff objected. They thought it would be unwise to take a congressional staff member to San Francisco. Dean Acheson, who was then Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, talked to Senator Connally about it. Senator

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Connally explained his position, and Dean Acheson said, "Senator, whatever you want, we'll do." So he went to the State Department and made arrangements for me to go to San Francisco. I think when it was all over, they all felt that it was helpful to have me there because they could not sit on the Senate floor, as I could, and help the senators during the debate. Consequently, it was very advantageous to the State Department, and they began to realize that as time went on, the staff could be very helpful to the Senate and to the administration. If they maintained the proper relationship between State and Capitol Hill and helped the senators to understand foreign relations problems better, this could be very helpful to the executive. But after that, my relations were consistently quite good.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask whether you ever felt any resistance from the State Department in dealing with a staff person rather than dealing with the senator himself?

WILCOX: Well, as time has gone on this has become a real problem. At that time, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations would come to see me and talk with me about problems relating to the Senate and the committee. We could work things out together in the mutual interest of both the Senate and the State Department. I don't think there was any resentment that they couldn't see the senators who were, after all, quite busy. I think that the top people could and did see the senators, and I encouraged

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this whenever I could. We really need to establish a reasonably close working relationship with the top people on Capitol Hill and in the executive branch. I did my best to encourage that kind of relationship, so that the senators would have a better grasp of the problems involved, and the executive would develop a better understanding of the legislative process. For example, after the General Assembly of the UN began its work, Jack Hickerson, who was then Assistant Secretary of State, and I worked out a formula to enable two senators to attend the meetings of the General Assembly, every election year, and two House members every other year. This proved very beneficial. It helped create a better understanding of the United Nations in the Congress. Two people went every year. This experience was very rich because they could see, at first hand, how negotiations took place and they could even take an active part in negotiations. They developed a greater knowledge about, and a greater interest in, foreign policy. It was to the mutual benefit of the Senate and to the State Department. That kind of thing can be

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facilitated if you have the proper working relationships between the staff on Capitol Hill and the staff downtown.

RITCHIE: Another question I had about the formation of the bipartisan staff. I always wondered if the fact that the Republicans won the election in 1946 and came in as the majority party for the first time in sixteen years, made them more willing to accept the new scheme of things under the reorganization. Do you think it perhaps

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went more smoothly in the sense that the majority was new and so was the staff? Or do you think both parties were willing to accept the new order?

WILCOX: Well, I think there was a consensus in our country at that time about what we needed to do in the world. Everybody wanted to become a member of the United Nations. There were only two votes against the Charter. Once they understood what the issues were--they debated it at considerable length, of course--but once they understood the issues they were willing to go in. Only two votes against it. One was Senator [William] Langer of North Dakota. Somebody asked him why he voted against the charter and he said, "Well, if I'd voted for it, I'd have been one out of ninety. I voted against it and I was one out of two. My name was on the front page of every newspaper in the country." That's the reason he voted against the United Nations Charter. But in any case, I think the fact that there was a consensus, and that Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg had worked together in bringing the UN Charter to fruition, I think that that was a very important factor.

RITCHIE: I also noted that just about the time you came on the staff, the committee released a major study that you had worked on in your capacity with the Legislative Reference Service, on Soviet foreign policy.

WILCOX: Yes, I recall.

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RITCHIE: How did that get initiated? What was the impetus behind that?

WILCOX: I don't remember now. I remember I did it with Sergis Yacobson, who was a Soviet specialist attached to the Legislative Reference Service. I don't recall now the precise origin, but it seemed at the time to be a timely thing, because we were talking a lot about the Soviet relationship to the United Nations and to other important developments in the postwar period. I think it was a good study and it was worthy of publication because it helped to develop a better understanding of the Soviet Union in that early period--but I don't remember precisely how it started.

RITCHIE: It was a very tough statement.

WILCOX: Yes, a rather tough report--but fairly accurate as we have seen with each passing year.

RITCHIE: That Soviet policy was expansionist and aggressive.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: That they would use any card in the deck.

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WILCOX: It was realistic as time has shown.

RITCHIE: Was it designed in part to galvanize opinion in the Congress?

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WILCOX: No, I think it was an attempt to make clear what wasn't clear in the minds of a lot of people, the nature of Soviet Communism and what we might expect from the Soviet Union in our negotiations with them over the years. We had to understand the kind of opposition we were running into.

RITCHIE: Do you think that the members of the committee and the members of the Senate were fully aware of that at the time?

WILCOX: Oh, I think so. As I recall, at the San Francisco conference our delegation wasn't "duped," or misled, or hoodwinked by the Soviet Union. I think they understood pretty fully the nature of the Soviet government and system. But they, I think, felt there was really no alternative but to go ahead along the lines that we were working on, to try to make the United Nations work and to hope that the Soviet Union would see that it was in the mutual interest of the countries involved to prevent war. After all, the Soviet Union had lost, tremendously, twenty million people during World War II, and we all hoped they would take a more positive attitude towards the maintenance of world peace than they subsequently did. But at least we had to understand the nature of the opposition we faced in the postwar period.

RITCHIE: Well, in part there was also a debate in the United States. You had the Henry Wallaceites who were proposing a more cooperative line toward the Soviet Union, rather than a tougher line.

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WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: And I was wondering if your study was an answer to that discussion as well?

WILCOX: Oh, not necessarily. As I said, I don't remember how it originated, but I think it was an honest attempt to get the members of the Senate and the House to understand better the nature of Soviet Communism.

RITCHIE: It came out just about the time of the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, in 1947.

WILCOX: Yes, that's right.

RITCHIE: It arrived in the committee at a very auspicious time.

WILCOX: It got quite a little play in the press.

RITCHIE: Yes, I was just reading some of the accounts of it.

WILCOX: Sergis Yacobson had more to do with it than I did. He was the principal author. I worked on it some, but he was the principal writer. It was a very good piece of work, I think, and I want to give him full credit.

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RITCHIE: Well, I think this would be a good breaking point, since you had just come on the committee. I'd like to take another session to discuss being on the committee and working for Vandenberg and Connally.

End Interview #1

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Francis O. Wilcox

Chief of Staff

Senate Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955

Interview #2:
Building Bipartisanship
(Friday, February 10, 1984)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

RITCHIE: The last time we talked about your coming to the Senate and being appointed chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Vandenberg in 1947. I wondered if you could start today by telling me a little about Arthur Vandenberg, and what type of a person he was to work for.



Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI)

WILCOX: Well, I am prejudiced when it comes to discussing Arthur Vandenberg. I must say he was a remarkable person in many ways. He was one of the few senators who really did his homework. When he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee he told his wife that she could have two nights a week out. The rest of the time they were in their apartment at the Wardman Park with Arthur Vandenberg doing his homework. He was very considerate of his staff. I don't know whether I mentioned this before, but when he appointed me as chief of staff he said, "Go out and get the best people you can find. Only remember, I will hold *you* responsible." He said that with a little twinkle in his eye, but I knew that he meant it even so. He would come over to the Foreign Relations Committee rooms where we had our offices--I think he liked to get away from the routine of his senatorial office--he would come over there every morning and put his feet up on my desk and talk about foreign policy,

and about the committee, and about the Senate, and about the State Department. He liked to exchange views and to test his ideas. His wife was equally solicitous of the staff. I remember she said that she was going to have a Christmas party--she was not at all well, she had terminal cancer. I think the senator urged her not to have the annual Christmas party, but she said, "Arthur, I'm going to have that Christmas party if it's the last thing I ever do." She had the party and she died shortly after that.

Arthur Vandenberg achieved a position of distinction in the Republican Senate, in the 80th Congress, so that he was looked upon as the leader in the field of foreign policy, while Bob Taft was looked upon as the leader in the Senate on the Republican side on domestic affairs. They got along really quite well. But Senator Vandenberg's attitude toward the Senate generally was that they were entitled to know everything that he knew, that they could not make up their minds unless they were fully informed, so he did his best to keep them fully informed. It was a remarkable thing that usually when he spoke there were sixty or so senators on the floor to hear him. This is, of course, quite unusual in the Senate because normally people aren't interested in hearing what senators have to say--unless they themselves are making the speech. But he treated members of the committee in a similarly solicitous way, making sure that they had every opportunity to get the information they needed to make up their minds in an objective way. Very often he would say, "Francis,

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Senator George isn't quite convinced that we should go down this path. I think we'd better have another meeting to see if we can't convince him."

Even though he may have had a majority of the votes in the committee, he nevertheless wanted to make sure that all the members were with him, and he took great pride in developing a feeling of unity and a spirit of unanimity in the committee. Indeed, as I recall, during his two years as chairman there was only one important vote that did not bring about a unanimous reaction from the committee, and that was I think of secondary importance. There was a personal reason why one of the senators didn't want to support a particular project. But he took great pride in that, and in those two years there was not one important vote that did not bring forth a unanimous reaction from the committee.

RITCHIE: Do you think that some of that was just the nature of who was on the committee, that they tended to think the way Vandenberg did, or was he really working behind the scenes to bring them all together into a consensus?

WILCOX: I think perhaps some of both. Certainly the latter was true. He did everything he could behind the scenes to convince them that they were going in the right direction. I think also, of course, there was a consensus in the country about our foreign policy at that time, which there isn't today. We had just emerged from a

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terrible world war, and I think everybody wanted to do what was possible to create the kind of conditions that would make a more permanent peace possible. We knew we had to do something, we had to move in the direction of a United Nations; and later when the time came I think the country realized that the Russians were misbehaving and that we needed to do something in addition to counter the threat of Russian aggression, so it was desirable to have something like the NATO treaty, the Greek-Turkish program, and similar defensive devices. It is true that if Senator Vandenberg had not been in the Senate at that time (or someone like him), to encourage the Republicans to move in that direction, I think it is true that--it is probable, I should say--that some of these things might not have been done. He carried the Republicans with him on all these crucial votes. But it's interesting to note that from the United Nations on down through the satellite peace treaties, the treaty with Japan, the NATO treaty, the Greek-Turkish program, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan; all of these things brought forth a strong show of support in the Senate, and I think that it was largely due to Arthur Vandenberg's leadership. Certainly if he had been on the other side of the fence the story would have been quite different. **RITCHIE:** He had made a very dramatic change in 1945, in his speech about becoming an internationalist. He had been a leading isolationist up to that point. That's largely what made him so

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valuable to the administration, since he was respected on one side and he had converted to the other, and carried people with him. Did you feel he had any lingering doubts? Having been an isolationist, was he worried about America becoming too involved in world affairs? Or when he made that conversion had he gone a hundred percent?

WILCOX: I don't know what you mean, Don, by a hundred percent. I don't think he had any strong doubts after Pearl Harbor. I think Pearl Harbor was the convincing demonstration to him that we lived in an interdependent world, that the United States could not remain isolationist. We had been pushed into the war whether we wanted to be or not, and there was no alternative. I think he felt that in the period after the war the only thing to do was to try and work with the other great powers to see if we could create the kind of world in which we might have a reasonable degree of stability.

RITCHIE: Senator Taft, on the other hand, who was equally respected by the Republicans in the Senate, really had very strong reservations about America's role overseas.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: So there was a different way that a Republican leader could have gone in that period.

WILCOX: Oh, indeed. That's the reason I think that Senator Vandenberg's leadership was so critical, because if he hadn't been

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there, and Bob Taft had been the leader of the Republicans on the international side as well as the domestic side, the situation might have been quite different. I must say, however, that after Bob Taft--and I always respected his intellectual ability, it was very great, there's no doubt about it--after Bob Taft became a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he grew in stature in the international field. I think he learned quite a little as a result of his experience on that committee and his mind began to change. You could see that before he died. His grasp of world affairs became better, bigger, broader, and he reacted as one who knew a little more about world affairs than he had earlier.

RITCHIE: Do you think it was basically that he hadn't paid very much attention to it, or as much attention as perhaps he had to other issues?

WILCOX: Well, I think that generally speaking there is a relationship between knowledge and rational behavior. I think that he had not been as knowledgeable in the field of foreign policy as he became in later years. The two things are related.

RITCHIE: In those morning sessions, when Vandenberg would come in and put his feet up on the desk, did he ever express concern about Taft, and Taft's influence on the people he had to convince?

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WILCOX: Oh, yes. He recognized that there was a conservative wing in the Republican party, and he had to do what he could to carry that wing with him, or at least to mute its strength, to make sure that a sizeable majority of the Republicans were with him. He was able to do that because as the vote would indicate in all the cases that I mentioned, there were a few people who opposed him, but for the most part the Republicans followed his leadership.

RITCHIE: It was an unusual circumstance. The Republicans had been out of the majority for decades. They were now in the majority again, and yet there was a Democratic president, and one whose reelection was very much in question. Were there any pressures on him to steer a more independent course from the White House?

WILCOX: Oh, yes, and of course there were plenty of opportunities to be critical of the administration and of the president and the Secretary of State. But I think by and large Senator Vandenberg had decided that what he was doing was in the national interest, and he tended to put party politics behind him when it came to foreign policy--not always on domestic policy, but when it came to foreign policy he operated this way. He felt that debate over foreign policy issues ought to be complete and rational, but that politics ought to stop at the water's edge when it came to foreign policy. I think he practiced that policy.

RITCHIE: How well do you think he got along with Harry Truman?

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WILCOX: Oh, I think he got along with him fairly well. He had known him as a senator. They had been on opposite sides of the fence on a good many issues, but I think he got along with him fairly well. President Truman recognized that it was

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Arthur Vandenberg's leadership in the Senate that brought the Republican element along with him. So both he and the Secretary of State George Marshall, and Dean Acheson, were appreciate of Vandenberg's efforts and they did what they could to keep him fully informed, and to consult with him on important issues. This was also especially true of Bob Lovett, who was under secretary of state for a period of time with General Marshall.

RITCHIE: Do you think they were going out of their way to stroke the senior Republican member because of their need to carry Republican votes?

WILCOX: Well, they certainly needed to carry Republican votes, especially in connection with treaties, because as you know it takes a two-thirds vote of the Senate to approve the ratification of a treaty, and the Democrats certainly didn't have a two-thirds vote, indeed they lacked a majority in the 80th Congress. So they would have been foolish indeed if they had not paid special attention to Vandenberg.

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RITCHIE: The reason why I asked that question was because for a while Vandenberg's role has been somewhat downplayed by people writing on that period--even some of the memoirs, Acheson and others--didn't credit Vandenberg.

WILCOX: Yes, you are quite right about that.

RITCHIE: Some of the journalists painted him to be sort of a pompous fellow, and really not as important as he seemed to be at the time. Now there seems to be another school of historians who are saying: wait, Vandenberg played a very important role. So there is some controversy over how significant his role was in the whole process, and you certainly were in a key position to observe that, and to see the relationship between the two sides, and whether or not the administration sincerely sought out Vandenberg's opinions. Was he really making a contribution to the foreign policy of the Truman administration?

WILCOX: Well, he most certainly did. Of course, as I say, I'm prejudiced, but it is obvious to me that he made a very important contribution. There's tendency on the part of political party leaders not to attribute too much--what shall I say?--not to give too much credit to the loyal opposition. They prefer to take the credit for themselves and their own leaders. It's only natural that they would not want to bestow upon Arthur Vandenberg all the laurels that he was due. I worked very closely with him for several years,

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particularly the two years that he was chairman, and my honest opinion is that he was an indispensable element in the political relationships that existed in the formulation of our foreign policy in that very critical period. Without him, of course you don't know what might have happened, but certainly he firmly believed in the idea of a nonpartisan foreign policy, and he worked toward that end.

Now, he was critical of some of the things that the administration did, and he pointed out that there wasn't a bipartisan policy with respect to China and the Middle East and certain other problem areas. But he felt that there was with respect to NATO and the Marshall Plan, where consultation between the executive branch and the legislative branch was full and complete. He felt that in connection with the United Nations also there had been a full and complete consultation. Secretary Hull had called in members of the Foreign Relations Committee--Democrats and Republicans alike--and they met from time to time to consider the kind of world order that we wanted to work toward. He felt that that was the way foreign policy ought to be formulated. But he repeated on several occasions when he was urged to be openly critical of the administration that he would call General Marshall and talk with him on the telephone, but that he would not take his story to the press. As he put it he "could not do that to George Marshall." He was reluctant to be critical of him in public because he felt that General Marshall was a real patriot.

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RITCHIE: Marshall's stature was particularly high in that period. Do you think that they had a personal friendship as well, or was it just that he admired Marshall?

WILCOX: There was no question but that he had great admiration for General Marshall. But my impression is that Marshall was not personally very friendly with anybody. You know, he was a little bit like George Washington--not the kind of person that you slapped on the back. General Marshall respected Vandenberg for what he did, in the way of contributing toward our foreign policy, and I think they got along quite well. Arthur Vandenberg's contacts during much of that period were with Bob Lovett, who was under secretary. He worked closely with him. They often met in Vandenberg's apartment in the Wardman Park in the evening, in the late afternoon, to develop, together, foreign policy ideas.

RITCHIE: How did Vandenberg use you as the chief of staff of the committee at that time? What types of things did he call upon you to do?

WILCOX: We advised with him on meetings that might be called, on matters that should come before the committee and the Senate, on hearings, on who should be heard at the hearings, on the kinds of questions that might be asked, and the possible outcome. We prepared committee reports for him. We did not normally prepare his important policy speeches, because he liked to prepare them himself. He did

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them on his own typewriter at home at night in the Wardman Park Hotel. He used me, and I guess some of the others from time to time, to share ideas with. He liked to talk about foreign policy problems, look at the different options before our country, and raise basic questions about what we should be doing. This was what I enjoyed most in my relationship with him.

He wasn't inclined to delegate full responsibility for important matters of that kind because he liked to get into the substance of foreign policy himself. So that when we took up the Greek-Turkish program we wrote a letter to every member of the Senate, inviting them to send to the committee the kinds of questions that they wanted answers for. He and I sat down one afternoon together, going over these questions and organizing them, arranging them in the form of a little booklet of questions. We got the answers from the executive branch for all these questions; these were in turn transmitted to the members of the Senate. This was one of the kinds of things he did with the staff to make sure that the Senate had all the information they needed. He leaned over backwards to assure his colleagues that he had an answer, or held get an answer, to all their questions. And he followed this formula on the Senate floor. He didn't try to avoid problems; he was very meticulous in giving full answers to every question that came up, regardless of who asked them.

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In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty hearings, he invited two conservative Republican senators to come to the committee hearings and ask all of the questions they wanted to ask. They took a good deal of the committee's time. He was very patient in his efforts to convince his colleagues on the Republican side that they were fully informed and that they had access to all the information that they needed to make sound decisions.

RITCHIE: I wonder if his solicitousness came out of his many years of being in the minority. When he finally got into the majority do you think he was more sensitive to the other side?

WILCOX: That might have been one of the factors, Don, but I think that he recognized his role as a kind of conciliator or mediator--an essential element in securing Republican support for important foreign policy issues--and he took his responsibilities very seriously. He felt that he could help develop with the administration the kind of foreign policy that would protect our national interest. This was the basis of his behavior, I think, all the way along.

RITCHIE: You described his patience with people. But I read once where you said he could be an impatient man. In what ways did you find him impatient?

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WILCOX: Well, I didn't find him impatient very often. He may have been in connection with some of his domestic activities and some of his other senatorial duties, but I didn't find him at all impatient in connection with the treatment of his colleagues. He accorded them every respect, showed them every courtesy, invited them to committee hearings, permitted them to ask question, and was quite responsive on the floor of the Senate. In private he may have expressed some unhappiness over the behavior of some of his colleagues, but he certainly didn't show that on the Senate floor or in the committee hearings.

RITCHIE: The first item that came up when he became chairman, as you mentioned, was the Greek-Turkish aid program, which Truman proposed to

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Congress early in 1947. There is an incident which is repeated in all of the books about diplomatic history at that time, in which the Senate and House leaders were invited to the White House for a briefing. Vandenberg said to Truman that the only way he was going to get his program through was to "scare hell out of the American people." Ever since then there has been a debate over what he really meant by that. I wondered if you were familiar with that, and if you have any feeling what Vandenberg meant by that remark, and what its impact was?

WILCOX: I don't think I can shed much light on that, Don. He may have said that. I suppose if he was reported to have said it he

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probably did. He was strong sometimes with his language. He had a way of presenting things in pictorial fashion, you know, with rather vigorous, strong language. I suppose that what he had in mind was the desirability of convincing the American people that we had to do this because of the serious threat of Communist aggression. I think he recognized that there would be a lot of opposition to it, for it cost a lot of money. And it was an important departure in United States foreign policy. This applied also to the Marshall Plan. To start rehabilitating western Europe you had to condition the American people to get them in the proper mood, and one way of doing that was to indicate the nature of the threat we faced in the world, both from the Communist side and from the potential inability of Europe to revive itself without our help. If we couldn't get these two points across to the American people, we'd be in serious trouble.

RITCHIE: The difficulty was to convince people that this was really directly in America's national security, to become involved in other areas of the world, rather than things that seemed perhaps more directly related. I suppose that in 1947 it might have been questionable what the United States' immediate needs were in places like Greece and Turkey. Did you get a sense that he was trying to educate both the Senate and the American people?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. I think he recognized the threat that came to the United States as a result of the withdrawal of Britain from

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the Middle East, and the threat of Soviet penetration in the area. And he realized that both the Senate and the American people were really somewhat unaware of this new development and the danger it brought to the free world. Since it represented a big departure in our foreign policy at least as sharp as the Monroe Doctrine, the American people weren't quite ready for it. So he had to convince the members of the Senate and the American people; and one way to do this is to scare people a little. You have to jar them. Sometimes the Senate, the House, the American people don't make up their minds to take action unless they are frightened a bit or confronted with a crisis. I am sure that's what he had in mind. You know, we don't take action in this country until a real crisis hits us. We don't normally think too far ahead.

RITCHIE: The other thing that Vandenberg is given quite a bit of credit for is when the Marshall Plan was first proposed the administration proposed it as a multi-year package, four or five years, \$17 billion, and it was Vandenberg who said they had to do it on a year-by-year basis. They cut it down, I think, to about \$6 billion the first year, or something like that. What is it about the United States Congress that tends to deal with aid programs in particular, and the Marshall Plan specifically, on a year-by-year basis rather than on a long-range basis?

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WILCOX: Well, I've wondered about that, too, Don, but I think the simple fact is that they like to keep control of the situation. If they give the executive branch sufficient funds to run a four-year program of that magnitude, without having a chance to review it on an annual basis, they feel that it's giving the executive branch too much authority. So they have scheduled their hearings and their appropriations on an annual basis, and the budget is on an annual basis. Now, in some cases I think this wrong, because what you need is sufficient lead time in certain situations, like foreign aid, where you should be in a position to plan over a period of time. Everybody talked about a four year program for the Marshall Plan, and that was the original proposal. But I think Vandenberg helped satisfy his Republican critics by making sure that they would have a chance to look at this program every year during its duration. Also the psychological effect of presenting the Congress with a \$16 billion program was an important factor. Certainly the members could digest a \$4 billion program much more easily than a four-year package. A number of things Vandenberg did were geared to the need to carry the Republican group along with him in the Senate. I think, though, that what you imply is quite correct, certainly in the construction of battleships and things of that sort that are done over a period of time it's unwise to base long range planning on annual appropriations. Congress does have the right to keep looking at these things but it can seriously handicap planning in the development

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field, for example, if those who are doing the planning don't have an opportunity to look ahead maybe several years to visualize the ultimate outcome.

RITCHIE: When the Marshall Plan was being discussed, and other aid programs, did they envision a permanent role of America in providing aid, or was this seen as just an emergency, stop-gap program? Do you think that people in the 1940s had some sense of what the continuing role was going to be?

WILCOX: No, I don't think so at the time of the Marshall Plan in any case. As the years rolled by they began to realize that more countries outside the western European area were going to be in real need, particularly as they began to gain their independence in the 1950s and '60s. They began to realize that these new countries obviously would have to have some economic and military help. But at the time of the Marshall Plan I think they felt that this was primarily the task of helping Europe rehabilitate itself, and they weren't at that point contemplating huge aid programs for the world generally. That came later.

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RITCHIE: The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were in a sense unilateral actions on the part of the United States to intervene, to take the place of the British in Greece, to provide aid to Europe. Was there any sense of conflict being that and the United Nations

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ideal of multilateral action? Was there concern that the administration was tending towards not working with the United Nations on these issues?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. This question came up always in connection with these programs in the 1940s after we had joined the United Nations. There was a considerable degree of loyalty in the Senate to the idea of multilateral action through the United Nations, so that whenever something came up like the Greek-Turkish program, the Democratic members particularly had to be reassured, and some of the Republicans too, that we were not undermining our loyalties to the United Nations, we were not forgetting our obligations there. In the Greek-Turkish aid program, the bill itself provides that--I've forgotten now the exact language--but in any event there is some reference to the possibility that the United Nations might take action, and in the event they did act, and our assistance proved unnecessary or undesirable, we would stop our aid to Greece and Turkey. I don't recall exactly the language, but in any event our obligations to the United Nations are explicitly recognized in the Greek-Turkish aid program. That was one thing that made it possible to get acceptance for the program in the Senate. Without it, I think, there would have been real trouble.

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RITCHIE: What do you think was Vandenberg's instinct in this case. Was he troubled over the conflict between the unilateral and the multilateral approach?

WILCOX: No, he wasn't troubled. I think he was very anxious to see the United Nations succeed. He'd been one of the framers of the charter and he was interested in doing everything possible to protect our relationship with the United Nations. But he also was aware of the opposition in the Senate to any action of this kind that would result in undermining our relations to the United Nations. So he was willing to take steps to effect some kind of a compromise with a proper bow towards the United Nations.

RITCHIE: He was also the author of the Vandenberg Resolution, which paved the way for the creation of NATO.

WILCOX: Yes. He and Bob Lovett were largely responsible.

RITCHIE: Again there were these two different paths in which the United States could go. Could you describe a little of the background to the Vandenberg Resolution? Did you work with him on that?

WILCOX: Yes. Oh, yes. The trouble arose, of course, because of the excessive use of the veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. There was at that time a tendency on Capitol Hill to look at all other possibilities for world order. The United Nations wasn't doing very well, so the members of Congress began to look at

all the other possibilities in the world, such as the Federal Union idea, the Clarence Streit concept of Union Now, and other proposals of this kind. The idea arose that maybe if we had some kind of a regional defense arrangement like the Rio Treaty, this would supplement the provisions of the United Nations Charter and make possible the collective defense of the western world. We began to talk about that as a result of the prolonged hearings that were held on Capitol Hill. The main supporters of this approach were Vandenberg and Lovett, and they met, as I said, frequently to talk about how this might be done without affecting adversely our relationship with the United Nations. As Vandenberg used to put it: "within the Charter but outside the veto." I met with the Department of State people from time to time, in my office, evolving the text of a resolution which was in turn evaluated and improved by Vandenberg and Lovett in their confidential meetings. Ted Achilles from the State Department came up on a number of occasions and we went over the text of the resolution and made suggestions for its improvement. Finally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the resolution, which provided for the possibility of creating some kind of a regional defense arrangement.

The language was a little bit vague. It didn't expressly say there would be a NATO Treaty and a NATO installation in Europe, but

it provided for the possibility of regional and other collective defense arrangements. The Senate passed it one afternoon by a vote of 64 to 4, as I recall, without very much debate. It's interesting, because this was the forerunner, this was the green light to the executive branch to go ahead and negotiate the North Atlantic Treaty for the collective defense of the Western world. It had very little debate on the Senate floor. I'm not sure that the Senate understood fully what they were proposing, but they did.

RITCHIE: Do you think Vandenberg understood fully what was involved?

WILCOX: I think so. When you look at it, though, in retrospect, the NATO Treaty was concluded after a good deal of negotiating, as you know. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had an opportunity to look at it on several occasions before it was finally concluded, and the members did make a number of recommendations that resulted in important changes in the treaty text. But I don't think that any of the senators who voted for the Vandenberg Resolution, or for the North Atlantic Treaty for that matter, had any real notion of the kind of organization that was to develop when NATO came into being: the extensive infrastructure, the communication system, the transportation system, the plan for the defense of Europe, the headquarters, the staff, and all the rest. I don't think any of the senators had a very good notion of the extent to which their vote for

the North Atlantic Treaty would be developed or that they had any real knowledge of the kind of result that would take place. In their wildest dreams I don't think they would have thought of that, because the treaty itself--a very short document--offered the base for literally hundreds of executive agreements between the United States and the other NATO countries. And it was as a result of this network of executive agreements that the NATO system evolved into the elaborate defense structure we see today.

RITCHIE: And beyond that, collective security arrangements all over the world: SEATO, CENTO. It was just the beginning.

WILCOX: Yes, that was the philosophy that Secretary Dulles had anyway--of developing collective defense pacts for the Middle East and Asia, and of course, the Rio Pact with the Latin American countries had been consummated before the United Nations Charter was ratified. Nothing was said or done about Africa at that point, because the countries of Africa mostly remained within the empires or the domain of the mother countries.

RITCHIE: The whole concept of executive agreements removed a lot of Senate control over foreign policy, since presidents were making agreements without having to send them back for ratification as treaties. The number of executive agreements increased considerably, and much of the legislation that was passed at that time gave presidents a larger share in foreign policy. We began the process

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building the "Imperial Presidency" under probably the least imperious of modern presidents. Do you think that senators like Vandenberg and others had a sense of the power shift that was going involving presidents and foreign policy? Was there concern on their part?

WILCOX: Oh, I think they recognized it, but it wasn't until maybe a little later that the use of executive agreements developed the way it did. When the executive branch had trouble getting treaties through the Senate, they began to think of other ways of achieving their purpose. During the 140s and the period when we were building for the post-war era, and when there was a real consensus in the country about our foreign policy objectives--and good bipartisan relationships--I don't think there was quite the same need for executive agreements as there was later on. It was afterwards, in the '50s and '60s that we began to notice a rather important trend on the part of the executive branch to resort to executive agreements rather than to treaties, partly because of the increase in business in the world in international affairs, and partly because of the desire to avoid the two-thirds vote in the Senate for the approval of treaties. Certainly by the '60s this had developed to a point where there was real concern on Capitol Hill. Then in the early 170s, as you know, steps were taken to make sure that the Congress at least had knowledge of the executive agreements that were concluded. Before that, there wasn't any assurance that the Senate knew about them even, in some cases. Now, under the terms of the Case-Zablocki Act, they are

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sent regularly to the Senate so at least there is an opportunity to find out what's going on in the executive branch. The arrangement seems to be working fairly well.

RITCHIE: The election of 1948 turned out very differently than everybody anticipated, both in the presidency and the Senate. Did Vandenberg see the handwriting on the wall, or was he as surprised as everybody else?

WILCOX: I think he was surprised. We'd talked about the election on various occasions. He would list all the reasons why he shouldn't be President of the United States. His name had been proposed as a likely candidate, as you know, earlier. He apparently had thought this through very carefully and had a whole list of reasons why he shouldn't be a candidate, including the fact that he felt at home in the legislative branch--that is where he could exercise the most influence and could be most effective. He had not been an executive. He thought that someone like Tom Dewey would be a lot better equipped than he. So he talked himself out of the race. Then he envisaged the very hopeful prospect, from his point of view, that Tom Dewey, Foster Dulles, and Arthur Vandenberg would be a superb team of leaders, exceptionally well equipped, certainly to conduct foreign policy. He was looking forward to that, and he, like most everybody else, thought Tom Dewey was going to win the election. The morning after the election, he walked into my office, took his cigar

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out of his mouth, and said about Harry Truman, "You've got to give the little guy credit. There he was flat on his back. Everyone had counted him out, but he came up fighting and won the battle." He said not one word of criticism but only admiration for the great effort President Truman had put forth, although I knew he was terribly disappointed.

RITCHIE: Of course; also he lost the chairmanship of the committee with the Democrats winning the majority of the Senate.

WILCOX: Yes. The next year Tom Connally came back as chairman of the committee.

RITCHIE: Did that change Vandenberg's role in the Senate, or was he still as influential in the minority as he had been in the majority?

WILCOX: Well, the majority still had to look to the minority for support because, as you know, in the Senate in the foreign policy field, indeed in most domestic issues, the majority still has to look to the minority for support. This is certainly true in connection with treaties. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty. Vandenberg supported that even though he was not then the chairman when it was finally approved. So his role remained not as important in a way as it had been, because he couldn't run the committee any more. He still had a lot to say about the minority members of the committee

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and their attitude about foreign policy. His leadership of the committee declined, obviously, but he still worked fairly closely with Senator Connally. The two of them cooperated reasonably well. There was jealousy involved on the part of Senator Connally, but they got along reasonably well because I think Connally knew that he had to have Vandenberg's support to get the job done. And, of course, I was in a good position to encourage that feeling.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask you about that, because it must have been very difficult for someone like Connally, who obviously had a large ego, to deal with Vandenberg, who was getting such good publicity and so much attention from the Democratic administration. Did you sense Connally's chaffing under that?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. It was apparent that Connally did not have the intellectual apparatus that Vandenberg did, and there was, as I say, a little feeling of jealousy on his part, particularly when the administration continued to pay a lot of attention to Vandenberg. Indeed, I had to remind the administration from time to time not to neglect Senator Connally, because it was important to Vandenberg as well as Connally that the two work together. Sometimes the administration forgets these things, and you have to remind them not to forget to consult with key people.

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RITCHIE: Do you think that an administration tends to assume that the members of its own party are automatically going to be good foot soldiers, but they have to go a little further down the road for someone from the opposition party?

WILCOX: Well, they better not do that in the Congress of today, because the members of Congress as you know are very assertive. They are inclined to be very independent, and the new members, especially the younger members, flaunt their independence in a rather obvious way. The executive branch has to be really very careful with both parties in Congress these days and not take for granted their own party members. Indeed, I think they realize that. We have had some good assistant secretaries of state, and some good secretaries, who have recognized that both parties had to be brought along with important decisions.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that Connally clearly wasn't as intellectual a senator as Vandenberg was. Did Connally lean on Vandenberg, or turn to him for advice?

WILCOX: Yes, he realized--perhaps reluctantly--that he needed Senator Vandenberg's support on important issues in the committee. He recognized Senator Vandenberg's intellectual ability and his influence in the Senate. So he did, I think, depend on him, and lean on him, and was careful not to offend him. He used to call him "Old

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Van" when he talked to me about Vandenberg. He said, "Old Van", "we want to get Old Van in on this." (On his part, Vandenberg referred to Connally as "Old Tom.")

RITCHIE: Did you find any change in your role, or the staff role, in the change between the Republican majority and the Democratic majority?

WILCOX: No. I had first worked for Senator Connally and he seemed quite content to have me continue on as his staff director. I think that in some ways he leaned on the staff a little more than Senator Vandenberg did, but in some ways less so, because he was not inclined to come in and sit down and put his feet up on my desk and talk at length about foreign policy. I don't think he was that much interested in foreign policy problems, the substance of foreign policy. I found him easy to get along with. I don't think he was quite as solicitous of the staff as Senator Vandenberg. For instance, he didn't throw an annual Christmas party for the staff as Vandenberg had. He didn't write his own speeches as Vandenberg did, but he relied upon us for the normal staff functions. He would expect us to set up committee meetings and the agenda, prepare the kinds of questions that should be asked of witnesses before the committee, to keep him informed of important developments, to recommend the kinds of meetings that we needed, and the kinds of problems that we needed to discuss, handle relations with the executive branch, and so on. He

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would look to us for advice of that kind, and on the Senate floor, of course, I always sat with him whenever we had an important issue on foreign policy. We tried to keep him properly briefed so that he could defend the treaty or the piece of legislation that happened to be on the floor.

RITCHIE: Did you find you had to provide him with more information when you sat next to him in the Senate than you did Vandenberg?

WILCOX: Yes, I think so. Senator Vandenberg, as I said, did his homework pretty thoroughly. Senator Connally wasn't inclined to do his homework as thoroughly as Vandenberg.

RITCHIE: Who wrote Connally's speeches for him? Was it your staff or his own staff?

WILCOX: We did it. I did some, and Pat Holt did some. Carl Marcy might have. Both were very good writers. We'd collaborate, depending upon the issue, and who the staff person was responsible for a particular matter, and how important the problem was. Very important problems I would sit on the floor with him, and in some cases where we had a technical problem he needed to explain or defend the staff member responsible for that particular question would be with him.

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RITCHIE: He seems to have done pretty well in the repartee of debate. He was famous for the humorous put-down, and the bombastic response, sort of a stump-speaker's training.

WILCOX: Yes, he was very good at that. Sometimes he was a little abrupt; sometimes a little abrasive; sometimes he turned people off; sometimes he said things that he shouldn't have said, but on the whole he handled floor debate pretty well. For example, one day the Senate was discussing the question of

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neutrality in war time and the use of weapons, and the fact that you couldn't always choose the weapons you were going to use--this would depend upon the adversary. He illustrated this point by telling the story of two men in Texas before the War Between the States. They were talking about the impending conflict, and one of them said to the other: "Aw, let them come. I think we can lick the damned Yankees with cornstalks." So the war came and went, and the two cronies met on the street corner again and were talking about what had happened. One of them said, "Say, I thought you said we could lick the damned Yankees with cornstalks?" The other said, "Yeah, but the trouble is the doggone Yankees wouldn't fight us with cornstalks." Now that's the kind of illustrative story that he could tell on occasion. And I've seen him put Bob Taft down rather abruptly, in a way that Vandenberg would not have done. His repartee was good. He was sharp and he had a quick tongue, and a quick temper. He was inclined to be more political in

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his approach on the Senate floor. I think he allowed politics to play a more important role than Vandenberg did in his consideration of foreign policy questions.

RITCHIE: Did this work against the type of consensus that Vandenberg had been trying to build in the committee and in the Senate?

WILCOX: Yes, there was some--I suppose in a sense Senator Connally was not as dedicated to the idea of non-partisan foreign policy as Vandenberg, and consequently it made it a little more difficult for Vandenberg to do the things that he wanted to do.

RITCHIE: Vandenberg became ill in the summer of 1949, and was in and out and not there for a while. Did this create problems, the fact that he was no longer around to lend his prestige to the bipartisan program?

WILCOX: Yes. I think it did, without any question. He was missed, he was sorely missed. The best answer to your question was expressed in the *New York Times*, when Vandenberg became seriously ill. It was obvious he could not resume his duties in the Senate. The *Times* printed a remarkable editorial about the senator's role of leadership, and remarked that "Even the Democrats miss the clear, authoritative voice [of Vandenberg] that rises above the buzz of party politics to define American policy to the world. For Senator

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Vandenberg's distinction is that he had given leadership to both parties in the development of foreign policy, and more than any other American has lined up behind it the massive popular support that has been our greatest asset in the post-war years. This leadership is lacking today." This is a reasonably good evaluation of the sentiment at the time that he became seriously ill and it became known that he couldn't resume his duties. He continued to exercise some influence by correspondence, but obviously he was in bed and under a doctor's care, and as he became more seriously ill he had less and less to say. But he continued to be interested up to--I won't say the very day that he died, but till

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very shortly before he died he was interested in what was going on. I had some correspondence with him during his illness to keep him abreast a little of what was going on.

RITCHIE: There really wasn't anyone to step in to fill the void that he left. There wasn't any Republican member of the committee who had the same stature.

WILCOX: No, there really wasn't at that time. But people come and go in this country and nobody is indispensable. The committee continued to do a pretty good job with Tom Connally, and Alex Wiley, and Walter George as chairmen during the next six years.

RITCHIE: But among the Republican leadership, the really powerful Republicans weren't members of the committee at that time. Taft

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hadn't come on the committee; Wherry was outside the committee. The people who were really leading the party weren't necessarily the Wileys and the Henry Cabot Lodges.

WILCOX: No, that's right. You're quite right.

RITCHIE: Did that create a problem for bipartisanship? Did you sense that it was pulling apart at that stage?

WILCOX: I don't think that it pulled apart in the early 1950s, until maybe '55 or '56 or in the later '50s maybe. It seemed to me to begin to deteriorate a little bit. But President Eisenhower was respected by both parties and he favored a bipartisan approach. Certainly by the time the Vietnam War came along it had pretty well fallen apart. But I don't think that Vandenberg's departure from the scene meant an immediate eclipse of the bipartisan approach, because it was used in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty, in connection with the Southeast Asian collective defense pact, and other matters that I think fitted into the pattern of our post-war diplomacy.

RITCHIE: Well, for the Truman administration, who was it for them to turn to on the Republican side after Vandenberg wasn't on the scene anymore? Who did they use as a conduit, or who did they listen to?

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WILCOX: Well, as you say, they had a problem. The remaining Republican committee members weren't as effective in the Senate. There was Alexander Wiley and Alex Smith of New Jersey, Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, and his colleague Guy Gillette. And Henry Cabot Lodge. These were, as I remember, the members who were on board at that time. Senator Smith was not a strong senator, but he was thorough and very dedicated. I think the administration tended to rely on him some because he was a Republican, after all, and he was loyal to the administration. Cabot Lodge had some influence and was a very good senator, and was often looked upon as one who could make a short speech very effectively in the Senate. He liked short speeches, but he spoke well. Bourke Hickenlooper from Iowa was a good senator, not an exceptional one--but solid--and he usually did what I thought were the right things. There wasn't anyone,

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though, who had the stature of Vandenberg. These were all fairly good senators, the ones I mentioned, but they didn't have the stature of Vandenberg and, therefore, there was no one that the administration could turn to--that is, in quite the same way.

RITCHIE: You also had the switch in the State Department from Marshall to Acheson. Marshall seemed to have a better relationship with Congress, or at least was respected widely. Acheson seemed to be a little more prickly figure.

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WILCOX: Yes, he was a little more abrasive. However, I thought Dean Acheson was a very capable Secretary of State; he and Foster Dulles were two of the most successful ones, the most able ones. But Dean Acheson did have a tendency to look down his nose at some members of Congress whom he thought were not as well-equipped mentally as he was, and who didn't understand all the ins and outs of foreign policy as he did. I think he tended to look down on them, or at least they felt he was looking down on them. I'm not sure that he did, but this was their reaction. Also there was some question when he was inaugurated as Secretary of State, some question about his feeling toward the Soviet Union and toward Communism. In order to assure Senate support for him on the Republican side, Vandenberg questioned him on his attitude toward Communism, and even wrote out a little statement for Acheson to agree to, which he did, about his opposition to international Communism. But I think he proved himself to be a very able Secretary of State. There was this little friction between Acheson and Vandenberg at the outset, but I think Vandenberg did it to win the support of his party in favor of the appointment.

RITCHIE: Friction between Vandenberg and Acheson?

WILCOX: Well, I was referring to the little note that he wrote about Acheson's opposition to communism. This assured the members of his party that they were supporting a good Secretary of State, one

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that they could stand behind. Nevertheless, from the letters Acheson wrote to Vandenberg it is obvious that he had a good deal of respect for the Senate.

RITCHIE: It's pretty remarkable that a Republican senator would draft a statement for a Democratic Secretary of State to make to convince other Republican senators to vote for him!

WILCOX: It's not customary, obviously, but much of the discussion in the committee centered around this question, and Senator Vandenberg--as the meeting progressed--drafted a little note. I don't know whether Dean Acheson modified it a bit, I've forgotten now, but anyhow that was the basis for support for him.

RITCHIE: In the 80th Congress you had someone like Vandenberg making actual political suggestions to the Truman administration: don't present the Marshall Plan as a four-year plan, do it as a one-year plan; do this to help you get it through; this is the way to deal with Congress. Now you had Acheson coming in

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as Secretary of State, just about the point when Vandenberg was fading from the scene, although there was some overlap. Was there anybody who had that kind of political insight that Acheson could lean upon, or do you think that some of the rough edges of Acheson's political career had to do with the fact that he didn't understand the legislative process as well and didn't have that kind of advice?

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WILCOX: Well, he should have understood the legislative process fairly well because he had served for a time as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and he had dealt with a good many members of the Congress. But I think the point you make is a valid one: he didn't have quite the same person that he could turn to that George Marshall had. It is true that the Acheson Vandenberg terms overlapped somewhat. I can remember Acheson coming before the Foreign Relations Committee with the North Atlantic Treaty text and discussing it with the members of the committee, and Vandenberg was active in the discussion at that time. So there was a short period of time when the two worked together. But the fact that Vandenberg disappeared from the scene was a handicap which had an effect upon the term of Dean Acheson.

RITCHIE: There seemed to be much more of a consensus in the Senate and in the United States about European affairs, and American versus Soviet activities, than over Asian affairs. It seems as if there was two different approaches. The Asian issues were much more divisive and raised a great hue and cry on the Senate floor. Do you have any explanation for the difference in the way America looked across the Atlantic as opposed to across the Pacific?

WILCOX: Much of it came from the debate which took place as a result of the removal of Chiang-Kai-shek to the island of Formosa, now called Taiwan. The Republicans, of course, charged that the

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Democrats "lost" China--and one could argue as to whether anybody "lost" China--but the fact is that the Kuomintang faction that we were supporting lost out in their bid to defeat the Communist element on the mainland, so the Nationalists moved to Formosa. There was a good deal of feeling among the Republicans that the administration hadn't handled this matter very well, and since this was a political issue that had not been dealt with in a bipartisan way, they felt free to criticize. And in the Foreign Relations Committee I remember that we added \$75 million to the authorization for aid programs to be spent--I've forgotten how they put it--in the general area of China, the Asian area. In any case, it was thought that this might be helpful to the Chiang-Kai-shek regime. Then, of course, the China Lobby became very strong in Washington, and put a lot of heat on in the next few years to maintain the opposition to mainland China and to support the Chiang-Kai-shek regime in Formosa. We did everything we could in those days, in the 1950s, to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations and in all the other international organizations, and at international conferences,

and we did everything we could to keep the Communist Chinese out of the United Nations and the various international conferences that were held in that period. Part of the problem stemmed from General Marshall's trip to China to see if he couldn't help promote a reasonable solution to the problem. There was a lot of controversy, you will recall, in Washington as to whether General Marshall had performed his duty

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satisfactorily or whether he had been hoodwinked in some way. This continued to be a divisive factor in the foreign policy of the United States and certainly in the Senate. The Republicans were more or less convinced that the Democrats had been responsible for the "loss of China." I happened to be in the State Department later in the 1950s and it was my responsibility, as Assistant Secretary of State, to take those steps necessary to keep Communist China out of the United Nations and to make sure that the position of the Nationalist regime was protected, and I can assure you that we did everything that was humanly possible to achieve this objective, until we arrived at the point where it became apparent that the other members of the international community would not support our position.

RITCHIE: When you were still on the Senate staff, did you feel the pressure of the China Lobby? Did you sense their pressure on the members of the Foreign Relations Committee?

WILCOX: I didn't feel it personally. I don't think they bothered me very much as I recall, but certainly as the years went by the pressure from the China Lobby became greater and this was one of the things, of course, one of the principal factors that led us to pursue the policy that we did in support of Chiang-Kai-shek. It was only a Republican president like Dick Nixon who could not be accused of being a Communist, or pro-Communist, it was only someone like him

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who could change the course of events. His trip to Asia in 1973 and the Shanghai communique, of course, changed the picture.

RITCHIE: You also began to get some new members of the committee, people like William Knowland and Taft, who were sympathetic to Chiang-Kai-shek . . .

WILCOX: Strongly sympathetic, yes.

RITCHIE: Did that change the atmosphere in the committee?

WILCOX: Well, I think it certainly made it more explicit and more concrete. Senator Knowland was as strong an advocate of Chiang-Kai-shek as you could find anywhere, so he made his views known quite clearly during that period after Chiang-Kai-shek went to Formosa. I don't know that it changed the attitude of the committee very much in this regard. There were no specific things that came before the committee in the way of treaties or legislation that had a direct bearing upon the problem, but certainly whenever the issue arose, Senator Knowland and Senator Taft made their views known very emphatically.

RITCHIE: You had people like [Kenneth] Wherry, and you had Joe McCarthy in the Senate, a very vocal group. What was your feeling as a foreign policy expert sitting there watching the Senate scene in 1949 and '50?

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WILCOX: Well, I had some reservations about it. I thought General Marshall was unfairly criticized. I thought he did the best he could in the very difficult trip he took to China. I thought that it was rather foolish to engage in a political debate as to who lost China, because nobody lost China. The course of events were such that Chiang-Kai-shek, despite the help he got from us, was not able to maintain his position there and he had to go to Formosa. The Chinese Communists won out and we had to make the best of it. This got to be heavily involved in politics, and of course, my position generally was that I preferred to have the members of the Senate and members of the committee look at such problems in an objective way, and in a nonpartisan way, and not to let political considerations color their decisions too much. That's the attitude of a professional, I suppose, who tends to be more idealistic in his approach than maybe some of the political ly-oriented members of his committee. But when you work on Capitol Hill for a while you learn to live with these things and you appreciate the fact that the Congress is a political body after all. They're going to take advantage of situations like these that may give them some political advantage.

RITCHIE: When you had a senator like William Knowland on the committee, who really thought very differently about an issue, very passionately about an issue, than say of the rest of the members of the committee, how did the staff deal with Knowland? Would he come to you as a staff person for assistance, or would he go to outside

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sources, Alfred Kolhberg or someone like that to write speeches for him or to prepare things? He was so diametrically opposed to the prevailing sentiment, I wondered how the professional staff could deal with him, and whether or not he even made demands on the professional staff.

WILCOX: I had very good relations with Bill Knowland. During the floor debates he would, I think, respect the background and the knowledge of staff members and seek advice and help from them. He was not inclined to bypass the staff, nor was he suspicious of our attitudes. He may have gotten some help from outsiders or from the China Lobby. He probably was influenced by the China Lobby, no doubt. That's the reason they're there. But we had no great difficulty with either Senator Knowland or Senator Taft. I think that both of them began to appreciate more some of the problems involved in foreign policy as they became oriented in the work of the committee. Both Senator Knowland and Senator Taft were very effective senators. When you had their support on the floor obviously you were going to go far toward achieving your objective.

RITCHIE: On other thing: members of the Foreign Relations Committee tended to be some of the most powerful people in the Senate. They all seemed to be chairmen of other committees. It seemed like they gravitated toward the Foreign Relations Committee. Did you find

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that a senator who was also chairman of another committee, as say Walter George was chairman of the Finance Committee, or

WILCOX: Bill Fulbright was chairman of Banking and Currency.

RITCHIE: Right. Did they tend to use their own committee staff? A chairman of a committee who was also a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, would they come to the Foreign Relations Committee staff, or did they already have an entourage of staff they could turn to?

WILCOX: Well, I suppose all senators have certain loyalties toward some staff members of their own, but there was a considerable overlapping of chairmen with other committees. I think this was probably due to the fact that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was then, and I think it still is, the most prestigious committee on Capitol Hill, unless it be the Appropriations Committee. It was natural that some of these members of the Senate, chairmen of other committees should also be members of Foreign Relations. They don't do it today, so much, they're a little more careful about the way they spread these perquisites around. Bourke Hickenlooper was chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee and was a senior member of our committee. Some of them undoubtedly used some of their own staff, but when it came to Foreign Relations Committee problems they recognized that we were more conversant with those issues than their own staff members, so I think the tendency was normally to turn to the

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staff of the committee. Alexander Wiley was maybe an exception for a time because Julius Cahn was his administrative assistant and he took an interest in foreign policy and indeed later asked to be made a member of the committee staff. He came to all the meetings and he took an active part in the staff work that Senator Wiley required. We worked with him; he worked with us. But I think generally the tendency was for members to respect the integrity and the knowledge of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee.

RITCHIE: Did you find when you were on the committee that senators tended to defer to other senators who had expertise in a field, like Bourke Hickenlooper on Atomic Energy

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: Or Walter George on Finance? How does it work?

WILCOX: Well, we felt it was a good thing to have this kind of overlapping of committee assignments because we had a greater capacity to exchange views that were of mutual interest. Certainly the Banking and Currency Committee had quite a little to do with the problems that the Foreign Relations Committee took up, and similarly the Finance Committee with Walter George. So that if the

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problems under consideration involved treaties, double-tax treaties for example, this was of interest and importance to the Finance Committee and

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maybe the Banking and Currency Committee. We had considerable liaison at certain times with the Committee on Agriculture, which was important. One of the problems in the Senate and the House is that there isn't--there wasn't then and I don't think there is now in most cases--a very close working relationship between the standing committees. Each committee is a little entity or an island unto itself, with a staff director and a chairman and others on the committee working on their particular problems. They don't communicate as much as they should with either the staff or the committee members. Certainly there isn't as much communication among the staffs and among the committees as there should be in order to have a good overall view of what is happening, and an exchange of information that might be useful in exploring a problem that overlaps the interest of maybe several committees. This has been one of the things that I often noticed when I was on Capitol Hill and we tried to do something about it. We tried to improve relations with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for example and exchange information and ideas. We met with them from time to time.

RITCHIE: With members of the staff of the House committee?

WILCOX: Yes, and we tried to develop closer working relations with some of the other substantive committees of the Senate, but as I

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say there's not been a tendency to do this as much as I would like to see. We did have some joint meetings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees.

RITCHIE: Of course, the Senate staff was much smaller at that point, and I suppose it was easier to make contacts.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: Did you know most of the other staff directors?

WILCOX: Yes, I knew a good many of them. Appropriations and the critical ones, Commerce, Banking and Currency, Armed Services, Labor, most of the major committees I knew the staff director.

RITCHIE: I also wanted to ask you about the situation with the House. Looking back the House did seem to be the tail. The Senate would always act first on foreign policy issues and the House was in the position of having to go along, although at times they seemed more reluctant than the Senate to go along with the administration. I was wondering about the types of relations and how the senators like Vandenberg dealt with House members? Was it an equal relationship or did House members feel second-ranking? Did that cause some difficulties in relations?

WILCOX: Well, you know, House members always refer to the "Other House," they don't refer to the Senate as the "Upper House."

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They call it the "Other Body" when they talk about the other side of the Capitol. And Senate members react the same way. Sure, there's been a feeling on the Senate side that the House members are less important, and there's been a feeling on the House side that the senators are a bit snobbish, they're elected for six years after all. There are these feelings and these differences in point of view. I think it's recognized everywhere that the Senate committee is far more important because it handles not only legislation and hearings and so on, but it handles treaties and it handles nominations, two very important aspects of our foreign policy that the House doesn't get involved in.

There's been a shift in this regard, however, because in recent years with foreign policy costing so much, and the House being primarily responsible for money matters, the administration has had to recognize, and the Senate has had to recognize, that the House has a more influential role than it had twenty-five or thirty years ago. I know that there's a tendency to want the House members to come over to the Senate side rather than have the Senate members go over to the House side--except for the State of the Union address--so they tend to compromise on this, maybe even making it half way. There are these little differences that arise. And the jealousies may come up in little conference meetings between the House and Senate members. The tendency there is for the House members to hold the line and expect the Senate members to make the compromises because the Senate

members are so darned busy they don't want to stay, and the House members sometimes--like the Russians--they're willing to stay on and on and on to make their point. So there are these little differences; but I notice that whenever a House member can do so without serious jeopardy to his career, he is willing to run for a Senate seat from his state. But these are little differences that depend a lot on the individual and I think most senators treat House members with the courtesy and respect that is due them.

RITCHIE: I wondered how it worked into the legislative strategy. You work so hard to get something through the Senate and then it still has to go through the House. Did the professional staff members provide information and counsel to your House counterparts?

WILCOX: Yes, oh, yes. There is some of that on important issues where the House is importantly involved. We used to keep in close touch with Boyd Crawford, the staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at that time, and furnish him with information and ideas and any exchange of views that might be helpful in getting the approval of the House Committee for the matter under consideration. On the Marshall Plan, for example, the staffs of the two committees worked very closely together in developing the background data the Congress needed to consider the issues involved.

RITCHIE: Well, I have loads of other questions I'd like to ask, about the Korean war period, and the period when Alexander Wiley was chairman of the committee, but I think this might be a good breaking point for today.

WILCOX: All right.

End of Interview #2

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Francis O. Wilcox

Chief of Staff

Senate Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955

Interview #2:
Building Bipartisanship
(Friday, February 10, 1984)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

RITCHIE: The last time we talked about your coming to the Senate and being appointed chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Vandenberg in 1947. I wondered if you could start today by telling me a little about Arthur Vandenberg, and what type of a person he was to work for.



Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI)

WILCOX: Well, I am prejudiced when it comes to discussing Arthur Vandenberg. I must say he was a remarkable person in many ways. He was one of the few senators who really did his homework. When he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee he told his wife that she could have two nights a week out. The rest of the time they were in their apartment at the Wardman Park with Arthur Vandenberg doing his homework. He was very considerate of his staff. I don't know whether I mentioned this before, but when he appointed me as chief of staff he said, "Go out and get the best people you can find. Only remember, I will hold *you* responsible." He said that with a little twinkle in his eye, but I knew that he meant it even so. He would come over to the Foreign Relations Committee rooms where we had our offices--I think he liked to get away from the routine of his senatorial office--he would come over there every morning and put his feet up on my desk and talk about foreign policy,

and about the committee, and about the Senate, and about the State Department. He liked to exchange views and to test his ideas. His wife was equally solicitous of the staff. I remember she said that she was going to have a Christmas party--she was not at all well, she had terminal cancer. I think the senator urged her not to have the annual Christmas party, but she said, "Arthur, I'm going to have that Christmas party if it's the last thing I ever do." She had the party and she died shortly after that.

Arthur Vandenberg achieved a position of distinction in the Republican Senate, in the 80th Congress, so that he was looked upon as the leader in the field of foreign policy, while Bob Taft was looked upon as the leader in the Senate on the Republican side on domestic affairs. They got along really quite well. But Senator Vandenberg's attitude toward the Senate generally was that they were entitled to know everything that he knew, that they could not make up their minds unless they were fully informed, so he did his best to keep them fully informed. It was a remarkable thing that usually when he spoke there were sixty or so senators on the floor to hear him. This is, of course, quite unusual in the Senate because normally people aren't interested in hearing what senators have to say--unless they themselves are making the speech. But he treated members of the committee in a similarly solicitous way, making sure that they had every opportunity to get the information they needed to make up their minds in an objective way. Very often he would say, "Francis,

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Senator George isn't quite convinced that we should go down this path. I think we'd better have another meeting to see if we can't convince him."

Even though he may have had a majority of the votes in the committee, he nevertheless wanted to make sure that all the members were with him, and he took great pride in developing a feeling of unity and a spirit of unanimity in the committee. Indeed, as I recall, during his two years as chairman there was only one important vote that did not bring about a unanimous reaction from the committee, and that was I think of secondary importance. There was a personal reason why one of the senators didn't want to support a particular project. But he took great pride in that, and in those two years there was not one important vote that did not bring forth a unanimous reaction from the committee.

RITCHIE: Do you think that some of that was just the nature of who was on the committee, that they tended to think the way Vandenberg did, or was he really working behind the scenes to bring them all together into a consensus?

WILCOX: I think perhaps some of both. Certainly the latter was true. He did everything he could behind the scenes to convince them that they were going in the right direction. I think also, of course, there was a consensus in the country about our foreign policy at that time, which there isn't today. We had just emerged from a

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terrible world war, and I think everybody wanted to do what was possible to create the kind of conditions that would make a more permanent peace possible. We knew we had to do something, we had to move in the direction of a United Nations; and later when the time came I think the country realized that the Russians were misbehaving and that we needed to do something in addition to counter the threat of Russian aggression, so it was desirable to have something like the NATO treaty, the Greek-Turkish program, and similar defensive devices. It is true that if Senator Vandenberg had not been in the Senate at that time (or someone like him), to encourage the Republicans to move in that direction, I think it is true that--it is probable, I should say--that some of these things might not have been done. He carried the Republicans with him on all these crucial votes. But it's interesting to note that from the United Nations on down through the satellite peace treaties, the treaty with Japan, the NATO treaty, the Greek-Turkish program, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan; all of these things brought forth a strong show of support in the Senate, and I think that it was largely due to Arthur Vandenberg's leadership. Certainly if he had been on the other side of the fence the story would have been quite different. **RITCHIE:** He had made a very dramatic change in 1945, in his speech about becoming an internationalist. He had been a leading isolationist up to that point. That's largely what made him so

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valuable to the administration, since he was respected on one side and he had converted to the other, and carried people with him. Did you feel he had any lingering doubts? Having been an isolationist, was he worried about America becoming too involved in world affairs? Or when he made that conversion had he gone a hundred percent?

WILCOX: I don't know what you mean, Don, by a hundred percent. I don't think he had any strong doubts after Pearl Harbor. I think Pearl Harbor was the convincing demonstration to him that we lived in an interdependent world, that the United States could not remain isolationist. We had been pushed into the war whether we wanted to be or not, and there was no alternative. I think he felt that in the period after the war the only thing to do was to try and work with the other great powers to see if we could create the kind of world in which we might have a reasonable degree of stability.

RITCHIE: Senator Taft, on the other hand, who was equally respected by the Republicans in the Senate, really had very strong reservations about America's role overseas.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: So there was a different way that a Republican leader could have gone in that period.

WILCOX: Oh, indeed. That's the reason I think that Senator Vandenberg's leadership was so critical, because if he hadn't been

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there, and Bob Taft had been the leader of the Republicans on the international side as well as the domestic side, the situation might have been quite different. I must say, however, that after Bob Taft--and I always respected his intellectual ability, it was very great, there's no doubt about it--after Bob Taft became a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he grew in stature in the international field. I think he learned quite a little as a result of his experience on that committee and his mind began to change. You could see that before he died. His grasp of world affairs became better, bigger, broader, and he reacted as one who knew a little more about world affairs than he had earlier.

RITCHIE: Do you think it was basically that he hadn't paid very much attention to it, or as much attention as perhaps he had to other issues?

WILCOX: Well, I think that generally speaking there is a relationship between knowledge and rational behavior. I think that he had not been as knowledgeable in the field of foreign policy as he became in later years. The two things are related.

RITCHIE: In those morning sessions, when Vandenberg would come in and put his feet up on the desk, did he ever express concern about Taft, and Taft's influence on the people he had to convince?

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WILCOX: Oh, yes. He recognized that there was a conservative wing in the Republican party, and he had to do what he could to carry that wing with him, or at least to mute its strength, to make sure that a sizeable majority of the Republicans were with him. He was able to do that because as the vote would indicate in all the cases that I mentioned, there were a few people who opposed him, but for the most part the Republicans followed his leadership.

RITCHIE: It was an unusual circumstance. The Republicans had been out of the majority for decades. They were now in the majority again, and yet there was a Democratic president, and one whose reelection was very much in question. Were there any pressures on him to steer a more independent course from the White House?

WILCOX: Oh, yes, and of course there were plenty of opportunities to be critical of the administration and of the president and the Secretary of State. But I think by and large Senator Vandenberg had decided that what he was doing was in the national interest, and he tended to put party politics behind him when it came to foreign policy--not always on domestic policy, but when it came to foreign policy he operated this way. He felt that debate over foreign policy issues ought to be complete and rational, but that politics ought to stop at the water's edge when it came to foreign policy. I think he practiced that policy.

RITCHIE: How well do you think he got along with Harry Truman?

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WILCOX: Oh, I think he got along with him fairly well. He had known him as a senator. They had been on opposite sides of the fence on a good many issues, but I think he got along with him fairly well. President Truman recognized that it was

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Arthur Vandenberg's leadership in the Senate that brought the Republican element along with him. So both he and the Secretary of State George Marshall, and Dean Acheson, were appreciate of Vandenberg's efforts and they did what they could to keep him fully informed, and to consult with him on important issues. This was also especially true of Bob Lovett, who was under secretary of state for a period of time with General Marshall.

RITCHIE: Do you think they were going out of their way to stroke the senior Republican member because of their need to carry Republican votes?

WILCOX: Well, they certainly needed to carry Republican votes, especially in connection with treaties, because as you know it takes a two-thirds vote of the Senate to approve the ratification of a treaty, and the Democrats certainly didn't have a two-thirds vote, indeed they lacked a majority in the 80th Congress. So they would have been foolish indeed if they had not paid special attention to Vandenberg.

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RITCHIE: The reason why I asked that question was because for a while Vandenberg's role has been somewhat downplayed by people writing on that period--even some of the memoirs, Acheson and others--didn't credit Vandenberg.

WILCOX: Yes, you are quite right about that.

RITCHIE: Some of the journalists painted him to be sort of a pompous fellow, and really not as important as he seemed to be at the time. Now there seems to be another school of historians who are saying: wait, Vandenberg played a very important role. So there is some controversy over how significant his role was in the whole process, and you certainly were in a key position to observe that, and to see the relationship between the two sides, and whether or not the administration sincerely sought out Vandenberg's opinions. Was he really making a contribution to the foreign policy of the Truman administration?

WILCOX: Well, he most certainly did. Of course, as I say, I'm prejudiced, but it is obvious to me that he made a very important contribution. There's tendency on the part of political party leaders not to attribute too much--what shall I say?--not to give too much credit to the loyal opposition. They prefer to take the credit for themselves and their own leaders. It's only natural that they would not want to bestow upon Arthur Vandenberg all the laurels that he was due. I worked very closely with him for several years,

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particularly the two years that he was chairman, and my honest opinion is that he was an indispensable element in the political relationships that existed in the formulation of our foreign policy in that very critical period. Without him, of course you don't know what might have happened, but certainly he firmly believed in the idea of a nonpartisan foreign policy, and he worked toward that end.

Now, he was critical of some of the things that the administration did, and he pointed out that there wasn't a bipartisan policy with respect to China and the Middle East and certain other problem areas. But he felt that there was with respect to NATO and the Marshall Plan, where consultation between the executive branch and the legislative branch was full and complete. He felt that in connection with the United Nations also there had been a full and complete consultation. Secretary Hull had called in members of the Foreign Relations Committee--Democrats and Republicans alike--and they met from time to time to consider the kind of world order that we wanted to work toward. He felt that that was the way foreign policy ought to be formulated. But he repeated on several occasions when he was urged to be openly critical of the administration that he would call General Marshall and talk with him on the telephone, but that he would not take his story to the press. As he put it he "could not do that to George Marshall." He was reluctant to be critical of him in public because he felt that General Marshall was a real patriot.

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RITCHIE: Marshall's stature was particularly high in that period. Do you think that they had a personal friendship as well, or was it just that he admired Marshall?

WILCOX: There was no question but that he had great admiration for General Marshall. But my impression is that Marshall was not personally very friendly with anybody. You know, he was a little bit like George Washington--not the kind of person that you slapped on the back. General Marshall respected Vandenberg for what he did, in the way of contributing toward our foreign policy, and I think they got along quite well. Arthur Vandenberg's contacts during much of that period were with Bob Lovett, who was under secretary. He worked closely with him. They often met in Vandenberg's apartment in the Wardman Park in the evening, in the late afternoon, to develop, together, foreign policy ideas.

RITCHIE: How did Vandenberg use you as the chief of staff of the committee at that time? What types of things did he call upon you to do?

WILCOX: We advised with him on meetings that might be called, on matters that should come before the committee and the Senate, on hearings, on who should be heard at the hearings, on the kinds of questions that might be asked, and the possible outcome. We prepared committee reports for him. We did not normally prepare his important policy speeches, because he liked to prepare them himself. He did

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them on his own typewriter at home at night in the Wardman Park Hotel. He used me, and I guess some of the others from time to time, to share ideas with. He liked to talk about foreign policy problems, look at the different options before our country, and raise basic questions about what we should be doing. This was what I enjoyed most in my relationship with him.

He wasn't inclined to delegate full responsibility for important matters of that kind because he liked to get into the substance of foreign policy himself. So that when we took up the Greek-Turkish program we wrote a letter to every member of the Senate, inviting them to send to the committee the kinds of questions that they wanted answers for. He and I sat down one afternoon together, going over these questions and organizing them, arranging them in the form of a little booklet of questions. We got the answers from the executive branch for all these questions; these were in turn transmitted to the members of the Senate. This was one of the kinds of things he did with the staff to make sure that the Senate had all the information they needed. He leaned over backwards to assure his colleagues that he had an answer, or held get an answer, to all their questions. And he followed this formula on the Senate floor. He didn't try to avoid problems; he was very meticulous in giving full answers to every question that came up, regardless of who asked them.

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In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty hearings, he invited two conservative Republican senators to come to the committee hearings and ask all of the questions they wanted to ask. They took a good deal of the committee's time. He was very patient in his efforts to convince his colleagues on the Republican side that they were fully informed and that they had access to all the information that they needed to make sound decisions.

RITCHIE: I wonder if his solicitousness came out of his many years of being in the minority. When he finally got into the majority do you think he was more sensitive to the other side?

WILCOX: That might have been one of the factors, Don, but I think that he recognized his role as a kind of conciliator or mediator--an essential element in securing Republican support for important foreign policy issues--and he took his responsibilities very seriously. He felt that he could help develop with the administration the kind of foreign policy that would protect our national interest. This was the basis of his behavior, I think, all the way along.

RITCHIE: You described his patience with people. But I read once where you said he could be an impatient man. In what ways did you find him impatient?

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WILCOX: Well, I didn't find him impatient very often. He may have been in connection with some of his domestic activities and some of his other senatorial duties, but I didn't find him at all impatient in connection with the treatment of his colleagues. He accorded them every respect, showed them every courtesy, invited them to committee hearings, permitted them to ask question, and was quite responsive on the floor of the Senate. In private he may have expressed some unhappiness over the behavior of some of his colleagues, but he certainly didn't show that on the Senate floor or in the committee hearings.

RITCHIE: The first item that came up when he became chairman, as you mentioned, was the Greek-Turkish aid program, which Truman proposed to

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Congress early in 1947. There is an incident which is repeated in all of the books about diplomatic history at that time, in which the Senate and House leaders were invited to the White House for a briefing. Vandenberg said to Truman that the only way he was going to get his program through was to "scare hell out of the American people." Ever since then there has been a debate over what he really meant by that. I wondered if you were familiar with that, and if you have any feeling what Vandenberg meant by that remark, and what its impact was?

WILCOX: I don't think I can shed much light on that, Don. He may have said that. I suppose if he was reported to have said it he

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probably did. He was strong sometimes with his language. He had a way of presenting things in pictorial fashion, you know, with rather vigorous, strong language. I suppose that what he had in mind was the desirability of convincing the American people that we had to do this because of the serious threat of Communist aggression. I think he recognized that there would be a lot of opposition to it, for it cost a lot of money. And it was an important departure in United States foreign policy. This applied also to the Marshall Plan. To start rehabilitating western Europe you had to condition the American people to get them in the proper mood, and one way of doing that was to indicate the nature of the threat we faced in the world, both from the Communist side and from the potential inability of Europe to revive itself without our help. If we couldn't get these two points across to the American people, we'd be in serious trouble.

RITCHIE: The difficulty was to convince people that this was really directly in America's national security, to become involved in other areas of the world, rather than things that seemed perhaps more directly related. I suppose that in 1947 it might have been questionable what the United States' immediate needs were in places like Greece and Turkey. Did you get a sense that he was trying to educate both the Senate and the American people?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. I think he recognized the threat that came to the United States as a result of the withdrawal of Britain from

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the Middle East, and the threat of Soviet penetration in the area. And he realized that both the Senate and the American people were really somewhat unaware of this new development and the danger it brought to the free world. Since it represented a big departure in our foreign policy at least as sharp as the Monroe Doctrine, the American people weren't quite ready for it. So he had to convince the members of the Senate and the American people; and one way to do this is to scare people a little. You have to jar them. Sometimes the Senate, the House, the American people don't make up their minds to take action unless they are frightened a bit or confronted with a crisis. I am sure that's what he had in mind. You know, we don't take action in this country until a real crisis hits us. We don't normally think too far ahead.

RITCHIE: The other thing that Vandenberg is given quite a bit of credit for is when the Marshall Plan was first proposed the administration proposed it as a multi-year package, four or five years, \$17 billion, and it was Vandenberg who said they had to do it on a year-by-year basis. They cut it down, I think, to about \$6 billion the first year, or something like that. What is it about the United States Congress that tends to deal with aid programs in particular, and the Marshall Plan specifically, on a year-by-year basis rather than on a long-range basis?

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WILCOX: Well, I've wondered about that, too, Don, but I think the simple fact is that they like to keep control of the situation. If they give the executive branch sufficient funds to run a four-year program of that magnitude, without having a chance to review it on an annual basis, they feel that it's giving the executive branch too much authority. So they have scheduled their hearings and their appropriations on an annual basis, and the budget is on an annual basis. Now, in some cases I think this wrong, because what you need is sufficient lead time in certain situations, like foreign aid, where you should be in a position to plan over a period of time. Everybody talked about a four year program for the Marshall Plan, and that was the original proposal. But I think Vandenberg helped satisfy his Republican critics by making sure that they would have a chance to look at this program every year during its duration. Also the psychological effect of presenting the Congress with a \$16 billion program was an important factor. Certainly the members could digest a \$4 billion program much more easily than a four-year package. A number of things Vandenberg did were geared to the need to carry the Republican group along with him in the Senate. I think, though, that what you imply is quite correct, certainly in the construction of battleships and things of that sort that are done over a period of time it's unwise to base long range planning on annual appropriations. Congress does have the right to keep looking at these things but it can seriously handicap planning in the development

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field, for example, if those who are doing the planning don't have an opportunity to look ahead maybe several years to visualize the ultimate outcome.

RITCHIE: When the Marshall Plan was being discussed, and other aid programs, did they envision a permanent role of America in providing aid, or was this seen as just an emergency, stop-gap program? Do you think that people in the 1940s had some sense of what the continuing role was going to be?

WILCOX: No, I don't think so at the time of the Marshall Plan in any case. As the years rolled by they began to realize that more countries outside the western European area were going to be in real need, particularly as they began to gain their independence in the 1950s and '60s. They began to realize that these new countries obviously would have to have some economic and military help. But at the time of the Marshall Plan I think they felt that this was primarily the task of helping Europe rehabilitate itself, and they weren't at that point contemplating huge aid programs for the world generally. That came later.

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RITCHIE: The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were in a sense unilateral actions on the part of the United States to intervene, to take the place of the British in Greece, to provide aid to Europe. Was there any sense of conflict being that and the United Nations

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ideal of multilateral action? Was there concern that the administration was tending towards not working with the United Nations on these issues?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. This question came up always in connection with these programs in the 1940s after we had joined the United Nations. There was a considerable degree of loyalty in the Senate to the idea of multilateral action through the United Nations, so that whenever something came up like the Greek-Turkish program, the Democratic members particularly had to be reassured, and some of the Republicans too, that we were not undermining our loyalties to the United Nations, we were not forgetting our obligations there. In the Greek-Turkish aid program, the bill itself provides that--I've forgotten now the exact language--but in any event there is some reference to the possibility that the United Nations might take action, and in the event they did act, and our assistance proved unnecessary or undesirable, we would stop our aid to Greece and Turkey. I don't recall exactly the language, but in any event our obligations to the United Nations are explicitly recognized in the Greek-Turkish aid program. That was one thing that made it possible to get acceptance for the program in the Senate. Without it, I think, there would have been real trouble.

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RITCHIE: What do you think was Vandenberg's instinct in this case. Was he troubled over the conflict between the unilateral and the multilateral approach?

WILCOX: No, he wasn't troubled. I think he was very anxious to see the United Nations succeed. He'd been one of the framers of the charter and he was interested in doing everything possible to protect our relationship with the United Nations. But he also was aware of the opposition in the Senate to any action of this kind that would result in undermining our relations to the United Nations. So he was willing to take steps to effect some kind of a compromise with a proper bow towards the United Nations.

RITCHIE: He was also the author of the Vandenberg Resolution, which paved the way for the creation of NATO.

WILCOX: Yes. He and Bob Lovett were largely responsible.

RITCHIE: Again there were these two different paths in which the United States could go. Could you describe a little of the background to the Vandenberg Resolution? Did you work with him on that?

WILCOX: Yes. Oh, yes. The trouble arose, of course, because of the excessive use of the veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. There was at that time a tendency on Capitol Hill to look at all other possibilities for world order. The United Nations wasn't doing very well, so the members of Congress began to look at

all the other possibilities in the world, such as the Federal Union idea, the Clarence Streit concept of Union Now, and other proposals of this kind. The idea arose that maybe if we had some kind of a regional defense arrangement like the Rio Treaty, this would supplement the provisions of the United Nations Charter and make possible the collective defense of the western world. We began to talk about that as a result of the prolonged hearings that were held on Capitol Hill. The main supporters of this approach were Vandenberg and Lovett, and they met, as I said, frequently to talk about how this might be done without affecting adversely our relationship with the United Nations. As Vandenberg used to put it: "within the Charter but outside the veto." I met with the Department of State people from time to time, in my office, evolving the text of a resolution which was in turn evaluated and improved by Vandenberg and Lovett in their confidential meetings. Ted Achilles from the State Department came up on a number of occasions and we went over the text of the resolution and made suggestions for its improvement. Finally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the resolution, which provided for the possibility of creating some kind of a regional defense arrangement.

The language was a little bit vague. It didn't expressly say there would be a NATO Treaty and a NATO installation in Europe, but

it provided for the possibility of regional and other collective defense arrangements. The Senate passed it one afternoon by a vote of 64 to 4, as I recall, without very much debate. It's interesting, because this was the forerunner, this was the green light to the executive branch to go ahead and negotiate the North Atlantic Treaty for the collective defense of the Western world. It had very little debate on the Senate floor. I'm not sure that the Senate understood fully what they were proposing, but they did.

RITCHIE: Do you think Vandenberg understood fully what was involved?

WILCOX: I think so. When you look at it, though, in retrospect, the NATO Treaty was concluded after a good deal of negotiating, as you know. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had an opportunity to look at it on several occasions before it was finally concluded, and the members did make a number of recommendations that resulted in important changes in the treaty text. But I don't think that any of the senators who voted for the Vandenberg Resolution, or for the North Atlantic Treaty for that matter, had any real notion of the kind of organization that was to develop when NATO came into being: the extensive infrastructure, the communication system, the transportation system, the plan for the defense of Europe, the headquarters, the staff, and all the rest. I don't think any of the senators had a very good notion of the extent to which their vote for

the North Atlantic Treaty would be developed or that they had any real knowledge of the kind of result that would take place. In their wildest dreams I don't think they would have thought of that, because the treaty itself--a very short document--offered the base for literally hundreds of executive agreements between the United States and the other NATO countries. And it was as a result of this network of executive agreements that the NATO system evolved into the elaborate defense structure we see today.

RITCHIE: And beyond that, collective security arrangements all over the world: SEATO, CENTO. It was just the beginning.

WILCOX: Yes, that was the philosophy that Secretary Dulles had anyway--of developing collective defense pacts for the Middle East and Asia, and of course, the Rio Pact with the Latin American countries had been consummated before the United Nations Charter was ratified. Nothing was said or done about Africa at that point, because the countries of Africa mostly remained within the empires or the domain of the mother countries.

RITCHIE: The whole concept of executive agreements removed a lot of Senate control over foreign policy, since presidents were making agreements without having to send them back for ratification as treaties. The number of executive agreements increased considerably, and much of the legislation that was passed at that time gave presidents a larger share in foreign policy. We began the process

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building the "Imperial Presidency" under probably the least imperious of modern presidents. Do you think that senators like Vandenberg and others had a sense of the power shift that was going involving presidents and foreign policy? Was there concern on their part?

WILCOX: Oh, I think they recognized it, but it wasn't until maybe a little later that the use of executive agreements developed the way it did. When the executive branch had trouble getting treaties through the Senate, they began to think of other ways of achieving their purpose. During the 140s and the period when we were building for the post-war era, and when there was a real consensus in the country about our foreign policy objectives--and good bipartisan relationships--I don't think there was quite the same need for executive agreements as there was later on. It was afterwards, in the '50s and '60s that we began to notice a rather important trend on the part of the executive branch to resort to executive agreements rather than to treaties, partly because of the increase in business in the world in international affairs, and partly because of the desire to avoid the two-thirds vote in the Senate for the approval of treaties. Certainly by the '60s this had developed to a point where there was real concern on Capitol Hill. Then in the early 170s, as you know, steps were taken to make sure that the Congress at least had knowledge of the executive agreements that were concluded. Before that, there wasn't any assurance that the Senate knew about them even, in some cases. Now, under the terms of the Case-Zablocki Act, they are

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sent regularly to the Senate so at least there is an opportunity to find out what's going on in the executive branch. The arrangement seems to be working fairly well.

RITCHIE: The election of 1948 turned out very differently than everybody anticipated, both in the presidency and the Senate. Did Vandenberg see the handwriting on the wall, or was he as surprised as everybody else?

WILCOX: I think he was surprised. We'd talked about the election on various occasions. He would list all the reasons why he shouldn't be President of the United States. His name had been proposed as a likely candidate, as you know, earlier. He apparently had thought this through very carefully and had a whole list of reasons why he shouldn't be a candidate, including the fact that he felt at home in the legislative branch--that is where he could exercise the most influence and could be most effective. He had not been an executive. He thought that someone like Tom Dewey would be a lot better equipped than he. So he talked himself out of the race. Then he envisaged the very hopeful prospect, from his point of view, that Tom Dewey, Foster Dulles, and Arthur Vandenberg would be a superb team of leaders, exceptionally well equipped, certainly to conduct foreign policy. He was looking forward to that, and he, like most everybody else, thought Tom Dewey was going to win the election. The morning after the election, he walked into my office, took his cigar

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out of his mouth, and said about Harry Truman, "You've got to give the little guy credit. There he was flat on his back. Everyone had counted him out, but he came up fighting and won the battle." He said not one word of criticism but only admiration for the great effort President Truman had put forth, although I knew he was terribly disappointed.

RITCHIE: Of course; also he lost the chairmanship of the committee with the Democrats winning the majority of the Senate.

WILCOX: Yes. The next year Tom Connally came back as chairman of the committee.

RITCHIE: Did that change Vandenberg's role in the Senate, or was he still as influential in the minority as he had been in the majority?

WILCOX: Well, the majority still had to look to the minority for support because, as you know, in the Senate in the foreign policy field, indeed in most domestic issues, the majority still has to look to the minority for support. This is certainly true in connection with treaties. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty. Vandenberg supported that even though he was not then the chairman when it was finally approved. So his role remained not as important in a way as it had been, because he couldn't run the committee any more. He still had a lot to say about the minority members of the committee

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and their attitude about foreign policy. His leadership of the committee declined, obviously, but he still worked fairly closely with Senator Connally. The two of them cooperated reasonably well. There was jealousy involved on the part of Senator Connally, but they got along reasonably well because I think Connally knew that he had to have Vandenberg's support to get the job done. And, of course, I was in a good position to encourage that feeling.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask you about that, because it must have been very difficult for someone like Connally, who obviously had a large ego, to deal with Vandenberg, who was getting such good publicity and so much attention from the Democratic administration. Did you sense Connally's chaffing under that?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. It was apparent that Connally did not have the intellectual apparatus that Vandenberg did, and there was, as I say, a little feeling of jealousy on his part, particularly when the administration continued to pay a lot of attention to Vandenberg. Indeed, I had to remind the administration from time to time not to neglect Senator Connally, because it was important to Vandenberg as well as Connally that the two work together. Sometimes the administration forgets these things, and you have to remind them not to forget to consult with key people.

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RITCHIE: Do you think that an administration tends to assume that the members of its own party are automatically going to be good foot soldiers, but they have to go a little further down the road for someone from the opposition party?

WILCOX: Well, they better not do that in the Congress of today, because the members of Congress as you know are very assertive. They are inclined to be very independent, and the new members, especially the younger members, flaunt their independence in a rather obvious way. The executive branch has to be really very careful with both parties in Congress these days and not take for granted their own party members. Indeed, I think they realize that. We have had some good assistant secretaries of state, and some good secretaries, who have recognized that both parties had to be brought along with important decisions.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that Connally clearly wasn't as intellectual a senator as Vandenberg was. Did Connally lean on Vandenberg, or turn to him for advice?

WILCOX: Yes, he realized--perhaps reluctantly--that he needed Senator Vandenberg's support on important issues in the committee. He recognized Senator Vandenberg's intellectual ability and his influence in the Senate. So he did, I think, depend on him, and lean on him, and was careful not to offend him. He used to call him "Old

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Van" when he talked to me about Vandenberg. Held say, "Old Van", "we want to get Old Van in on this." (On his part, Vandenberg referred to Connally as "Old Tom.")

RITCHIE: Did you find any change in your role, or the staff role, in the change between the Republican majority and the Democratic majority?

WILCOX: No. I had first worked for Senator Connally and he seemed quite content to have me continue on as his staff director. I think that in some ways he leaned on the staff a little more than Senator Vandenberg did, but in some ways less so, because he was not inclined to come in and sit down and put his feet up on my desk and talk at length about foreign policy. I don't think he was that much interested in foreign policy problems, the substance of foreign policy. I found him easy to get along with. I don't think he was quite as solicitous of the staff as Senator Vandenberg. For instance, he didn't throw an annual Christmas party for the staff as Vandenberg had. He didn't write his own speeches as Vandenberg did, but he relied upon us for the normal staff functions. He would expect us to set up committee meetings and the agenda, prepare the kinds of questions that should be asked of witnesses before the committee, to keep him informed of important developments, to recommend the kinds of meetings that we needed, and the kinds of problems that we needed to discuss, handle relations with the executive branch, and so on. He

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would look to us for advice of that kind, and on the Senate floor, of course, I always sat with him whenever we had an important issue on foreign policy. We tried to keep him properly briefed so that he could defend the treaty or the piece of legislation that happened to be on the floor.

RITCHIE: Did you find you had to provide him with more information when you sat next to him in the Senate than you did Vandenberg?

WILCOX: Yes, I think so. Senator Vandenberg, as I said, did his homework pretty thoroughly. Senator Connally wasn't inclined to do his homework as thoroughly as Vandenberg.

RITCHIE: Who wrote Connally's speeches for him? Was it your staff or his own staff?

WILCOX: We did it. I did some, and Pat Holt did some. Carl Marcy might have. Both were very good writers. We'd collaborate, depending upon the issue, and who the staff person was responsible for a particular matter, and how important the problem was. Very important problems I would sit on the floor with him, and in some cases where we had a technical problem he needed to explain or defend the staff member responsible for that particular question would be with him.

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RITCHIE: He seems to have done pretty well in the repartee of debate. He was famous for the humorous put-down, and the bombastic response, sort of a stump-speaker's training.

WILCOX: Yes, he was very good at that. Sometimes he was a little abrupt; sometimes a little abrasive; sometimes he turned people off; sometimes he said things that he shouldn't have said, but on the whole he handled floor debate pretty well. For example, one day the Senate was discussing the question of

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neutrality in war time and the use of weapons, and the fact that you couldn't always choose the weapons you were going to use--this would depend upon the adversary. He illustrated this point by telling the story of two men in Texas before the War Between the States. They were talking about the impending conflict, and one of them said to the other: "Aw, let them come. I think we can lick the damned Yankees with cornstalks." So the war came and went, and the two cronies met on the street corner again and were talking about what had happened. One of them said, "Say, I thought you said we could lick the damned Yankees with cornstalks?" The other said, "Yeah, but the trouble is the doggone Yankees wouldn't fight us with cornstalks." Now that's the kind of illustrative story that he could tell on occasion. And I've seen him put Bob Taft down rather abruptly, in a way that Vandenberg would not have done. His repartee was good. He was sharp and he had a quick tongue, and a quick temper. He was inclined to be more political in

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his approach on the Senate floor. I think he allowed politics to play a more important role than Vandenberg did in his consideration of foreign policy questions.

RITCHIE: Did this work against the type of consensus that Vandenberg had been trying to build in the committee and in the Senate?

WILCOX: Yes, there was some--I suppose in a sense Senator Connally was not as dedicated to the idea of non-partisan foreign policy as Vandenberg, and consequently it made it a little more difficult for Vandenberg to do the things that he wanted to do.

RITCHIE: Vandenberg became ill in the summer of 1949, and was in and out and not there for a while. Did this create problems, the fact that he was no longer around to lend his prestige to the bipartisan program?

WILCOX: Yes. I think it did, without any question. He was missed, he was sorely missed. The best answer to your question was expressed in the *New York Times*, when Vandenberg became seriously ill. It was obvious he could not resume his duties in the Senate. The *Times* printed a remarkable editorial about the senator's role of leadership, and remarked that "Even the Democrats miss the clear, authoritative voice [of Vandenberg] that rises above the buzz of party politics to define American policy to the world. For Senator

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Vandenberg's distinction is that he had given leadership to both parties in the development of foreign policy, and more than any other American has lined up behind it the massive popular support that has been our greatest asset in the post-war years. This leadership is lacking today." This is a reasonably good evaluation of the sentiment at the time that he became seriously ill and it became known that he couldn't resume his duties. He continued to exercise some influence by correspondence, but obviously he was in bed and under a doctor's care, and as he became more seriously ill he had less and less to say. But he continued to be interested up to--I won't say the very day that he died, but till

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very shortly before he died he was interested in what was going on. I had some correspondence with him during his illness to keep him abreast a little of what was going on.

RITCHIE: There really wasn't anyone to step in to fill the void that he left. There wasn't any Republican member of the committee who had the same stature.

WILCOX: No, there really wasn't at that time. But people come and go in this country and nobody is indispensable. The committee continued to do a pretty good job with Tom Connally, and Alex Wiley, and Walter George as chairmen during the next six years.

RITCHIE: But among the Republican leadership, the really powerful Republicans weren't members of the committee at that time. Taft

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hadn't come on the committee; Wherry was outside the committee. The people who were really leading the party weren't necessarily the Wileys and the Henry Cabot Lodges.

WILCOX: No, that's right. You're quite right.

RITCHIE: Did that create a problem for bipartisanship? Did you sense that it was pulling apart at that stage?

WILCOX: I don't think that it pulled apart in the early 1950s, until maybe '55 or '56 or in the later '50s maybe. It seemed to me to begin to deteriorate a little bit. But President Eisenhower was respected by both parties and he favored a bipartisan approach. Certainly by the time the Vietnam War came along it had pretty well fallen apart. But I don't think that Vandenberg's departure from the scene meant an immediate eclipse of the bipartisan approach, because it was used in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty, in connection with the Southeast Asian collective defense pact, and other matters that I think fitted into the pattern of our post-war diplomacy.

RITCHIE: Well, for the Truman administration, who was it for them to turn to on the Republican side after Vandenberg wasn't on the scene anymore? Who did they use as a conduit, or who did they listen to?

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WILCOX: Well, as you say, they had a problem. The remaining Republican committee members weren't as effective in the Senate. There was Alexander Wiley and Alex Smith of New Jersey, Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, and his colleague Guy Gillette. And Henry Cabot Lodge. These were, as I remember, the members who were on board at that time. Senator Smith was not a strong senator, but he was thorough and very dedicated. I think the administration tended to rely on him some because he was a Republican, after all, and he was loyal to the administration. Cabot Lodge had some influence and was a very good senator, and was often looked upon as one who could make a short speech very effectively in the Senate. He liked short speeches, but he spoke well. Bourke Hickenlooper from Iowa was a good senator, not an exceptional one--but solid--and he usually did what I thought were the right things. There wasn't anyone,

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though, who had the stature of Vandenberg. These were all fairly good senators, the ones I mentioned, but they didn't have the stature of Vandenberg and, therefore, there was no one that the administration could turn to--that is, in quite the same way.

RITCHIE: You also had the switch in the State Department from Marshall to Acheson. Marshall seemed to have a better relationship with Congress, or at least was respected widely. Acheson seemed to be a little more prickly figure.

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WILCOX: Yes, he was a little more abrasive. However, I thought Dean Acheson was a very capable Secretary of State; he and Foster Dulles were two of the most successful ones, the most able ones. But Dean Acheson did have a tendency to look down his nose at some members of Congress whom he thought were not as well-equipped mentally as he was, and who didn't understand all the ins and outs of foreign policy as he did. I think he tended to look down on them, or at least they felt he was looking down on them. I'm not sure that he did, but this was their reaction. Also there was some question when he was inaugurated as Secretary of State, some question about his feeling toward the Soviet Union and toward Communism. In order to assure Senate support for him on the Republican side, Vandenberg questioned him on his attitude toward Communism, and even wrote out a little statement for Acheson to agree to, which he did, about his opposition to international Communism. But I think he proved himself to be a very able Secretary of State. There was this little friction between Acheson and Vandenberg at the outset, but I think Vandenberg did it to win the support of his party in favor of the appointment.

RITCHIE: Friction between Vandenberg and Acheson?

WILCOX: Well, I was referring to the little note that he wrote about Acheson's opposition to communism. This assured the members of his party that they were supporting a good Secretary of State, one

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that they could stand behind. Nevertheless, from the letters Acheson wrote to Vandenberg it is obvious that he had a good deal of respect for the Senate.

RITCHIE: It's pretty remarkable that a Republican senator would draft a statement for a Democratic Secretary of State to make to convince other Republican senators to vote for him!

WILCOX: It's not customary, obviously, but much of the discussion in the committee centered around this question, and Senator Vandenberg--as the meeting progressed--drafted a little note. I don't know whether Dean Acheson modified it a bit, I've forgotten now, but anyhow that was the basis for support for him.

RITCHIE: In the 80th Congress you had someone like Vandenberg making actual political suggestions to the Truman administration: don't present the Marshall Plan as a four-year plan, do it as a one-year plan; do this to help you get it through; this is the way to deal with Congress. Now you had Acheson coming in

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as Secretary of State, just about the point when Vandenberg was fading from the scene, although there was some overlap. Was there anybody who had that kind of political insight that Acheson could lean upon, or do you think that some of the rough edges of Acheson's political career had to do with the fact that he didn't understand the legislative process as well and didn't have that kind of advice?

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WILCOX: Well, he should have understood the legislative process fairly well because he had served for a time as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and he had dealt with a good many members of the Congress. But I think the point you make is a valid one: he didn't have quite the same person that he could turn to that George Marshall had. It is true that the Acheson Vandenberg terms overlapped somewhat. I can remember Acheson coming before the Foreign Relations Committee with the North Atlantic Treaty text and discussing it with the members of the committee, and Vandenberg was active in the discussion at that time. So there was a short period of time when the two worked together. But the fact that Vandenberg disappeared from the scene was a handicap which had an effect upon the term of Dean Acheson.

RITCHIE: There seemed to be much more of a consensus in the Senate and in the United States about European affairs, and American versus Soviet activities, than over Asian affairs. It seems as if there was two different approaches. The Asian issues were much more divisive and raised a great hue and cry on the Senate floor. Do you have any explanation for the difference in the way America looked across the Atlantic as opposed to across the Pacific?

WILCOX: Much of it came from the debate which took place as a result of the removal of Chiang-Kai-shek to the island of Formosa, now called Taiwan. The Republicans, of course, charged that the

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Democrats "lost" China--and one could argue as to whether anybody "lost" China--but the fact is that the Kuomintang faction that we were supporting lost out in their bid to defeat the Communist element on the mainland, so the Nationalists moved to Formosa. There was a good deal of feeling among the Republicans that the administration hadn't handled this matter very well, and since this was a political issue that had not been dealt with in a bipartisan way, they felt free to criticize. And in the Foreign Relations Committee I remember that we added \$75 million to the authorization for aid programs to be spent--I've forgotten how they put it--in the general area of China, the Asian area. In any case, it was thought that this might be helpful to the Chiang-Kai-shek regime. Then, of course, the China Lobby became very strong in Washington, and put a lot of heat on in the next few years to maintain the opposition to mainland China and to support the Chiang-Kai-shek regime in Formosa. We did everything we could in those days, in the 1950s, to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations and in all the other international organizations, and at international conferences,

and we did everything we could to keep the Communist Chinese out of the United Nations and the various international conferences that were held in that period. Part of the problem stemmed from General Marshall's trip to China to see if he couldn't help promote a reasonable solution to the problem. There was a lot of controversy, you will recall, in Washington as to whether General Marshall had performed his duty

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satisfactorily or whether he had been hoodwinked in some way. This continued to be a divisive factor in the foreign policy of the United States and certainly in the Senate. The Republicans were more or less convinced that the Democrats had been responsible for the "loss of China." I happened to be in the State Department later in the 1950s and it was my responsibility, as Assistant Secretary of State, to take those steps necessary to keep Communist China out of the United Nations and to make sure that the position of the Nationalist regime was protected, and I can assure you that we did everything that was humanly possible to achieve this objective, until we arrived at the point where it became apparent that the other members of the international community would not support our position.

RITCHIE: When you were still on the Senate staff, did you feel the pressure of the China Lobby? Did you sense their pressure on the members of the Foreign Relations Committee?

WILCOX: I didn't feel it personally. I don't think they bothered me very much as I recall, but certainly as the years went by the pressure from the China Lobby became greater and this was one of the things, of course, one of the principal factors that led us to pursue the policy that we did in support of Chiang-Kai-shek. It was only a Republican president like Dick Nixon who could not be accused of being a Communist, or pro-Communist, it was only someone like him

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who could change the course of events. His trip to Asia in 1973 and the Shanghai communique, of course, changed the picture.

RITCHIE: You also began to get some new members of the committee, people like William Knowland and Taft, who were sympathetic to Chiang-Kai-shek . . .

WILCOX: Strongly sympathetic, yes.

RITCHIE: Did that change the atmosphere in the committee?

WILCOX: Well, I think it certainly made it more explicit and more concrete. Senator Knowland was as strong an advocate of Chiang-Kai-shek as you could find anywhere, so he made his views known quite clearly during that period after Chiang-Kai-shek went to Formosa. I don't know that it changed the attitude of the committee very much in this regard. There were no specific things that came before the committee in the way of treaties or legislation that had a direct bearing upon the problem, but certainly whenever the issue arose, Senator Knowland and Senator Taft made their views known very emphatically.

RITCHIE: You had people like [Kenneth] Wherry, and you had Joe McCarthy in the Senate, a very vocal group. What was your feeling as a foreign policy expert sitting there watching the Senate scene in 1949 and '50?

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WILCOX: Well, I had some reservations about it. I thought General Marshall was unfairly criticized. I thought he did the best he could in the very difficult trip he took to China. I thought that it was rather foolish to engage in a political debate as to who lost China, because nobody lost China. The course of events were such that Chiang-Kai-shek, despite the help he got from us, was not able to maintain his position there and he had to go to Formosa. The Chinese Communists won out and we had to make the best of it. This got to be heavily involved in politics, and of course, my position generally was that I preferred to have the members of the Senate and members of the committee look at such problems in an objective way, and in a nonpartisan way, and not to let political considerations color their decisions too much. That's the attitude of a professional, I suppose, who tends to be more idealistic in his approach than maybe some of the political ly-oriented members of his committee. But when you work on Capitol Hill for a while you learn to live with these things and you appreciate the fact that the Congress is a political body after all. They're going to take advantage of situations like these that may give them some political advantage.

RITCHIE: When you had a senator like William Knowland on the committee, who really thought very differently about an issue, very passionately about an issue, than say of the rest of the members of the committee, how did the staff deal with Knowland? Would he come to you as a staff person for assistance, or would he go to outside

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sources, Alfred Kolhberg or someone like that to write speeches for him or to prepare things? He was so diametrically opposed to the prevailing sentiment, I wondered how the professional staff could deal with him, and whether or not he even made demands on the professional staff.

WILCOX: I had very good relations with Bill Knowland. During the floor debates he would, I think, respect the background and the knowledge of staff members and seek advice and help from them. He was not inclined to bypass the staff, nor was he suspicious of our attitudes. He may have gotten some help from outsiders or from the China Lobby. He probably was influenced by the China Lobby, no doubt. That's the reason they're there. But we had no great difficulty with either Senator Knowland or Senator Taft. I think that both of them began to appreciate more some of the problems involved in foreign policy as they became oriented in the work of the committee. Both Senator Knowland and Senator Taft were very effective senators. When you had their support on the floor obviously you were going to go far toward achieving your objective.

RITCHIE: On other thing: members of the Foreign Relations Committee tended to be some of the most powerful people in the Senate. They all seemed to be chairmen of other committees. It seemed like they gravitated toward the Foreign Relations Committee. Did you find

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that a senator who was also chairman of another committee, as say Walter George was chairman of the Finance Committee, or

WILCOX: Bill Fulbright was chairman of Banking and Currency.

RITCHIE: Right. Did they tend to use their own committee staff? A chairman of a committee who was also a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, would they come to the Foreign Relations Committee staff, or did they already have an entourage of staff they could turn to?

WILCOX: Well, I suppose all senators have certain loyalties toward some staff members of their own, but there was a considerable overlapping of chairmen with other committees. I think this was probably due to the fact that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was then, and I think it still is, the most prestigious committee on Capitol Hill, unless it be the Appropriations Committee. It was natural that some of these members of the Senate, chairmen of other committees should also be members of Foreign Relations. They don't do it today, so much, they're a little more careful about the way they spread these perquisites around. Bourke Hickenlooper was chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee and was a senior member of our committee. Some of them undoubtedly used some of their own staff, but when it came to Foreign Relations Committee problems they recognized that we were more conversant with those issues than their own staff members, so I think the tendency was normally to turn to the

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staff of the committee. Alexander Wiley was maybe an exception for a time because Julius Cahn was his administrative assistant and he took an interest in foreign policy and indeed later asked to be made a member of the committee staff. He came to all the meetings and he took an active part in the staff work that Senator Wiley required. We worked with him; he worked with us. But I think generally the tendency was for members to respect the integrity and the knowledge of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee.

RITCHIE: Did you find when you were on the committee that senators tended to defer to other senators who had expertise in a field, like Bourke Hickenlooper on Atomic Energy

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: Or Walter George on Finance? How does it work?

WILCOX: Well, we felt it was a good thing to have this kind of overlapping of committee assignments because we had a greater capacity to exchange views that were of mutual interest. Certainly the Banking and Currency Committee had quite a little to do with the problems that the Foreign Relations Committee took up, and similarly the Finance Committee with Walter George. So that if the

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problems under consideration involved treaties, double-tax treaties for example, this was of interest and importance to the Finance Committee and

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maybe the Banking and Currency Committee. We had considerable liaison at certain times with the Committee on Agriculture, which was important. One of the problems in the Senate and the House is that there isn't--there wasn't then and I don't think there is now in most cases--a very close working relationship between the standing committees. Each committee is a little entity or an island unto itself, with a staff director and a chairman and others on the committee working on their particular problems. They don't communicate as much as they should with either the staff or the committee members. Certainly there isn't as much communication among the staffs and among the committees as there should be in order to have a good overall view of what is happening, and an exchange of information that might be useful in exploring a problem that overlaps the interest of maybe several committees. This has been one of the things that I often noticed when I was on Capitol Hill and we tried to do something about it. We tried to improve relations with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for example and exchange information and ideas. We met with them from time to time.

RITCHIE: With members of the staff of the House committee?

WILCOX: Yes, and we tried to develop closer working relations with some of the other substantive committees of the Senate, but as I

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say there's not been a tendency to do this as much as I would like to see. We did have some joint meetings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees.

RITCHIE: Of course, the Senate staff was much smaller at that point, and I suppose it was easier to make contacts.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: Did you know most of the other staff directors?

WILCOX: Yes, I knew a good many of them. Appropriations and the critical ones, Commerce, Banking and Currency, Armed Services, Labor, most of the major committees I knew the staff director.

RITCHIE: I also wanted to ask you about the situation with the House. Looking back the House did seem to be the tail. The Senate would always act first on foreign policy issues and the House was in the position of having to go along, although at times they seemed more reluctant than the Senate to go along with the administration. I was wondering about the types of relations and how the senators like Vandenberg dealt with House members? Was it an equal relationship or did House members feel second-ranking? Did that cause some difficulties in relations?

WILCOX: Well, you know, House members always refer to the "Other House," they don't refer to the Senate as the "Upper House."

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They call it the "Other Body" when they talk about the other side of the Capitol. And Senate members react the same way. Sure, there's been a feeling on the Senate side that the House members are less important, and there's been a feeling on the House side that the senators are a bit snobbish, they're elected for six years after all. There are these feelings and these differences in point of view. I think it's recognized everywhere that the Senate committee is far more important because it handles not only legislation and hearings and so on, but it handles treaties and it handles nominations, two very important aspects of our foreign policy that the House doesn't get involved in.

There's been a shift in this regard, however, because in recent years with foreign policy costing so much, and the House being primarily responsible for money matters, the administration has had to recognize, and the Senate has had to recognize, that the House has a more influential role than it had twenty-five or thirty years ago. I know that there's a tendency to want the House members to come over to the Senate side rather than have the Senate members go over to the House side--except for the State of the Union address--so they tend to compromise on this, maybe even making it half way. There are these little differences that arise. And the jealousies may come up in little conference meetings between the House and Senate members. The tendency there is for the House members to hold the line and expect the Senate members to make the compromises because the Senate

members are so darned busy they don't want to stay, and the House members sometimes--like the Russians--they're willing to stay on and on and on to make their point. So there are these little differences; but I notice that whenever a House member can do so without serious jeopardy to his career, he is willing to run for a Senate seat from his state. But these are little differences that depend a lot on the individual and I think most senators treat House members with the courtesy and respect that is due them.

RITCHIE: I wondered how it worked into the legislative strategy. You work so hard to get something through the Senate and then it still has to go through the House. Did the professional staff members provide information and counsel to your House counterparts?

WILCOX: Yes, oh, yes. There is some of that on important issues where the House is importantly involved. We used to keep in close touch with Boyd Crawford, the staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at that time, and furnish him with information and ideas and any exchange of views that might be helpful in getting the approval of the House Committee for the matter under consideration. On the Marshall Plan, for example, the staffs of the two committees worked very closely together in developing the background data the Congress needed to consider the issues involved.

RITCHIE: Well, I have loads of other questions I'd like to ask, about the Korean war period, and the period when Alexander Wiley was chairman of the committee, but I think this might be a good breaking point for today.

WILCOX: All right.

End of Interview #2

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Francis O. Wilcox
Chief of Staff,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955

Interview #4:
Assistant Secretary of State
(Friday, April 13, 1984)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

RITCHIE: You said there was some material that you would like to add in from the last interview.

WILCOX: Yes, there were a couple of points, Don, that you raised that I wanted to amplify just a bit. You asked, for instance, about the relationship between Acheson and Vandenberg. I said that I thought the relationship was pretty good, generally speaking, although I think Acheson had some question about Vandenberg's vanity. But I noticed in my notes that he did write Vandenberg commenting on his "rare qualities of leadership in the legislative branch. These are not only your ability and amazing effectiveness on the floor, qualities which everyone recognizes," wrote Acheson, "but your outstanding fairness and your warm generosity in meeting someone who tries to take an objective view." This, I think, does at least show that on occasion--there are times when you can afford to flatter people, and if Vandenberg had done a good turn to Acheson, it may be that that was the result. But in any case I think Acheson did admire some of the qualities that Vandenberg exhibited.

You did ask also about the workload of the committee during the early days, and I just happened to come across a note that I had made

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about the activities of the 80th Congress, and the tremendous workload in foreign policy right after the war. This was one reason why it was important to have a bipartisan approach. Just to take a look at the more important items on the Foreign Relations Committee calendar during the 80th Congress: 1) aid to Greece and Turkey; 2) relief assistance to the war devastated countries; 3) the International Refugee Organization; 4) the trusteeship agreement for the Pacific territories; 5) the Rio treaty; 6) the Institute of InterAmerican Affairs; 7) treaties of peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary; 8) the St. Lawrence Seaway; 9) the World Health Organization; 10) the Foreign Aid Act of 1947, known as Interim Aid; 11) the Marshall Plan; 12) aid to China; 13) the Children's Fund; 14) the UN headquarters convention; 15) the revision of the UN participation act; 16) the so-called Vandenberg Resolution; 17) the \$65 million UN headquarters loan; 18) the wheat agreement; 19) the Smith-Mundt information and educational exchange act; 20) three double-tax conventions; and 21) treaties of commerce with Italy and China. Now, that does give you some indication of the tremendous scope of activity in that early postwar period. It

does indicate, I think, again the desirability of having something like a bipartisan approach to our foreign policy in that period.

Those were two points I wanted to add to my earlier comments about the work of the Foreign Relations Committee during the postwar era.

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RITCHIE: I'd also like to go back a little bit. In reading over the last transcript I realized there was one area that I wanted to ask you about, and that was triggered by your comment that when you were considering going to the State Department you also had an offer from Allen Dulles of two different positions in the Central Intelligence Agency. I wanted to ask you what the relationship between the Foreign Relations Committee and the CIA was in those early years, when you were on the committee staff. Was it a close relationship? Was it a distant relationship? How did the committee get along with this new intelligence operation?

WILCOX: Well, as you suggest, the National Security Act came along in 1947, and one of the problems that arose in the early history of the CIA was the question of congressional surveillance. It was understood, I think, on Capitol Hill, that the CIA had to do some of its work in secret, but that it did have to have some kind of surveillance from Capitol Hill. Otherwise the Executive Branch would be completely free to do whatever it wanted to in any part of the world, if it could get by with it. The question arose with Senator Vandenberg, who was then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as to what kind of machinery, what kind of organization would be suitable. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon had introduced a resolution providing for the creation of a surveillance committee on Capitol Hill. But the difficulty was that Senator Morse had a close relationship with Drew Pearson, and I think Senator Vandenberg, and the

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committee staff, felt that if Senator Morsels resolution was acted upon, according to the custom on Capitol Hill, he would be asked to serve as chairman. But this relationship with Drew Pearson and his column was such that it did not seem to be desirable to have him serve as chairman of the surveillance committee looking after CIA activities, when the tendency to leak to the press was rather apparent. So what we did was to shelve the surveillance problem for several years. That's the principal reason why at that time a satisfactory surveillance system was not set up. Now, this question came to the fore again, you remember, in the 1970s when the CIA got out of bounds and Congress became very indignant and provided that some eight committees and over a hundred and fifty members of Congress had to be notified about any covert act that was to be undertaken by the CIA. This was perfectly absurd, of course. How could any covert action be kept secret if it were known by 150 members of Congress? More recently the Congress has amended that to provide that only two committees now will be notified in connection with covert acts. But that's the beginning of the problem, and that's

the reason why, as I recall it, a subcommittee or a surveillance committee was not created in the early period.

RITCHIE: Were you able to get directors of the Central Intelligence Agency to testify before the committee in private sessions? Were they reluctant to come before the committee?

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WILCOX: There was some reluctance of course. As I recall there weren't many occasions when the head of the CIA was brought before the Foreign Relations Committee. The record will clear that up. There were some occasions, but it was not like the relationship between the Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of State, for example, where we had frequent consultations and frequent testimony. The CIA had a closer working relationship with the Armed Services committees.

RITCHIE: It seems that in that period the CIA was increasingly becoming an arm of American foreign policy. Looking back we understand its role in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. Did you have a sense that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were aware of the covert activities that were going on?

WILCOX: I think they were aware but they weren't fully briefed on those activities. Generally speaking, most members of the Congress felt they didn't want to know about some of these covert things. They felt that if they knew, the tendency might be to say something about them in public. They were really quite protective of the agency at that early date, to make sure that any covert activities were not leaked to the press. In this respect, I think in the early days the Members of Congress showed a greater degree of responsibility toward covert activities and the CIA than they do in this period, when some members seem to be quite willing to reveal what

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they know to the press. That, of course, means that when you have a covert act that becomes public knowledge, it obviously ceases to be a covert act. Look at the mining situation now in the waters around Nicaragua. As soon as it became known that the CIA was involved, and strong criticism began to arise on Capitol Hill, obviously the administration had no alternative but to discontinue the aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents who were mining the harbors there.

RITCHIE: It does create a gray area that must make it more difficult to evaluate what executive policy is if there are areas of executive policy that are not being presented to the Congress. At least at that period--now there's more oversight.

WILCOX: Yes, and I think it is important that some members of the Foreign Relations Committee have some knowledge of what is taking place. For a time, there were a few members of the Foreign Relations Committee who were to serve with some of the members of the Armed Services Committee, I've forgotten the exact proportion now, to keep in touch with the CIA and to monitor its activities. But there certainly must be some kind of relationship between Capitol Hill and

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the CIA, and between the CIA activities and our foreign policy. Obviously there is in the executive branch through the work of the NSC. If the State Department (and the ambassador) doesn't know what the CIA is doing in a particular country it can play havoc with our foreign policy. So there must be a proper relationship, both between

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the executive branch department's concerns with foreign policy, and the CIA and the Capitol Hill representatives on the other hand.

RITCHIE: You mentioned Senator Morsels resolution. Later on Senator Mike Mansfield and Senator Eugene McCarthy introduced similar resolutions. Were there other members of the Foreign Relations Committee before 1955 who expressed any kind of discomfort over not knowing what was going on? Or who expressed concern that they were not getting information from the CIA?

WILCOX: Yes, this happens of course from time to time. But it didn't happen then nearly so often as it has in the last eight or ten years. I think this is partly because of the persistent efforts of the press to reveal anything that has taken place and to investigate rumors and reports in a way perhaps that they didn't in the 1940s and '50s.

RITCHIE: The other thing I wanted to ask you was how it came that Allen Dulles offered you two positions. Had you had any dealings with Dulles that he had you in mind for these positions in the CIA?

WILCOX: Well, I don't know, Don. I did know Allen Dulles. He had been before the Foreign Relations Committee on various occasions, and I knew him as a friend. I guess in looking around for people for these two jobs he had my name on a list and he decided to offer them

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to me. I don't know why, unless he thought I was qualified to do the job. But in view of the fact that I preferred to be in the Department of State I did turn him down.

RITCHIE: I was just curious how your name came up on his list.

WILCOX: I wouldn't know. I have no idea.

RITCHIE: I'd like to ask you about the period you were Assistant Secretary of State, from 1955 to 1960. I'm curious as to how different the world looked from Foggy Bottom as opposed to Capitol Hill. Did you find yourself looking at issues in a different way after you shifted from the Congress to the Executive branch?

WILCOX: Yes, I think it's inevitable that one look at these problems in a somewhat different light. You become responsible for action in a way that you aren't on Capitol Hill. Of course the members of Congress are entitled to and responsible for monitoring the activities of the executive branch. They don't have any direct responsibilities for what takes place after the law is passed or after the treaty goes into effect, whereas when you are in the Department of State you have to follow up and take care of all the details that are involved in that action. For example, in connection with the Suez crisis and the Congo situation, we had to do

all the planning involved in taking the necessary action to provide sanctions in the Suez crisis, set up the forces that were to be used there, to

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work with the Department of Defense, to take care of the logistics, the way of getting troops and supplies and so on, into the areas, negotiating all these things with the different agencies and the countries that were involved. These are things, of course, that the Congress doesn't have any particular responsibility for. But this meant many, many days of hard, nitty-gritty work, laying the plans and doing the negotiating with all the countries that were involved, and of course working with the United Nations Secretariat. We had very close relations with them. And our relationships in the executive branch with the Department of Defense and the other departments that were concerned.

The task of getting the Marines into Lebanon, for example, in 1958, or the task of moving forces into the Congo in 1960, and of taking care of all negotiations that are involved with the different countries and the United Nations. This requires many, many days of work within the executive branch, and arriving at decisions as to how troops would be transported and how provisions would be supplied, and who would take care of the airlift, and all the other things that are involved in this sort of situation. No, there's a good deal of difference. On Capitol Hill you're dealing with the basic principles and you come to an agreement with respect to the general approach to a problem--that our policy shall be so and so--and then it's left to

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the executive branch to execute the policy agreed upon. So as between the formulation of policy and the conduct of policy, you have a very substantial difference.

The legislative branch is involved in most cases in the formulation of policy, but in the execution of policy it's the executive branch that has to carry the ball--with of course the legislative branch doing the necessary monitoring. They are entitled to keep in touch, and that's the reason consultations are important--even after the decision is made to do something--to keep Congress informed as to how things are proceeding, what the problems are, and all the rest. After all, Congress does not have the staff, the communication facilities, or the know how to execute, on a day to day basis, the policy decisions agreed upon.

RITCHIE: I know you came back to the committee on a number of occasions. I've seen your name in the executive session transcripts, especially around the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, and items like that. Because of your connections with the committee were you consulted on congressional relations within the State Department?

WILCOX: Well, yes. When we were considering problems in the Department of State, particularly if a crisis arises everybody is so concerned about meeting the crisis that they tend to forget sometimes that Congress should be alerted or

briefed or warned as to what is happening. Because of my experience on Capitol Hill I would often

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remind the officers in the State Department that they should be in touch with their subcommittees, or with the full committee, or the Secretary should go testify, or whatever. I think the custom now is getting to be more readily accepted in the State Department, but I suggested when I was in the Department that in connection with every action paper we put at the bottom: "Has Congress been properly advised and consulted?" So we would make sure not to forget the important role of Congress.

RITCHIE: Did you get the feeling that some State Department officials considered Congress basically a nuisance?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. It is true that some people in the Department do consider that Congress is a big nuisance. Take the present situation for example. Secretary George Shultz is very annoyed, obviously from his statements in the press. He's annoyed because he thinks that Congress is undermining our policy in Lebanon and in Central America. This creates in the Department, among those who are working on these problems, a real concern, a real feeling that maybe Congress is getting in the way. I think a lot of State Department people do have the feeling that members of Congress don't know very much about the problem, and they're after publicity, and they interfere sometimes in a way that is harmful to our policy. They take an incredible amount of time away from the executive branch, who have to go up frequently to the Hill to testify, or to brief members of

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Congress. There are some exasperating experiences, I must say, when you are in the executive branch, but you have to learn to live with these things because it takes two to tango, and you have to be able to convince Congress that what you're doing is right. This is, of course, the essence of the check-and-balance system of our government.

RITCHIE: Was there anyone in particular who exasperated you, when you were dealing with the committee after you left it?, Did you find any members more difficult to deal with than others?

WILCOX: Well, Don, I got along pretty well with Congress, because I was known on Capitol Hill. This is a great advantage. You will find that the members of the House and the Senate are rather considerate of their own products, and when someone who graduates from Capitol Hill comes back they're treated with I would say a greater degree of courtesy than other people might be treated. I had no particular problems with the Congress. I suppose the one situation that aggravated me as much as any was the John Rooney subcommittee--in the House--which took care of appropriations for State Department activities. It was my responsibility to get funds for the United Nations and for other activities within my bureau, and among other things I had to get support for

representation allowances. The Congress has been notoriously difficult with respect to what they call "whiskey money." They don't see the importance, at
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that time anyway--they do more now perhaps--but they weren't inclined to see the importance of the relationship between entertainment and foreign policy. If you go to an international conference there is a good deal of entertaining being done. You invite your colleagues from other countries to have a cocktail or to come to dinner or to lunch or whatever, and a good deal of work is done in that fashion. But some members of Congress were always reluctant to recognize the importance of this, I guess maybe because if word got back home that Congress was approving two million dollars for "whiskey money" there might be a hue and cry, particularly back in the Bible Belt where they might not approve of such things. But the fact is we would go to conferences and be very short of entertainment money.

I remember one international labor conference that I went to where the Chinese put on a very fancy party, much more elaborate than the United States could afford. It's a curious thing that the United States, as big and powerful as we are, can't afford to put on a party as nice as some very small country with very modest resources. So this was one place where I had to argue pretty hard. Now, John Rooney was always good to me, and I got along with him very well, but this was one area of concern that we had. But I must say that during my tenure in the State Department I never had any difficulty getting money for the United Nations, or any of the specialized agencies, or

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any of the conference activities that I was involved in. But with respect to this one area they were a little reluctant to give us what we thought we needed in order to do a good job.

RITCHIE: You mentioned Rooney. I was interested to know if you found there was any particular difference in dealing with the House Foreign Affairs Committee as opposed to dealing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from a State Department point of view?

WILCOX: I suppose that having graduated from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I found it fairly easy--I use that term cautiously--as least I can say I was well received by the Foreign Relations Committee. I knew all the members, and I could approach them individually as friends. That was very helpful to me. I knew also a good many members from the House committee, particularly the chairman and the ranking members, and I had no hesitations in approaching them about foreign policy problems.

I recall on one occasion, I think it was a United Nations development program that was up for a vote on Capitol Hill and the Appropriations Committee came up with a figure that was somewhat lower than we thought would be reasonable or fair. I conducted quite a campaign and got that vote changed on the floor of the Senate, which is a rather unusual sort of thing to do. But I wrote letters to a good

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many of my friends in the Senate, and talked to some on the telephone, and got them to reverse the vote, which I considered at

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that time a rather substantial victory, because the chances of getting something like that overturned on the floor of the Senate aren't very great, particularly when it comes from the Appropriations Committee, which was very strong at that time. But I don't recall any particular differences between the House and the Senate, except for the fact that you're dealing with a smaller number of people in the Senate, and the fact also that I knew them quite well and was able to get along with them reasonably well.

RITCHIE: Were House members, do you think, more sensitive to slights, in the sense that they are considered the "Lower House" and the Senate has had more of a leading role in foreign policy?

WILCOX: Yes, you find that. There is a certain amount of jealousy, and a certain amount of maybe just a bit of feeling of superiority on the part of some of the senators toward the House. You notice a substantial difference in conference work when representatives of the two bodies come together to hammer out some kind of a compromise on a bill or resolution. The members of the Senate are harder pressed in terms of time and workload. They aren't as inclined to devote as much time to talking about these things as much as the House members are. They want to get the job done and get back to their offices or to their constituencies. So they're inclined to give in a little more easily. The House members, I think, recognize this, and they are a little like the Russians: they are willing to

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negotiate over a relatively long period of time to achieve their objectives. The Senate members have to be a little careful or they will get the short end of the deal when it comes to conference work, because House members aren't quite as constrained with respect to time, and they are willing to stay longer to achieve their objectives. I did notice that in my experiences with conference activities.

RITCHIE: When I was looking over the period you were assistant secretary, it struck me that a person you must have been dealing with frequently was former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was the United Nations ambassador. I wondered what kind of a person Lodge was to work with. You had worked with him as a staff person when he was a member of the Senate, and now you were the assistant secretary and he was the United Nations ambassador. How did you find Lodge as a colleague?

WILCOX: When I took the job as assistant secretary, a number of people told me I was foolish because it would be difficult to get along with Cabot Lodge. I had always gotten along with him in the Senate, and I thought I could manage the situation in the Department of State. When he went to take over the United States Mission in New York, the then Assistant Secretary of State told Lodge that they

would be sending instructions from the State Department to the Mission in New York. Ambassador Lodge is reported to have replied

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rather indignantly, "Well after all, I'm a member of the cabinet. Who are you to send me instructions?" Or words to that effect. It soon developed that he began to realize that it was to his advantage to be under instructions from the State Department, because when you are negotiating something, if you have full powers to negotiate and the other side knows that you have full powers, you're at a serious disadvantage because they expect you to make decisions on the spot. But if you can say, "I'll have to consult with my government about that," then you're off the hook for the time being and you can wire back to Washington and get the necessary instructions. But Senator Lodge felt that since he had been instrumental in getting President Eisenhower into the White House, that he had an unusual relationship with the president--which indeed he did have--and that he shouldn't really expect to take instructions from an Assistant Secretary of State. Well, as time went on he realized that was not only a logical procedure but that it was to his advantage in conducting negotiations.

The Mission in New York, of course, can't have access to all the information that is available to the Department of State, because it's in the Department that they get word from all the missions in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and you have the necessary in-put from the Department of Defense, Agriculture, and Labor and the other interested departments. It's only there that you can see the total picture. The people in the Mission in New York have access to

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the ambassadors and the representatives of the different countries there, but this is not sufficient to determine what our foreign policy should be. So it's only natural that instructions have to be sent from the Department to the Mission in New York. I remember Cabot Lodge saying to me on one occasion, after I went to the Department, "I'm a good soldier. You just tell me what you want me to do, and I'll do it." So he had changed his attitude over time, as he began to appreciate the proper role of the State Department and the United States government in the formulations of policy. And of course, there is the congressional role that has to be considered. These are things that the Mission normally doesn't know about. So it is important that those relationships be kept in their proper place and various facts and opinions carefully weighed before a policy is finally agreed upon. Oh, but Lodge was all right. I got along with him fine. He did have access to the White House, of course, to the president, but that's understandable and it was helpful to have our United Nations programs supported at that level. But we exchanged views all the time, and I did not find him difficult to work with.

RITCHIE: He's sometimes described as a patrician type who could be a little imperious in his behavior.

WILCOX: Yes, I think that's probably true. After all, he had been a senator, and he did have this special relationship with the president. He came from New England--where patricians are born and

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brought up--and he might have been a bit imperious in some ways with his staff, but on the whole I found him a reasonable person and easy to get along with. If you had good arguments he was always willing to listen to them.

RITCHIE: I would think it would be difficult for a senator to make the move from the legislative to the executive branch. In the Senate they are wholly independent figures, it's not uncommon for a senator to buck his own party. But when you are in the executive branch you are expected to be a team player, and presidents are supposed to make the final decisions.

WILCOX: Yes, in the executive branch a certain amount of loyalty to the president is essential.

RITCHIE: Did you have the sense that some of the senators who made the transition to the cabinet found life less pleasant than they expected?

WILCOX: I think that's inevitable, Don. Members of the Senate who go on international missions or who serve on delegations to international conferences tend to reflect that attitude. They're free to speak their own mind on Capitol Hill and they do so. They aren't limited, but when they get in the executive branch they have to conform to the policies of the United States government. It's the president who makes those policies, or at least he's the one who

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stands responsible for them. When people get to New York, for instance, with the General Assembly of the United Nations they have to go along with the policy that has been determined.

I remember on one occasion--I can recall a number of occasions like this--but I remember on one occasion Senator Morse, as a delegate, was asked to vote on the approval of Portugal as a member of the Security Council. He became indignant because the Portugese had not given independence to their colonies Angola and Mozambique, and he felt that he would be misunderstood if he voted to support the election of Portugal to the Security Council. Well, the United States government had agreed that normally the states in the region from which a state came would determine who would be elected to represent that region, who their representative would be on the Security Council, and the Europeans had decided that it was Portugal's turn. Well, who were we to deny this decision of the European group? But when the time came to vote, Wayne Morse was the principal delegate sitting there. He said to me, "Well, I'm not going to vote for Portugal." I said, "Well, you just sit here and I'll go vote. I don't mind." But it showed that he had a mind of his own and he wasn't about to do something that would jeopardize his relations with his constituency, even though it meant in effect that he was denying our foreign policy.

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Instances like this do happen, where senators decide not to take a public position, or at least not to expose their differences with the State Department to the public view. But it is true that somebody like Ed Derwinsky in the State Department now (previously a member of Congress) obviously has to go along with the foreign policy of the United States, and that's just not true on Capitol Hill.

RITCHIE: The votes just this week on Nicaragua indicated that not even the members of the president's party will stand behind him on certain issues. You also worked with the senators and congressmen who went up to the United Nations--you mentioned Morse. Did you think that program continued to work well, having members as delegates?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. There's no question about it. When I was with the Foreign Relations Committee there were numerous examples where members of the Senate would say, "Well, I served on the delegation to the United Nations and I was there when this problem came up, and I can tell you just what happened." Maybe on the floor of the Senate or maybe in the Foreign Relations Committee, this sort of thing would happen very often. So this experience gave to the members who participated not only a better realization of the problems involved in negotiating with other countries, and the difficulties that our government encounters in formulating and executing policy, but it also gave them an understanding, a knowledge of the problems

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that came up, so they were better equipped to do their job on the floor of the Senate or in the committee itself. I think it exposed to a good over-all array of foreign policy problems. You know, on the agenda of the United Nations there are normally about a hundred and twenty-five topics, ranging from arms control to trusteeship problems to human rights to trade relations to legal problems and to different regional problem areas like the Middle East and South Africa. It gives members an exposure to a wide range of foreign policy problems that can be very helpful to them in their work in the Senate. That applies also to House members. I think it has been very helpful, not only to continuing support for the United Nations--which has fallen off recently, for obvious reasons--but also equipping the members better for their work in the House and the Senate. Now, more recently the United Nations has fallen on harder times--so far as we are concerned-- and our policies have been more difficult to defend in the General Assembly. We have been on the short end of a good many votes. So the situation is different from what it used to be, quite different.

RITCHIE: It was sort of a transitional period, when you were there. From 1955 to 1960 was a time when former colonies were becoming members of the United Nations, and the membership was expanding quite rapidly. Did that change your views, and were you satisfied with the response of the United Nations to the changes that were going on within the UN?

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WILCOX: Well, I wasn't satisfied because we were in a very difficult position. We were pushed hard by the colonial powers to support their position in the United Nations and not to encourage the independence of the developing areas too soon. And we were pushed hard by others who wanted independence for all of the colonies and the trust territories as rapidly as possible. The United States tried to be reasonable--to chart a middle course. We recognized that if the colonies got their independence too soon this would put them in a difficult position because they wouldn't be able to maintain their economies, they wouldn't have the experience and the education and training for their people to survive as new states, at least not to make the kind of progress that we had hoped. So we were in a difficult position. We were criticized by the French and the British and the Dutch and the Belgians for siding too much, in their judgment, with the colonies, and we were criticized by the colonies and the other countries that wanted speedy independence for not being more forthright in supporting their position. In other words, we were caught between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea.

We did our best to be reasonable. So I wasn't entirely satisfied with the way things developed, but the fact is that in 1960, as I recall, there were seventeen new countries admitted to the United Nations, and in that period between 1955 and 1963 or 1964 the United Nations grew tremendously. Our position began to change because as these new countries were admitted we lost the kind of control we had

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over the General Assembly, the kind of support we'd been able to muster through the years. The Latin countries had usually supported us; the NATO countries had supported us; and we could get a substantial vote for our position on almost any important issue. But as the membership increased by the time 1965-1970 rolled around we found ourselves more often on the short end of the vote.

RITCHIE: I understand that you were speaking at the United Nations when Nikita Khrushchev took off his shoe and pounded it on the table. I wonder if you could tell me a little about that and some of your reactions to what was going on?

WILCOX: That was a time when our relations with the U.S.S.R. were not too good. They were criticizing us severely for being colonial powers--that is, the British, the French, the Belgians and the Dutch--for being colonial powers. I was speaking for our United States delegation at that point and suggested that there were two kinds of colonialism in the world. One was the kind that the Russians were referring to, which was rapidly being liquidated because many colonies were getting their independence, and the other was the kind that the Soviet Union had imposed on the countries of Eastern Europe, where there was no liberty and no freedom and no prospects for gaining independence. I thought that people ought to take into account and evaluate these two kinds of colonialism.

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At that point, the Philippine delegate rose to speak on a point of order and asked for the podium. I was standing at the podium, and he made a point which was comparable to mine--highly critical of the Soviet Union brand of colonialism. At that point, I guess, Mr. Khrushchev felt that he had enough of this. The Philippine delegate had indicated that the kind of colonialism that Khrushchev was talking about, or that the Russians were talking about, certainly was not reflected in our relations with the Philippines, because we had been most generous in our treatment of the Philippines and had given them their independence at an early date, as everybody knew. I guess that the reference to the Soviet kind of colonialism did touch a raw nerve. Khrushchev began to pound on the table. It's said that this sort of thing is done a little more, perhaps, in the Soviet Union than in the United States.

But it was at that point that the chairman of the meeting, the ambassador from Ireland, Fred Bohlen began to pound his gavel for order, because when Khrushchev began to pound his shoe there was a lot of noise in the Assembly hall. The noise increased and he kept pounding, and pretty soon the gavel broke. All over the country this was shown on television so that after the elapse of a week or so Fred Bohlen began to receive gavels from all over the country. I think he must have received twenty-five or thirty gavels to replace the one that was broken. He kindly gave me one that was made out of a ten-pin by the Boys Club of Dayton, Ohio. I have it as one of my

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little mementoes of my experiences in the United Nations. I don't know what he did with all the other gavels that he was sent, but it was quite an event and it was portrayed at some length in the press at that time.

RITCHIE: I assume you were taken aback when you looked down and saw the Soviet Premier with his shoe in his hand.

WILCOX: Yes, I called the acting Secretary of State and reported the incident to him. It was Douglas Dillon who was acting Secretary at the time. He said, "Well, what are you going to run for now?" He thought maybe I ought to run for the Senate or something, having challenged the Soviet Union that way! But at the delegation meeting the next morning it was agreed that I should resume my talk and that the other members of the delegation would support what I had said in the Assembly so that it wouldn't appear that I was acting on my own behalf. Obviously, I was reflecting the point of view of the delegation in any case. But it was one of the first instances where we called a spade a spade and pointed out directly the evils of the Soviet brand of colonialism.

RITCHIE: It was probably the most dramatic moment, I guess, of your association with the UN.

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WILCOX: Well, it was one of the most dramatic, because Mr. Khrushchev was creating quite a sensation in the country at the time, when he was here along with some of the other heads of state. That was in 1960 and the United Nations was in

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a very prominent position at that time in the press because of the presence in this country of the leaders of India, Yugoslavia, and other "neutralist" countries.

RITCHIE: That was the same session that Castro attended.

WILCOX: Yes.

RITCHIE: Did you sense a tilting of the Third World nations--or a more favorable reaction on their part--towards Khrushchev and Castro?

WILCOX: Well, it was becoming apparent that with the admission of many new members to the UN the situation was going to change, because they were bound to have an influential voice in the activities of the General Assembly especially, where they were all represented. This didn't come to a head until somewhat later, because it was in 1960 that a good number--I think sixteen of the African and Asian countries were admitted to the United Nations in that year, and some came later, so that now instead of the fifty-one that the organization started with, I think the latest number is one hundred and fifty-eight or one hundred and fifty-nine members of the UN. Most of

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the additions came from Asia and Africa. And with the spread of "neutralism" in the world our role in the UN was bound to suffer.

RITCHIE: It was just shortly after that that you announced your retirement from the State Department. Why did you decide to leave the State Department in 1960?

WILCOX: Because Milton Eisenhower was a pretty convincing negotiator. I had not thought that I would be leaving the Department that soon, but Milton Eisenhower--then president of Johns Hopkins University--came to see me one day and said that they were searching for a new dean at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies here in Washington. He explained to me that they had approached several foundations for large grants to build a new building and to mount a program for the next ten years or so. He said that some of the foundations executives had indicated--and I think this was especially Dean Rusk who was then president of the Rockefeller Foundation--that if I would be willing to accept the job they would give the school sizable grants of four and a quarter million dollars. This would enable us to build a new building and to increase and enlarge the program for a period of ten years or so. I told him I had not planned to leave the Department, but he urged me to think about it, and I promised him that I would. Sometime later he called and invited me to come to Baltimore for the weekend, which I did. He's a very convincing man, and over the weekend he convinced me that

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I should accept the job as dean. I certainly didn't regret the decision after that, because it's a very prestigious organization and there was a good deal of interest and pleasure involved in planning a new building. We got a very nice piece of land from the District of Columbia at a very low price. We put up a new building,

we enlarged the faculty and we put on a more substantial program than we had been able to do before that.

RITCHIE: What sort of objectives did you set for yourself and for the school when you started out?

WILCOX: I wanted to make it the best institution of its kind in the world. With a new building and with its location here in Washington, in our nation's capital, where the State Department, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Congress, and the diplomatic missions are located, it seemed to me to be an ideal place for the training of young people in international relations. So I felt that we had an excellent opportunity to achieve that objective. And I believe that most people would agree that today the school is, if not the best, certainly one of the best two or three in the country and in the world. The idea of having students study international relations, where the important decisions are being made and where they would have access to people who are making them certainly was attractive to me. I think it has proved to be attractive to the students both from the United States and abroad. A number of

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the adjunct professors that we have at the school are in the business of making decisions. They can relate at first-hand what happens when a crisis arises and what kind of response comes from the executive branch and from the Congress. So in my book it is very advantageous to be studying world affairs here in Washington--which, after all, is a great laboratory.

RITCHIE: Did you find that you were able to integrate your congressional experiences into the school?

WILCOX: Oh, yes. We started a course on the Conduct of Foreign Policy and we encouraged the State Department to create a number of congressional fellowships, or interns, who would be assigned to Capitol Hill for jobs with members of the Congress, the Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, or leading members of the committees. Some 20 of these fellows would be working on Capitol Hill and at the same time would be taking a course on the conduct of foreign policy, with particular reference to the role of Congress. This was designed to enable more members of the executive branch to understand better the relations between Congress and the executive in the conduct of foreign policy. That course has now been going on for over fifteen years and as a result a good many members of the Foreign Service now understand better what the challenge is and what the tasks are in developing good working relations with Capitol Hill. And then, too, we encourage our students

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generally to visit Capitol Hill, to go to the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee and the other committees in the foreign policy field. It isn't the best thing in the world for students to go out and teach foreign policy if they haven't had an opportunity to see at first hand the Senate committees in action, or to visit

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the Department of State, or to have an opportunity to interview people at the World Bank, or to engage in some project that involves the very important laboratory facilities that exist here in Washington. At least it's helpful if they've had those first-hand experiences.

RITCHIE: We lost the last few minutes because the machine did not shut off when the tape ran out. I hate to ask you to repeat what you said.

WILCOX: I was just saying that one of the things the school has done to help develop a better understanding of Congress and its role in foreign policy, is to establish a program in conjunction with the executive branch and the Congress whereby some twenty or twenty-five younger people from the executive branch hold an internship position on Capitol Hill. During the year they are on Capitol Hill they come to the school for course work in foreign policy, particularly a course that is specially designed for them on the conduct of foreign policy with emphasis on the relationship between Congress and the State Department and the executive branch in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. With this year on Capitol Hill I think

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they have a much better understanding of the role of Congress and they go back to their executive branch work better equipped to deal with Congress. This has been going on for fifteen years, so that with twenty or twenty-five a year being trained in this process you can see that there is a substantial number of people in the executive branch who have a far better understanding of the role of Congress.

RITCHIE: Being here in Washington during this period you must also have been an observer of the Washington scene, and I wondered if you could comment on the changes that were going on in the relations between the executive and the legislative branches, during these years while you looking at it from an academic perspective? How the Foreign Relations Committee changed, for instance, and how its role changed.

WILCOX: Well, there's no question but what the role of the Foreign Relations Committee has changed. The Foreign Relations Committee used to be the focal point on Capitol Hill for the consideration of foreign policy problems. As the years have passed the defense aspect of foreign policy has become more and more important, so the Armed Services Committee has shared with the Foreign Relations Committee the spotlight in connection with foreign policy problems. And also, as more of our international problems have had domestic impact, or domestic connotations, the Committee on Agriculture, the Labor Committee, and other committees dealing with trade relations,

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immigration, health, communications and so on--these have all begun to share in the foreign policy process. I noticed that Senator Charles Percy wrote a piece not long ago in which he pointed out there were sixteen committees of the Senate interested in foreign policy problems. This has resulted in a considerable change in the role of the Foreign Relations Committee, with more and more committees

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sharing in the task. While the Foreign Relations Committee still remains the mother committee in its relationship with the State Department, the other committees have more and more to say about foreign policy, and this means that the inter-relationships up there on Capitol Hill need to be improved. It means that maybe there should be more joint hearings, more joint committee action. It means that the staffs ought to relate more closely than they do.

But to go back to look at the role of Congress as a whole, by the time the Vietnam war came along, you had a real collapse of the bipartisan approach. I think it's fair to say that the bipartisan approach to foreign policy ran through the late '50s, maybe, but it began to dissipate and by the time the Vietnam war came along it had collapsed. You had a very important role that the Foreign Relations Committee played at that time, because if it hadn't been for the persistent efforts of the committee I don't think the attitude of the public in this country would have been quite as much in opposition to the Vietnam war as it was. I think it was the efforts of the chairman, Senator Fulbright, and the members of the committee, that did

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much to help bring about the turn in public sentiment toward the Vietnam war. Rightly or wrongly, Dean Rusk thinks that if the Congress had not strongly opposed maybe we would have won the war. I don't know whether that is true or not, but I have a feeling we made a big mistake in getting into the war in the first place and it was to our credit to get out--even though we didn't win it--and it was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that really engineered this thing. As a result of that, the Congress has been much more assertive in recent years. There are two factors, I think, involved. One is a deep distrust of the executive branch brought about by misinformation during the Vietnam war and the Dominican crisis, which took place in '65. There was a good deal of misinformation about body counts and about other things that took place during the Vietnam war, and the Congress felt they were misled, so they developed a suspicion of the executive branch. The other factor was the determination of the Members to take a more assertive role in foreign policy and not to let something like Vietnam happen again; I think they felt that they had not carried out their proper role in foreign policy. They had allowed their war powers to lapse and hadn't exercised the proper functions that they should have exercised under the separation of powers principle. And they were determined not to let this happen again. So they have become much more assertive.

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This is due to not only Vietnam but to the fact that there has been a great influx of new members in recent years. In the early 1980s fifty-five members of the Senate were serving in their first term. Now this is something that is very unusual. In the House the turnover was equally great, where you had a lot of younger members, a lot of new members coming in, who were elected, many of them, on an anti-establishment platform. They have less respect for the establishment than the

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older members did. They have less loyalty to party discipline and to leaders in the House and Senate. They are still very much concerned about the Vietnam war and determined not to let this sort of thing happen again.

There were some structural changes too in the House and the Senate in the 1970s that made the legislative process more open in nature. The election of committee chairmen by secret ballot, for example, has taken away some of the old principle of seniority, or detracted from it. The provision for open hearings, the increase in number of subcommittees and the number of chairmen. What else? There were a number of things like the Freedom of Information Act. These things have in general, created a more open legislative process. You have much more action on the House and Senate floor now a days that used to take place in the committee. The number of amendments that are offered on the floor now, for example, and that are accepted by the House and Senate has greatly increased over previous years. This means that the committees are losing some of their

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authority and members are asserting their independence by taking their proposals directly to the floor of the House and Senate.

So you have a new kind of Congress. You have a younger Congress. You have a more assertive Congress. It's determined to play an important role in the field of foreign policy. This has developed to the point where in the 1970s the Congress enacted over a hundred and fifty prohibitions and restrictions on executive action. Take arms sales for example. The original provision was that any arms sales, seven million dollars and over, had to be notified to the House and the Senate. Now I think the number has been raised to \$25,000,000. You had--what are some of the other restrictions--well, I mentioned the one on intelligence where you had at least to notify a hundred and fifty members of the House and the Senate for covert action. There were others of that type that were introduced, providing for example that foreign aid would not be given to countries that didn't conform to certain standards with respect to human rights, and the House and Senate would determine. These restrictions did quite a lot to limit and hamper the execution of foreign policy, but they did demonstrate the determination of the Congress to take restrictive and limiting action that would give them a more important role in foreign policy. So we have a tremendous change in the last fifteen years both in the composition and the philosophy of Congress, and I think it's a change that is going to be permanent.

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RITCHIE: President Reagan just recently gave a speech in which he indicated he would like us to go back to perhaps the way things were before, the idea of Congress falling in line behind administration decisions once the decision had been made, and things like that. Do you think he's asking for a return to bipartisanship?

WILCOX: Well, he did.

RITCHIE: And was that the type of bipartisanship that existed in the 1940s and 1950s?

WILCOX: Of course, he did two things. He scolded roundly the Congress for undercutting his policies in Central America and in Lebanon, and then he asked for a return to the bipartisan approach in foreign policy. I think the principle is sound, but the timing was very bad. To associate it with his accusations about undercutting policy, it seemed to me to be unwise and perhaps unfair. It's all right to be critical of the Congress, but I'm not sure that I would have tied the request to return to a bipartisan approach to the scolding that he gave Congress. And of course the Democratic members came back and said the president is playing politics with foreign policy. It's an election year, they argued, and if he wanted a bipartisan foreign policy why didn't he start this sometime ago? But they all came through with support for a bipartisan foreign policy. I think it was Dante Fascell, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who said, "Well, it takes two to tango,

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Mr. President." Getting at the point that it wasn't sufficient for the members of the House and Senate to be willing unless the president--who has to take the lead in these things--would really give them the kind of lead that would make it possible for the Congress to participate in a good tango.

Speaking of bipartisanship I have here some notes that I made in the early days in which I set forth the ideal conditions for a bipartisan foreign policy. I jotted down four ideal conditions. First, when the White House and the administration are controlled by one party, and the Congress is controlled by the other party--as in the case of the 80th Congress--when cooperation becomes absolutely essential; the government can't function in that kind of situation unless you have a bipartisan approach. Secondly, when there is a fairly good consensus in the country about the basic principles or goals of our foreign policy and the way it should be conducted. Such a consensus existed in 1947. We have to agree that there isn't that consensus right now. There could be if the two branches would work together to develop it. Thirdly, the kind of leadership on Capitol Hill that can command the confidence of the Congress and the executive and be willing to de-emphasize politics while working for the national interest. And fourthly the kind of strong leadership in the White House that is willing to accord Congress its rightful place in the constitutional scheme of things and is willing to consult frequently with Congress on important foreign policy questions. Now, if

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you have these conditions--those would be the ideal conditions in my opinion--for the reestablishment of a bipartisan policy.

RITCHIE: Bipartisanship broke down in the mid-1960s, but you've indicated that you thought it was moving in that direction since the mid 1950s. Do you think this was a result of the way Lyndon Johnson was handling foreign policy, or

do you think there was something within the bipartisan philosophy that really couldn't sustain itself over a long period of time?

WILCOX: Well, the leadership changed, both in the White House and on Capitol Hill. Senator Vandenberg was criticized by some of the Republicans for practicing what they called a policy of "metooism," indicating that the legislative branch would just go along with more or less anything that the president wanted.

Vandenberg was very careful to avoid this sort of accusation by making certain that the Congress had a fairly important role to play in the evolution of policy, hopefully from the beginning. He pointed out that if the leaders of the Congress worked with the executive branch in evolving policy, and if the committee had a role to play at a proper stage in policy making, that discussions could take place there and any changes that the Republicans wanted to make could be made, and that this would accomplish the purpose. There was no me-tooism involved in that kind of procedure.

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It's hard to say just where and when the bipartisan approach broke down. It didn't ever apply to all things, all foreign policies, but I would guess that somewhere in the mid '50s it began to diminish in importance and by the time Vietnam came along of course it went out the window. Even there, of course, you had a breakdown within the parties, because there were a number of Republicans who supported the administration, and a number of Democrats who supported it and a number who opposed it. Indeed, I think it can be said that some of Lyndon Johnson's principal supporters were Republicans, and some of his principal opponents were Democrats. If you look at the Foreign Relations Committee with Senator Fulbright as the prime example, he lost the support of a good many Democrats, certainly in the Vietnam war. This has been true in a good many instances. I guess you'd have to say that the wingspread of the two parties is pretty substantial with the result that you find some of the Democrats just as conservative, or more conservative in foreign policy matters, than some of the Republicans, and vice versa. But I think that after the early post-war years when the basic pillars of our foreign policy were constructed, the consensus in the country began to change somewhat. This was reflected in the Congress and in the executive branch to a certain extent.

But some people have argued that bipartisanship is not realistic, it's not practical, and that differences are bound to exist. There are differences now, of course, certainly, of a substantial

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nature about nuclear weapons and about the use of the armed forces both between and within the two parties. It's pretty hard to nail down a bipartisan approach toward foreign policy unless real efforts are made at the beginning of a policy. I have contended that about the only way to do it effectively is to establish a continuing relationship between the two branches. In fact, the consultative process has not functioned very well. The subcommittees have not been as

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effective in developing the kind of consultation that we'd hoped. All the committees want the Secretary of State to come to testify. They don't want assistant secretaries or under secretaries, they want the Secretary. This hasn't worked as effectively as it might. What I would like to see is some kind of a continuing relationship, maybe along the lines of Clem Zablocki's suggestion that there be created a National Security Committee on Capitol Hill, made up of the leaders of the House and the Senate, from the four or five related committees such as Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations. These leaders would bring together the threads of foreign policy on Capitol Hill in a way that is comparable to the National Security Council in the executive branch. They could meet with the executive branch people on occasion.

But I think we need something really more than that, and I would like to see the president invite fifteen or twenty of the leaders of Congress to the White House at regular intervals, not just when crises arise, but every four or five or six weeks to have a real

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review of foreign policy problems and to look at those issues that are arising on the horizon so that the members of Congress are more aware of the problems we face in the world. In this way they can be kept abreast of emerging problems and what we intend to do about them. This could be done either by enlarging the National Security Council and having the members of Congress brought into the Council, or it could be done informally by the president. He could try it once or twice and see how it worked. If it didn't work very well he could refrain from inviting them again. But my feeling is that if a president is really serious about bipartisanship and about making this constitution work, he could make a real effort--and it's got to be done from the executive branch, the leadership in this has to be taken by the executive and not on Capitol Hill --- he would make a real effort to bring the members in, as I say either formally or informally at regular intervals. If he's afraid of the constitutional process and the possibility of violating our constitutional system of checks and balances, at least he could do it on an informal basis.

The way it's done now, as you know, is that the president normally waits for a crisis to arise. Then, by the time he calls the members in, they've had to do something about the crisis, and he tells them what they've done, or what they are about to do. And there isn't any opportunity to exchange views, or to make recommendations or suggestions on the part of the legislative branch. So I think the members always feel that it's rather frustrating, that they

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don't have any input, that they listen to what the president, and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and Defense have to say, and it's too late to change things. When the consultation takes place, the White House already has the press release fixed up. They issue that when the meeting is over, and that's it. I know that there are all kinds of reasons why this suggestion would not

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meet with favor on Capitol Hill or in the executive branch. Party politics remains one factor; jealousy between the executive and legislative branches is the other. Some members wouldn't want to get committed. They would be reluctant to go down to the White House at regular intervals, because then they would think they would be beholden to the president, and they don't want to do that. There are all kinds of reasons why this couldn't be done, but in my book something like this needs to be done, because the Constitution isn't working very well right now. There are too many crises coming up that are mishandled. We're misunderstood abroad. The troops in Lebanon, the troops in Central America, the mining of the Nicaraguan harbor incident, these are but three of the many instances where you have had serious misunderstandings between the president and the Congress.

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RITCHIE: A couple of times we've mentioned Senator Fulbright as a key player in the split between the administration and the Congress. I was wondering if you might evaluate Fulbright by comparison to the other chairmen that you worked with on the committee, what you thought of his performance as chairman?

WILCOX: Well, there's no question but that Senator Fulbright is a very intelligent person. He's had a remarkable role in foreign policy ever since--what, 1943?--when he introduced into the House the resolution calling for the creation of an international organization to keep the peace after World War II. Then he came over to the Senate and was made a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a very early stage. I think that his service on Capitol Hill ran through ten Secretaries of State. That meant that he had a pretty good exposure to foreign policy, and a pretty good institutional history at his command, in a way that Secretaries of State just didn't have. So there's no question but what he had the kind of background that he needed to be chairman of the committee. I was not with the committee when he served as chairman, so all I know is what I have heard and read. I did not see him perform his functions, except the few times that I testified before the committee, I did not see him perform his function as chairman. I admire his courage.

He took the lead in getting the approval of the Senate for the Tonkin Resolution in 1964, which gave to the president a kind of

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blank check to do what he needed to do to win the war in Vietnam. He has said since that time that this was the thing that he did in life that he was most regretful about, or words to that effect. This is the one decision he had made that he really wished he could make over again. But then he later began to oppose the administration in different ways, which eventually led to the resignation of the president and the decision to withdraw from Vietnam. I think this came about--and I have reviewed it briefly in the book I did on Congress and foreign policy [Congress, The Executive and Foreign Policy (New York, 1971)]--I think it came about partly because of misinformation on the Dominican crisis first, where the president made some outlandish statements about what had happened, and the

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committee later found out that this was not true. And it came about as a result of the diminished friendship between Lyndon Johnson and Bill Fulbright. They had been close friends, and their wives had been close friends. When Senator Fulbright started to make a speech on the Dominican crisis, he sent a copy to the president, and through some staff oversight or whatever, I don't know, the president didn't do anything about it, or say anything about it, and the relationship began to deteriorate. I think the president misunderstood Fulbright and Fulbright misunderstood the president.

When this sort of thing happens, when the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the president of the United States fall out, some serious consequences can occur. Now, at this point,

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Senator Fulbright's support for Lyndon Johnson began to diminish and as the misinformation came in from the Defense Department and the government, it increased Senator Fulbright's concern and distrust. This spread to the committee, and you know the results. I think it was the persistent concern and opposition of the Foreign Relations Committee that developed then that resulted in our decision to get out of Vietnam. But that's a long story that needs to be documented.

RITCHIE: The critical issue seems to be the distrust that the senators began to feel towards the information they were getting from the executive branch. It seems that bipartisanship had to be built on some level of trust.

WILCOX: Yes. Trust is an essential element in the development of good working relations.

RITCHIE: And even the relationship between the committee and the executive branch, and how many staff people the committee has, how the subcommittees are set up, and all the rest of it, has to assume that you are getting honest answers and the right information. But when that assumption can no longer be made it seems almost inevitable that the committee would begin to go a separate way, build a much larger staff, and try to develop its own sources of information.

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WILCOX: Yes, I think this is fundamental. If you don't have trust between the two branches, if members of Congress begin to feel suspicious about the kind of information they're getting, and they don't trust the executive branch, you're in for real trouble. I recall when Bill Rogers went before the Foreign Relations Committee just before the bombing in Cambodia. There were good reasons why the executive branch wanted to root out the forces in Cambodia that were making it difficult for our forces to operate. I've forgotten the exact detail, but the committee did raise questions about Cambodia and about its relationship to Vietnam, the crisis there. Secretary Rogers didn't tell the committee that they were ready to launch a bombing attack, but the next day, or the day after, the attack was launched and the members of the Congress who had had Secretary Rogers before them felt that he had neglected to tell them something important

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that they should have known. Either they hadn't asked him the right question, or he hadn't answered it in such a way as to let them know that there was to be an air attack. They felt that they had been let down. It may be that he felt it would be unwise to give out this information because if it leaked it could jeopardize the whole enterprise. But the fact is that they felt that he had in a way betrayed them, because he had not informed them. Whether they could say that he had misled them is another question. He didn't lie to them. Maybe they didn't pose the question directly enough. Or maybe

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he didn't know. I'm not sure what led to that, but it's the kind of incident that creates distrust between the two branches.

RITCHIE: Certainly Senator Goldwater's letter to William Casey that appeared in the Washington Post the other day had that same sense of anger and distress that information wasn't made available.

WILCOX: Well, there again, you see, is the problem of communication, because some staff people said that the committee was informed of the mining of the Nicaraguan harbor. The CIA apparently feel that they did inform the committee. Maybe Senator Goldwater didn't hear it, or maybe he didn't understand it, maybe it wasn't clear enough in Bill Casey's testimony, or whatever. It's hard enough to understand Bill Casey anyway. But there are some indications that the committee was notified--at least the staff was. Now, who's right, I don't know, but the kind of letter that Senator Goldwater wrote to Bill Casey does tend to raise doubts and suspicions about the role of Congress and the role of the CIA and the executive branch.

RITCHIE: There certainly seems to be a great human element in any equation of foreign policy: how well individuals like Johnson and Fulbright can work together; how much a senator like Barry Goldwater feels his prerogatives have been neglected. The human factor seems to be a major element.

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WILCOX: Personal pride and prejudices come into the picture, but if you find people like Arthur Vandenberg and Harry Truman or Bob Lovett or General Marshall, it's a good start towards putting together the kind of leadership on Capitol Hill and in the executive branch that you need. That's a good beginning but it isn't easy to find. People are funny.

RITCHIE: Well, we've covered a lot of ground in your long career with the Congress, the executive branch and American foreign policy. This has been a tremendously useful series of interviews.

WILCOX: Well, I don't know whether we got into the chairmanship of Senator Wiley or Senator George very much. But I think maybe the earlier period is probably more important for your purposes.

RITCHIE: Are there any areas that you would like to develop any further that we didn't cover?

WILCOX: It just occurred to me that there was one thing with respect to the staff and the tenure of Senator George. I don't know whether I mentioned this before or not, but it is, I think, illustrative of the kinds of things staff members can do if they have an opportunity--and opportunities do arise because of the pressure of duties that the senators have. I remember when we were discussing one day the Foreign Assistance bill, Senator George was concerned about his constituency in Georgia and about the possibility that he

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might run again. He felt that in view of the political situation there that it was important for him to sponsor a substantial cut in the foreign aid program. We were holding hearings that day in the Foreign Relations Committee and after the morning session was over, he said to me, "You know, I have to cut this foreign aid program a substantial amount. I wish you would go through it and see where you can find a billion dollars or so to cut out of it. Then we'll convene after lunch, and I will make a formal proposal."

Well, I went through the foreign aid bill, different aspects of it, including technical assistance and aid to the developing countries, and military assistance, which was fairly important, and I found it difficult to locate very much in the way of weak places in the bill. So after the lunch period was over, I went to see Senator George. He said, "Well, what do you suggest?" I replied, "Well, senator, I have gone over the bill carefully and I think that all of the places where you might cut have to do either with activities and functions that you consider in the national interest and have proposed or urged before the committee." I said, "There are only one or two places that seem to me to be appropriate for you to recommend cuts." We discussed it awhile and he finally decided to recommend a two hundred million dollar reduction in the bill.

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When he was confronted, you see, with the facts in a reasonable way and was encouraged to think about the impact of his action upon the foreign aid bill, he decided that it was not in the national interest to do that. This is where his patriotism and reason took over from the political considerations that had motivated him earlier. But it's just one sample of the kind of thing that a reasonable staff person can do on occasion. Now, this sort of thing doesn't happen every day, but this is one of the things that sticks in my memory: the thought that he, the leader, was going to recommend very heavy cuts in the foreign aid program, but when he was encouraged to stop and think about the effect of those cuts, he readily changed his mind.

There was another matter that occurred to me that would be of some interest and that has to do with the action of the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty. Dean Acheson came before the committee on a couple of occasions and went through the text of the treaty in a way that I thought was very helpful. In doing that, he raised certain questions in the minds of senators about improvements in the treaty. One of those changes had to do with

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the use of armed forces in order to restore stability in the north Atlantic area in the event an attack should take place. Senators George and Connally and Vandenberg, as I recall, were the three who were involved mainly in these recommendations. The text of Article 5, 1 don't have it with me, provides that in the event an

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armed attack should take place, the other countries would come to the aid of the attacked country, in whatever manner they felt would be helpful, including the use of armed force. That wording was put in deliberately so that it would not be compulsory to use armed force, but it would be possible to use armed force, and that armed force would be contemplated. Related to it was the phrase that occurred, I think, in Article 11 of the treaty, which Senator George advocated, that whatever action is taken under the treaty would be taken in accordance of the constitutional processes of the countries involved. He asked that this be put in Article 11 so that the constitutional process would cover every aspect of the treaty, not just Article 5, but Article 4 and Article 6, and the other articles as well. When the changes were made, there was some criticism that the senators had gone too far in depriving the executive branch of the authority they might need to come to the aid of an attacked country. In other words some people felt that the senators had weakened the treaty and that our lack of resolve would be noticed by the other signatories. But the years have passed. In fact the changes made have not resulted in any weakening of the Western Alliance or the NATO treaty or our resolve to come to the aid of an attacked state. We've gone ahead and we've helped with the other countries to develop the infrastructure, the command structure, the communications systems, and the plans to defend Europe. These things have all developed, you see, and I don't think in retrospect what the Senate did

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was detrimental to the treaty at all. It made it possible for the Senate to approve the treaty by a substantial vote. I think there were only twelve votes against it, as I recall. But it was these changes that made it possible for the Senate to give an overwhelming vote to the treaty. Now, that is one sample of the kinds of things that the Foreign Relations Committee can do that can be helpful to our foreign policy and to the executive branch in getting an important policy established.

RITCHIE: Oh, yes. I was wondering, if you were in the position now of advising someone who was about to become the chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, from your experiences with the committee and the executive branch, what kind of advice would you give?

WILCOX: Oh, things have changed, so you've got a bigger job up there than I had in terms of personnel to manage. I had a very small staff. Now there are sixty members of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. I would say, however, that it's important for staff members to be in a position to service both sides of the aisle in a nonpartisan way and to avoid getting heavily involved in political

considerations. Now, I realize that is advice that cannot be accepted by staff members who are attached to minority members, because they are bound to carry out the wishes of their superiors. I would say that the most important thing is to remember that staff members have not been elected by the people of the United States.

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They are not policy makers. They are advisers, and consultants, and helpers, and assistants. If they themselves misrepresent their senators or attempt to make foreign policy on their own, they can easily go too far and destroy their usefulness.

I remember one member of the House committee in the early days who was a very capable person--and a good friend of mine--Bill Elliott from Harvard, who got into trouble because he attempted to lecture to the Foreign Affairs Committee and tell them what to do, and they didn't like it. I think the staff members have to remember that it's the senator and the congressman who are the representatives of the people and who are the ones to take the lead in the formulation of policy. What the staff members can do is to be helpful to them and not attempt to take over their role. I think they ought to also refrain from exercising their authority in an unwise way by leaving the impression in the executive branch that they're speaking for their senator or the congressman when in fact they may not be. They may not tell the executive branch that senator so-and-so wants this, but the implication of their remarks might lead the executive branch people to feel that they are speaking for their senator, when in fact they aren't. This creates a lot of confusion downtown--and a good deal of doubt and mistrust. Staff members ought not to throw their weight around too much either. They ought to be careful in their trips abroad not to embarrass the United States or to use unfairly the authority that is involved in their position. They have

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a responsible role to play and they ought to play it with caution and restraint. Well, who am I to lecture to the staff members who are now there in a much different position than I was in?

RITCHIE: Well, like Dean Acheson you were "Present at the Creation." I thank you very much for your insights and your observations.

[End of Interview #4]

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Francis O. Wilcox

Chief of Staff

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955

**Interview #5:
Breakdown of Bipartisanship**
(Wednesday, June 13, 1984)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

WILCOX: Don, it occurred to me that there were several things that I might have commented on in the course of our discussions, but then again I may have overlooked them. One of them had to do with the problem of bipartisanship. As you know, there is very little of real substance or real importance that gets through the House and Senate without support from both political parties. So that in effect we do have a great deal of bipartisan cooperation as things stand, because the wingspread of the two parties is so great and there's so much overlapping that the president can't ever get anything of importance through unless he gets some conservative support from the Republicans, or some moderate--or conservative--support from the Democrats, or vice versa depending on who is in the White House. Some of President Johnson's strongest opponents were Democrats, and some of President Nixon's toughest critics were Republicans. So there is, and I think the last two administrations have shown this quite clearly, a need on Capitol Hill for greater party unity and greater party discipline. The president ought to be able to count upon his party supporters in the Senate to help him with his program. I also wanted to say something about the transition period, because it seems to me that the presidents that come and go tend to

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make the same mistakes. If you look at President Carter's tenure, his tour of duty here in Washington, he brought in some nine Georgia supporters who were with him in the White House and they made a good many mistakes because they didn't know very much about Washington, they didn't know very much about the White House or the Congress, and how the Executive Branch functioned. During the campaign the Carter forces boasted of the fact that they were from outside of Washington, as though that were a great asset. It might have been in the course of the election--it had some appeal in the country--but it certainly wasn't after they got here in Washington to begin their job in the White House. President Reagan made the same mistake when he brought in a number of people who had no experience really in government, or at least in the Federal government. They didn't know the Washington bureaucracy, they didn't know very much about Congress or how the government machinery operates, and furthermore they didn't know very much about foreign policy. So you have the two presidents coming into office making almost the same kind of mistake, as though one

wouldn't learn from the other. It takes far too long for an administration to get underway, before the appointments can be completed, before plans can be laid, a year is lost before any real progress can be made on the substance of foreign policy. That applies to domestic policy too, to a certain extent.

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To go back, for a moment, to the question of bipartisanship. There were, I think, probably three major foreign policy victories for President Carter: the Panama Canal treaties, the sale of jet planes to Arab countries, and the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo. These were three of the most important victories that he achieved during his tenure in the White House, and these were all made possible by Republican votes. Without fairly strong Republican support they would have been defeated, there's not question about it. So, as we emphasize the importance of getting support from the other side of the aisle in the House and Senate, it's apparent that that is done all the time.

Now, when you look at the role of Congress in foreign policy and you look at the instances where Congress has had a very substantial influence, you have to ask the question: who is right and who is wrong? In the case of Angola, Congress made clear that we should not be involved in Angola, and this gave to the Soviet Union a green light to proceed to do anything they wanted to do there, with the realization that the United States would not intervene. The same is true of Senator Henry Jackson's amendment on trade relations with the Soviet Union, when he specified--the amendment that he sponsored specified--that we should not take certain steps to improve trade relations unless the Soviet Union would agree to permit a certain number of Jewish emigrants to come to the United States or to Israel, or at least to leave the Soviet Union. Now, he argued that this was

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an important aspect of our negotiations with the Soviet Union in that it put pressure on the U.S.S.R. to move in the right direction. The administration argued that it prevented any reasonable negotiations with the Soviet Union. Who was right and who was wrong? Clearly in these cases, and in other similar cases, Congress was not doing anything illegal. They thought they were doing something that would help our foreign policy. That was their best judgment. But the administration, I think, felt that they were meddling needlessly in our foreign policy. This question of whether Congress is meddling or whether it isn't meddling will be discussed, I'm sure, for many years to come.

RITCHIE: Do you think the Congress should take an independent role on an issue where they differ strongly from an administration, or should they allow an administration to design foreign policy and try to check what they disagree with?

WILCOX: Well, clearly they have a constitutional right to express their opinion and to do what they think is in the interest of the Republic. I think in the case of Angola, it was wrong to signal to the world that the United States would not interfere, or not play any role in Angola, because you really need to keep your

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enemy guessing a little more than that. It gave the Soviets in effect, a green light to go ahead and do what they wanted to do.

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RITCHIE: Is that one of the real drawbacks of the Congress' role in foreign policy, that it's hard for the Congress to do anything covertly, that everything the Congress does is overt?

WILCOX: It has to be, and of course the changes that have taken place in the 1970s have provided for a more open Congress and a more open foreign policy. Whether you like it or not, this is what's going to happen. I've been interested though, to see--I've been reading some material about the parliamentary democracies in Western Europe. In every case, I think, including the United Kingdom, France, Western Germany, Italy, the foreign affairs committees don't have the same stature, the same power and authority that our congressional committees have. It's the executive that conducts foreign policy, traditionally, without very much interference from the legislative branch. Of course, there they don't have the separation of powers principle. They have a parliamentary system and the executive leaders are members of the parliamentary body, so the situation is quite different.

But the problem of the Turkish embargo is another case in point, where Congress specified that we couldn't sell arms to Turkey that we had promised her unless real progress was made on the Cyprus question. Well, who is best equipped to determine this problem? The administration felt that Turkey was terribly important to the southern flank of NATO, and that the Turks had made clear that they were

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not going to do anything about Cyprus until the arms embargo was repealed. Whether Congress is in a better position to judge that question is certainly open to consideration. I think what we need to do in cases like that is of course to try and reconcile the differences between the executive and legislative branches, and not let these differences impede the conduct of foreign policy. Congress ought not to obstruct any more than is absolutely essential. You don't want to destroy the efficiency of the executive branch, but on the other hand Congress has a proper role to play. The problem is how to bring these two things together.

I might have said something, too, about the importance of Congress as an educator. Senator Fulbright had an article recently in *Foreign Affairs* in which he emphasizes this point. Josh Billings once said that "it ain't ignorance that causes all the trouble, it's the fact that people know so much that just ain't so!" One of the roles of Congress in looking at our foreign policy problems is to do its share in informing the people of the country about recent developments, about problems that exist, and about options that are available because we clearly need an informed electorate. We clearly need an informed public if we're going to have a foreign policy that's worth a hoot. The task of making the people more aware of foreign policy problems, I think, falls to the Congress, maybe in two ways:

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through hearings conducted by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and they can do this in a very effective way as

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they did some years ago in connection with our policy towards China. I think they helped open up new avenues of thought with respect to that problem. Then the trips back home that the members of Congress make, and the meetings they have with their constituents are important. They can do a great deal to help keep the people back home informed of our foreign policy problems.

RITCHIE: Part of getting publicity requires the cooperation of the press. Did you feel when you worked for the Foreign Relations Committee that the press accurately reflected and reported what was going on? Were they giving enough attention to what the committee was doing, or were they focusing their attention on the president and the State Department?

WILCOX: Well, on the whole, I think the press does a very good job. Certainly the Washington press corps is made up of some of the best informed people in the country. It's a remarkably sharp, intelligent group of people. They do tend to emphasize conflict. They do tend to emphasize differences between the executive and legislative branches, differences of opinion and that sort of thing, rather than emphasizing the positive. But I think in general they do a very good job. They make some mistakes, of course, but on the whole I think they are pretty accurate.

RITCHIE: Did you have to deal with the press much when you were chief of staff?

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WILCOX: Oh, yes. The press would come to see me and other members of the staff for background information and for any thoughts that we had about important developments that might have taken place in the committee. They, as you know, go around and pick up pieces of information here and there and the first thing you know they put together a logical, reasonable story. They do turn to the staff quite a bit for information.

With respect to this problem of public opinion, I remember the response of the public to the announcement about the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican, when Mark Clark's name was put forth early after the war as a possible ambassador to the Vatican. I never saw such a stream of mail that came into Capitol Hill, protests from the Protestant denomination churches and other opponents to the appointment. This led me to feel strongly that the people of the country hadn't really been at all informed about the importance of having a representative at the Vatican at this high level. The Vatican has a great deal of influence in the world. The question isn't whether we approve of Catholicism or whether we are supporting the Pope, the question is whether we have a representative at the Vatican and at other important centers who can be helpful to our foreign policy and who can report back to Washington developments that occur in connection with their particular missions. In this case, the separation of

church and state concept was so strongly supported by the Protestant groups that the president simply had to

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withdraw the nomination of Mark Clark. I'm glad to see that the nomination was recently approved and we do have an ambassador now, because it's a very useful thing to do.

Another case in point, of course, was SALT II. It got all tied up in politics and was never brought to a vote in the Senate. But there was a great emotional content in the arguments against the Soviet Union. It illustrated once again how important public opinion can be in the evolution of our foreign policy. The mail was very heavy on that point. I think that SALT II could have served as a useful stepping stone to continued negotiations with the Soviet Union in the arms control field. It should have been approved.

Then one other point related to that, Don, and I'm through, has to do with what I call open diplomacy. With foreign leaders beating a path to Capitol Hill in order to be where the action is. With the Congress assuming a more and more important role, diplomats and leaders from other countries realize this and come to Capitol Hill to talk to legislative leaders and to the Foreign Relations and other committees. I was in a meeting in Toronto not long ago, where a professor announced that Canada henceforth was going to bypass the State Department in order to take many of its problems directly to Capitol Hill. They have been unhappy because we haven't done very much about acid rain, and we haven't done very much about the fisheries treaty, and whether they can get sufficient action through the executive

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branch has I think been a question in Canadian minds. They apparently have decided to bypass the State Department on several issues and see if they can't get some satisfactory action from Capitol Hill. Now, if this is done by a good many other countries it can revolutionize the conduct of our foreign policy, because if Congress gets involved in these negotiations and discussions more and more, what's going to happen to the State Department and executive branch?

RITCHIE: That could be the reason why the Canadians are going to build their Chancellory at the base of Capitol Hill.

WILCOX: Yes. Well, they'll be closely situated there next to the center of power.

RITCHIE: Well, how would you think Congress would respond to individual countries bringing their cases to them?

WILCOX: For quite some time members of Congress have invited visiting dignitaries, prime ministers and so on who come to Washington. It's appropriate to have them on Capitol Hill for a luncheon or to have them visit the Foreign Relations Committee. The Chancellor of Germany came after the war on a number of occasions as did a number of other top people. But it's a little different now. I recall when, I think it was the foreign minister of Israel came and gathered together on Capitol Hill, without any intervention from the

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executive branch, fifty or sixty senators to talk with him about Israel and our relations with Israel. This is the sort of thing that can really complicate the conduct of foreign policy and make the executive branch's job much more difficult. I think though, given the increasingly important role of Congress, it's almost inevitable that we will have more and more people going to Capitol Hill seeking out members to help them with particular foreign policy questions. Of course, they've always had members of the Senate and House to embassies for dinner and things of that sort, hoping to influence them one way or another. But this move, if it's continued and developed, could revolutionize the whole problem of the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy in the modern world. If they deliberately bypass the executive branch to get to Congress, it has some objectionable features certainly.

RITCHIE: There has also been some criticism recently of ten House members who signed a letter to the Nicaraguan government, trying to make suggestions as to how to better relations between Nicaragua and the United States. Jim Wright, the Democratic leader in the House, was one of the signers, and the Republicans in the House have been criticizing that as a violation of the Logan Act, arguing that members of the House have no right to interject themselves into American relations with another nation. But you are indicating that this goes on all the time and may increase.

WILCOX: Well, it's easy enough to violate the Logan Act, but when a number of members of the House or the Senate are involved it's difficult for the administration to say very much or to do very much. When it's just one congressman or one senator that's a little different, but when a group is involved that's a horse of a different color. You remember the group, I think it was some seven congressmen who went to Grenada after the Grenada incident took place. They came back and supported the position of President Reagan and the Congress dropped the whole matter of opposing our action in Grenada. In some cases these trips can be helpful to the administration as they were in the case of the Panama Canal. So the executive branch has to be very careful in its dealing with Congress as to whether they smile upon that kind of intervention or whether they frown upon it.

RITCHIE: I suppose the most notable example when you were with the committee was when Joe McCarthy tried to negotiate a treaty with the Greek shipping lines to get them to stop transporting goods to Communist nations, around 1953.

WILCOX: Well, you've jarred my memory a bit there, Don. I don't recall that particular incident. But the point is you simply can't have five hundred and thirty-five Secretaries of State. You can't have foreign policy by committee. One of the things that is quite clear in the business world is that you can't do business through a committee. I think the same thing is true to a certain

extent in the government. You need to have somebody in charge, and there isn't anybody in charge on Capitol Hill. When you have five hundred and thirty-five people looking at a problem from differing points of view it's very hard to get a consensus on some of these matters. So while the Congress has a great deal to offer, and there are many advantages in having Congress involved in foreign policy, nevertheless it has to recognize that the principal responsibility lies with the executive branch and with the President of the United States.

But the main thing is to make sure that the two branches work together. Otherwise we can't expect the Constitution to function effectively. The question is not whether the president is more important than the Congress or vice versa. The real question remains--how can we develop the kind of teamwork and cooperation between the two branches that is essential in our check and balance system of government.

End of Interview #4

Francis O. Wilcox
Chief of Staff
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955

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